

Michigan Court Security Manual



**Michigan Supreme Court
State Court Administrative Office
P.O. Box 30048
Lansing, MI 48909**

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SECTION ONE - GENERAL EMERGENCY PLANNING

- I. **Purpose.** This emergency manual sets forth the model procedures and responsibilities for responding to certain emergencies. While not every conceivable emergency can be planned for, it is feasible to identify major possibilities and to consider the best general approach to dealing with them.
- II. **Scope.** This plan concerns itself with this courthouse and its occupants. This plan necessarily draws on various external emergency response agencies not under court control. These agencies should be provided with this plan and invited to participate in its training and evaluation. The court should take a proactive posture to be involved in all local emergency planning with the county emergency coordinator and/or the Michigan State Police Emergency Coordinator. The court should also involve Public Health officials and consult with the local FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator.
- III. **Concept of Operations.** The concept of this plan is to provide an outline for dealing with specific emergencies. Further, each plan should provide progressively broader and more intensive responses as the magnitude of the specific emergency increases. Additionally, plans should provide for command and control passing to a non-court agency, when need be, with return of control to the chief judge and/or court administrator as soon as possible. An integral part of all emergency plans is the identification of alternative court locations in the event the court building is unusable.
- IV. **Definitions**
 - A. **Emergency.** An unforeseen, sudden event that calls for immediate, extraordinary action to protect human safety, protect the court and/or public property. Examples are:

Fire, Bomb Threat, Hostage Situation, Flood, Civil Riot/Disturbance, Shooting/Sniper Situation, Tornado, Chemical/Biological Radiological Incident, Armed Robbery, Medical Emergency, Courtroom/Building Seizure, etc.
 - B. **Emergency Response Team.** Team of staff that includes decision makers, and staff from each floor, area, and/or division who assist in an emergency. Their main functions include establishing and maintaining communications with the command center, and assisting in building evacuation.
 - C. **Command Center.** A place designated to be staffed in an emergency or evacuation. Should have adequate means of primary and secondary communication methods to communicate with responding emergency agencies, emergency response team members, and other staff.

V. Command, Control, and Communications

- A. **For all emergencies** the court's emergency response team will have on-scene command until the arrival the Incident Commander from an emergency response agency. At that time, the emergency response team's leader will report to the on-scene Incident Commander at the designated Emergency Command Post and brief him/her on the situation. The court emergency command leader will then coordinate a secure location for the court's emergency control center as close as possible to the Emergency Command Post, and convene the court's command and control team in that location. If the courthouse is not available, the emergency response team will set up another pre-determined. One member of the emergency response team will be left to work with the Incident Commander and report regularly to the command and control center.
- B. On-scene command by professionals begins with their arrival and ends when the Incident Commander states that the situation is stabilized. declares the area safe, and returns control to the chief judge or the court administrator.

VI. A. Plan Exercise

- B. **Desk Exercises.** A desk exercise will be conducted at the discretion of the chief judge or court administrator and will consist of the assembly of key court personnel and a walk-through of this plan, simulating some emergency chosen at random. The personal copies of emergency plans will be reviewed to insure they are all current.

VII. Training. All court staff training required or implied by this plan is the responsibility of the court and will be detailed in the court's training plan. The leader of the court's emergency response team shall determine team member's current knowledge and applicable certifications, conduct team meetings and refresher sessions, and coordinate formal training.

VIII. Emergency Response Team Member I.D. Conspicuous badges will worn by all emergency response team members during emergencies and exercises.

IX. Evacuation. When any emergency evacuation is needed, the same evacuation plan should be utilized. All evacuation plans should include:

- Notification and alternate notification process,
- Emergency response team coordination of evacuation,
- Planned search areas to verify complete evacuation,
- A designated meeting area for each division and verification by division heads or supervisors that all staff members are accounted for.

- X. **Accommodation of Physically Disabled.** When an emergency evacuation is necessary, disabled individuals may need special assistance. Above all else, involve the individual. They are the experts on their own disabilities and how best to move them out of a building in an emergency. Make sure he/she understands what is happening and what procedure must be followed. Many disabled people are vulnerable to respiratory complications – remove them from smoke or fumes immediately.
- A. **Mobility Impairments:** Persons having mobility impairments may or may not use wheelchairs. On floors above or below ground level, escort the person with a mobility impairment to a **predetermined “area of refuge”** in a smoke proof stairwell since elevators become inoperative when the fire alarm sounds. Immediately notify emergency personnel about the location and condition of the person with the mobility impairment so that emergency personnel can safely transport the individual to ground level.
- B. **Visual Impairments:** Although most blind or visually impaired persons will be familiar with their immediate work area, it is necessary to:
- Explain the nature of the emergency.
 - Offer to guide her/him. As you walk, explain your destination, where you are, any obstacles, which way you are going to turn, the number of steps, etc.
 - Upon reaching safety, orient the individual to her/his surroundings. Ask if further assistance is needed. Stay with her/him.
- C. **Hearing/Speech Impairments:** Communication varies with persons who are deaf, hard of hearing, or speech impaired. They may not hear audible alarms. It is important that everyone understand what is happening, how and where to proceed. To gain attention, turn light switches on and off, tap her/his shoulder, wave your hands, etc. Indicate through gestures, or in writing (short, concise words), what is happening and what to do.
Example: FIRE – out rear door to the right and down. Leave NOW!
- XI. All courts should have arrangements for counseling services pre-established for situations where there is serious injury or death.

ABOVE ALL, REMEMBER THAT PEOPLE WITH SIMILAR DISABILITIES ARE STILL UNIQUE. THROUGH BRIEF COMMUNICATION AND ASKING QUESTIONS, EVACUATION CAN BE QUICK AND SAFE.

SECTION TWO – SPECIFIC PROCEDURES**EMERGENCY EVACUATION****PURPOSE:**

To establish a systematic method of safe and orderly evacuation of the entire building and its occupants in an emergency.

APPLICABILITY:

ALL fire alarms, orders for evacuation, and drills require complete evacuation of the building.

PROCESS:

All staff is to exit from their designated or alternate emergency exit door and proceed to their predetermined assembly area. Predetermined assembly areas are to be at least 1,500 feet from the building. In the assembly area, roll call will be taken. DO NOT leave this area until instructed to do so.

NOTE: If readily available take your purse and/or keys with you before leaving the building, as you may not be allowed to re-enter the building for an extended period of time. DO NOT GO TO FIND YOUR BELONGINGS!

EMERGENCY EVACUATION AND CLOSURE PROCEDURES

This procedure applies to all evacuations, and emergency closures of the courthouse.

RESPONSIBILITIES of all staff:

- A. Alert all visitors and staff** in your area there has been an emergency and they are to evacuate via the nearest exit immediately
- B. Secure your area** (if time permits)
 - 1. Turn off all equipment.
 - 2. Secure all cash drawers, files, checks, funds, jail records, etc.
 - 3. Close all windows and doors (do not lock).
- C. Leave the building** via the nearest safe exit. Leave in an orderly manner- **do not run.**
- D. Use stairs only. DO NOT USE ELEVATORS.** Use preplanned evacuation routes.

- E. **Assist the disabled** in exiting or to an Area of Refuge. The area of refuge will typically be a smoke-proof stairwell or other pre-designated area.
- F. **Proceed to** your designated **assembly area**.
- G. **Report to your manager** for a roll call, and wait in the designated area for further instructions.
- H. **Do not** attempt to **re-enter the building** unless instructed by a manager to do so.

RESPONSIBILITIES of the Emergency Response Team:

- A. Put on identification tags and marked and/or colored ERT vests or helmets.
- B. Implement the evacuation plan, and have staff assemble in their designated areas.
 - 1. Ensure the evacuation of your entire area. **Mark offices and floors as evacuated with “Evacuated” tags.**
 - 2. Report progress to the command center.
- C. Proceed to pre-assigned assembly areas.
- D. Assist the command center.
- E. Maintain liaison with the Incident Commander and report developments to the Court’s Command and Control Team.
- F. Verify evacuation of the holding cell.

RESPONSIBILITIES of Chief Judge or Court Administrator

- A. Report to command center. Make necessary decisions regarding the emergency. Assist responding agencies.
- B. Call (911), if needed.
- C. Notify, **after evacuating**, by remote telephone, police agencies to cancel prisoner appearances. Telephone number(s): _____
- D. Notify, **after evacuating**, by remote telephone, the prosecutor. Telephone number: _____
- E. Notify, **after evacuating**, by remote telephone, armored car service to cancel pick-up. Telephone number: _____
- F. Place public notice signs on the inside of glass doors advising public of what to do. The _____ will keep signs.

- G. Secure cash, checks, and money orders in safe. If no time, lock cash drawers and take keys. Close all file cabinets. (False fire alarms may be a diversion for a robbery.)
- H. **Maintain a chronological log of events.**
- I. Ensure the court is secure by maintaining a watch on building. See that private citizens remain in safe areas.
- J. Additional notifications:

RESPONSIBILITIES of the Chief Judge or Designee:

- A. Determine whether the judges and staff are to remain in the assembly areas or be sent home.
- B. Upon returning to building, check all calendared and docketed appearances that were missed; re-schedule and notify all parties as required.

RESPONSIBILITIES of the Court Management Team:

- A. **Take your copy of this plan with you.**
- B. Assign a specific person(s) to assist any handicapped employee. Ensure employees have read this plan and understand its' contents. Assist the physically handicapped as a first priority. **Know where the designated refuge areas are located.**
- C. Assemble your staff in the assembly area.
- D. Call roll and report status to the command center, or emergency response team.
- E. Keep staff together and await instructions.

RESPONSIBILITIES of the Prisoner Escort Officers and the Police Department:

Follow your department's procedures for evacuating prisoners from the courtroom and/or prisoner holding areas. **Police are responsible for the security of all prisoners.**

KEY POINTS

EMERGENCY EVACUATION

- **Call 911.**
 - **State your name**
 - **Address of the court**_____
 - **Nature of emergency**
 - **Injuries**
- **Alert staff and others to exit the building.**
- **Secure your work area.**
- **Exit the building** – do not run.
- **Assist the disabled/help to an Area of Refuge.**
- **Do not use elevators.**
- **Move to predetermined assembly area at least 1,500 feet from the building.**
- **Observe the exit route and be alert for any suspicious packages, vehicles.**
- **Report to your manager** at the assembly area.
- **Do not re-enter the building** without specific clearance.

EVACUATION CHECKLIST

ISSUE		YES	NO
1.	Evacuation routes identified		
2.	Assembly area identified		
3.	Alternative assembly area identified		
4.	Evacuation routes posted		
5.	“Evacuated” tags obtained		
6.	Areas of refuge identified		
7.	Emergency evacuation Key Points distributed		
8.	Emergency telephone numbers identified		
9.	Chronological log prepared		
10.	Court closed sign prepared		
11.	Evacuation drills conducted. Date:		
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING FIRE EMERGENCY PLANS

All areas of fire control, prevention, detection, evacuation, and suppression must be considered in developing fire emergency plans. All fire related plans should be developed in cooperation with local fire departments. All employees should **know** the **location** of the nearest **fire extinguisher** and **fire alarm**.

Prevention

- A. Periodic inspections by fire department.
- B. Visibly inspect all fire extinguishers regularly.
- C. Use materials and furnishings that are flame-retardant, especially in the holding areas.
- D. **Prohibit use of candles, incense burners, or personal heaters in the workplace.**
- E. Ensure search all persons prior to placing them in holding areas and remove matches, lighters, etc.
- F. Routinely search holding areas.
- G. If the court is in a multi-purpose building, meet with other tenants to determine their risk level.
- H. Conduct annual safety audits of the court for fire hazards – electrical wiring, housekeeping, etc.

Detection

- A. Have court fire safety equipment (sprinklers, smoke detectors and fire alarms) inspected and tested at least annually, or per MIOSHA standards.
- B. Monitor “high-risk” area(s). Maintain and test smoke detection system.
- C. Establish internal reporting/announcement method.
- D. Establish responsibility for contacting appropriate outside agencies.

Evacuation

- A. Establish responsibility for decision and notification.
- B. Establish security and emergency response team assignments.

- C. **Outline/diagram direct exit routes and alternative routes and post them.**
- D. Pre-determine the locations off site for assembly.
- E. Plan for transportation to secure holding area for prisoners.
- F. **Train and practice.**

Suppression

- A. Assist fire department in becoming familiar with the court layout prior to the actual occurrence of fire.
- B. Obtain, place, and mark appropriate equipment.
 - 1. Self-contained breathing apparatus - **must have at least one in the holding area and security personnel must be trained and fit to MIOSHA standards to use.**
 - 2. Automatic fire suppression system
 - 3. Fire extinguishers. All employees should know the location of the nearest fire extinguisher and fire alarm. Employees should be trained in the proper use of fire extinguishers.
 - 4. Fire hoses and standpipes
- C. Maintain all equipment per MIOSHA standards.
- D. Keep current information on location of flammable materials in the building.
- E. Assign staff to provide fire crews with information concerning fire location, size, type, etc.

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES – FIRE: General Guidelines

Reporting

- A. **Activate Fire Alarm**
- B. **Dial 911.** State that this is a Fire Emergency. When connected with the fire department, or at the operator's request, **state:**
 - Your name.
 - The court's address:
 - Exact location of the fire.
 - Describe injuries, if any.

PROCEDURES FOR ALL STAFF**When a Fire Alarm is Activated:**

- A. Proceed to the nearest safe EXIT.** Follow directions of the emergency response team.
- B.** Feel the top of the door. If it is hot or smoke is visible, do not open. Seal, do not lock, the door and look for alternative exits.
- C.** Do not attempt to save possessions at the risk of personal injury.
- D.** Do not use elevators.
- E.** Do not break windows. Oxygen feeds fires.
- F.** Stay low if moving through smoke.
- G.** Report to designated assembly area.

If Trapped In a Room:

- A.** Place cloth material around/under the door to prevent smoke from entering.
- B.** Close as many doors as possible between you and the fire.
- C. DO NOT open or break windows** unless necessary to escape (outside smoke may be drawn in).
- D.** Be prepared to signal your location through window.

Responsibilities of Emergency Response Team

- A.** Station someone near the street to direct fire department.
- B.** Evacuate the building by implementing the evacuation procedure.
- C.** Close all doors and windows around the area of the fire.
- D.** If possible, confine the fire to single room or area.
- E.** Use fire extinguisher (if appropriate).
- F.** Refer to the court Emergency Closure Checklist

Upon Arrival of Fire Department

- A.** Senior fire officer assumes command.
- B.** Follow fire department orders.

Assembly, Reporting, and Recall

- A.** Following evacuation, all personnel will assemble in the designated assembly area. Management team members will take roll and report status of their areas to the emergency response team. If anyone is thought to be trapped in the building or is unaccounted for, report the information to the Fire Department commander at once.
- B.** Await further instructions in the assembly area.

KEY POINTS**FIRE EMERGENCY PLANS**

- **Activate fire alarm**
- **Call 911**
 - **State your name**
 - **Address of the court:** _____
 - **Exact location of the fire**
 - **Report any known injuries**
- **Secure your work area**
- **Exit the building** – do not run
- **Assist the disabled/help to an “area of refuge”**
- **Do not use elevators or break windows**
- **Stay low** if moving through smoke
- **Move** to predetermined assembly area **at least 1,500 feet from the building**
- **Observe the exit route and be alert for any suspicious packages, vehicles**
- **Report to** your **manager** at the assembly area
- **Do not re-enter the building** without specific clearance

FIRE EXTINGUISHER INSTRUCTIONS

- **Pull** safety pin from handle
- **Aim** nozzle at base of fire
- **Squeeze** the trigger handle
- **Sweep** the spray from side to side

FIRE EMERGENCY CHECKLIST

ISSUE	YES	NO
1. Fire department inspection contacted		
2. Fire extinguishers inspected and tested		
3. Holding cell area checked for fire resistant materials		
4. Candles, incense burners, personal heaters prohibited		
5. Annual safety audit conducted		
6. Smoke detectors checked		
7. Exit routes and alternative routes diagramed and posted		
8. Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) secured		
9. Staff trained in use of SCBA		
10. Police notified of prisoner evacuation policy		
11. Staff trained in use of fire extinguishers		
12. List of all flammables prepared		
13. Staff trained in policy		
14. Floor monitors identified		
15.		
16.		
17.		
18.		
19.		

CONSIDERATIONS FOR TELEPHONE BOMB THREAT OR SUSPECTED MAIL BOMB

Planning, identification/detection, and evacuation must be considered in developing Bomb Emergency plans. All related plans should be developed in cooperation with local police and fire departments.

Planning

The following are from Bomb Threats and Physical Security Planning from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. For a more detailed explanation, please refer to the original document.

- A. Designate a chain of command.
- B. Establish a command center.
- C. Decide what primary and alternate communications will be used.
- D. **Establish, clearly, how and by whom a bomb threat will be evaluated.**
- E. Decide what procedures will be followed when a bomb threat is received or device discovered. Train command center staff and decision makers.
- F. Determine to what extent the available bomb squad will assist and at what point the squad will be requested.
- G. Utilize the model evacuation plan but allow enough flexibility to avoid a suspected danger area.
- H. Use the emergency response teams, and provide evacuation training and drills.
- I. Designate search teams and provide on-going training.
- J. Designate areas to be searched.
- K. Establish techniques to be utilized during search.
 - 1. Look for anything unusual or out of place.
 - 2. Search and report only. **Do not touch anything unusual.**
 - 3. **Search is visual only.** The Police Department and/or the Bomb Squad will conduct the physical search.
 - 4. Evacuate building or area if instructed by the Incident Commander to do so. Assemble in designated area. Refer to the court's Emergency Closure Checklist.

- L. Establish a procedure to report and track progress of the search to the Emergency Command Post, and a method to lead qualified bomb technicians to a suspicious package.
- M. Have a contingency plan available if a bomb should go off. **The contingency plan should be located off-site**, yet readily available.
- N. Establish a **simple to follow** procedure for the person receiving the bomb threat, and train staff on the procedure and use of the bomb threat form.
- O. Review your physical security plan in conjunction with the development of your bomb incident plan.
- P. Train all staff, and especially security and maintenance personnel to be alert for people who act in a suspicious manner, and especially to watch for objects, items, or parcels which look out of place or suspicious.
- Q. Establish and implement a policy that all inquiries from the news media be directed to one individual appointed as spokesperson.

Detection

- A. Monitor all packages, parcels, and incoming mail through a weapons and explosives screening process. Provide training and equipment to screen packages.
- B. Establish internal reporting/announcement method.
- C. Establish telephone and switchboard procedures for handling a threat. Require reporting of all threats, and provide on-going training on handling threats.
- D. Establish responsibility for contacting appropriate outside agencies.
- E. Establish responsibility and process to conduct searches. Provide training on searching.
- F. Assist the police department in becoming familiar with the court layout prior to the actual occurrence of a bomb threat.

Evacuation

- A. Implement emergency evacuation procedures.
- B. Establish responsibility for decision and notification.
- C. Establish security and evacuation assignments.
- D. **Outline/diagram direct exit routes and alternative routes and post them.**

- E.** Pre-determine the locations for assembly off-site.
- F.** Plan for transportation of prisoners to a secure holding area.
- G.** **Train and practice.**

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES – TELEPHONE BOMB THREAT, SUSPECTED MAIL OR PACKAGE BOMB**Telephone Procedures**

- A. Engage phone tape recorder (if available) or have another person listen in on an extension (if applicable). **All courts should have telephone ID.**
- B. Get all information possible. Use telephone bomb threat checklist.
- C. **Take every threat seriously;** treat as real until proven otherwise.

Suspected Mail or Package Bomb

- A. If a suspicious letter or parcel arrives do not open it. Review the attachment on Letter and Package Bomb Indicators from the FBI and US Postal Service.
- B. If available, have package x-rayed or electronically scanned to attempt to determine contents.
- C. When in doubt treat the package as a real bomb.

Reporting

Note the order of these steps may vary depending on the pre-established process and chain of command.

- A. Dial 911. State that this is a Bomb Threat Emergency.
- B. When connected to the police department, or at operator's request, give:
 - 1. Your name.
 - 2. The court's address:
 - 3. Exact location of bomb, if known.
 - 4. Time when the bomb is to explode, if known.
- C. Notify: _____

General Procedures

Note the order of these steps may vary depending on the pre-established process and chain of command.

- A. The police department will respond to the court and take command.
- B. All appropriate persons/agencies will be alerted.

- C. Trained staff will conduct a floor search under the command of the court's emergency response team.
 - 1. Look for anything unusual or out of place.
 - 2. Search and report only. **DO NOT TOUCH ANYTHING.**
 - 3. **Search is visual only.** The Police Department and /or the Bomb Squad will conduct the **physical** search.
 - 4. **Evacuate building or area if instructed by the Incident Commander** to do so. Assemble in pre-designated area. Refer to the court's Emergency Closure Checklist.

KEY POINTS

BOMB THREAT

- **Get information – USE BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST**
- **Notify supervisor**
 - If directed to do so: Call 911
 - State your name
 - Court address _____
 - Exact location of bomb, if known
 - Time bomb is to explode, if known
- **Follow directions**

KEY POINTS

SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES

- **Do not touch**
- **Notify supervisor**
 - If directed to do so: Call 911
 - State your name
 - Court address _____
 - Exact location of package
- **Follow directions**

BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

Exact time of call:

Phone number of caller (caller ID):

Exact words of caller: _____

GET INFORMATION - QUESTIONS TO ASK

1. **When** is the bomb going to explode? _____
2. **Where** is the bomb? _____
3. **What** does it look like? _____
4. **What** will cause it to explode? _____
5. **What** is your name? _____
6. **What** is your address? _____
7. Did you place the bomb? _____
8. Why? _____
9. Where are you calling from? _____

CALLER'S VOICE (circle)

Calm	Disgusted	Nasal	Angry	Broken
Stutter	Slow	Sincere	Lisp	Rapid
Giggling	Deep	Crying	Squeaky	Excited
Stressed	Accent	Loud	Slurred	Normal

If the voice is familiar, whom did it sound like? _____

What were the background noises? _____

Did the call sound like a cellular or pay telephone? (circle) Yes No

Remarks: _____

Person receiving call: _____

Telephone number call received at: _____

Date: _____

Report call immediately.

From: Bomb Threats and Physical Security Planning
U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

BOMBS/BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

ISSUE	YES	NO
1. Threat evaluation team identified		
2. Search teams identified and trained		
3. Contingency plan prepared and located off-site		
4. Bomb threat forms located at all incoming telephone stations		
5. Staff trained in use of threat forms		
6. Caller ID available at all incoming telephones		
7. All incoming mail checked at one location		
8. Staff trained in checking incoming mail		
9. Practice search conducted		
10.		
11.		
12.		
13.		
14.		
15.		

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES – NATURAL/CIVIL DISASTER

Because disasters are always possible, the court should have **plans in place prior** to an occurrence. Plans for natural disasters such as tornados, flooding, and heavy snowfall should be developed with the assistance of the local emergency management authority. In addition, the court should examine its' environment for other potential civil disasters such as; nearby railroads and chemical spills.

Reporting.

- A. Locate nearest working telephone, or police radio, or use a cellular telephone. If no phones or radios can be located, send a designated staff member to police headquarters to report on the situation.
- B. Call 911 and state type of emergency. When connected with the fire department or police department, or at the operator's request, state:
 - 1. Your name.
 - 2. Address of the court:
 - 3. Nature of the emergency.
 - 4. Situation and extent of injuries as known.
- C. Contact local disaster relief agency. Telephone number: _____
- D. Contact utility emergency services for gas/electric. Telephone numbers:
Electric _____ Gas _____
- E. Contact the State Court Administrative Office

Procedures for the Emergency Response Team.

- A. Take command and begin organizing relief/assistance groups to help the injured.
- B. Use fire extinguishers as necessary.
- C. Evacuate the building and assemble in designated area, or take shelter in a pre-designated area, i.e. tornado shelter.

Upon Arrival of Emergency Response Professionals.

- A. Incident Commander will assume command..
- B. Follow directions from the Incident Commander.

KEY POINTS

CIVIL/NATURAL DISASTER

- **Call 911**
 - **State your name**
 - **Address of the court:** _____
 - **Nature of the emergency**
 - **Report any known injuries**
- **If appropriate, contact gas/electrical services for cut-off**
- **Evacuate, if necessary**
- **Assist emergency responders**

CIVIL/NATURAL DISASTER CHECKLIST

ISSUE	YES	NO
1. Local emergency management authority contacted		
2. Environmental scan conducted (other nearby hazards)		
3. Utility services emergency numbers prepared		
4. Interior shelter areas checked		
5. Disaster recovery plans prepared		
6. Locations of heavy equipment identified		
7. Disaster recovery contractors identified		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Fire ● Computer ● Flood damage ● Telephone backups ● Temporary office equipment 	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____
8. Alternative court location identified		
9.		
10.		
11.		
12.		
13.		
14.		
15.		

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES—MEDICAL EMERGENCY

Medical emergencies are likely to occur in the court environment. Key points to follow in establishing a medical emergency policy are:

- A. Provide training for key people in first aid or advanced first aid, and CPR.
- B. Have well stocked first aid kits available in a number of locations accessible to staff in the event of an emergency. First aid kits should also contain **universal precaution equipment**.
- C. Establish method for notifying trained staff to assist.
- D. List emergency numbers near all phones; and assign responsibility for contacting emergency response agencies, and make provision for notification of family members.
- E. Accessibility Issues:
 - Emergency vehicle arrival area and parking.
 - Elevator access.
 - Special security provisions for prisoner medical emergencies.

Procedures for Any Court Staff

- A. Remain with victim and continue care.
 - 1. Soothe and calm victim.
 - 2. Do not move victim unless required by life-threatening circumstances.
 - 3. Clear obstructions from the area.
- B. Send someone outside to direct paramedics.

When Paramedics Arrive

- A. Senior paramedic assumes command.
- B. Follow paramedic's orders.

KEY POINTS

MEDICAL EMERGENCY

- **Call 911**
 - **State your name**
 - **Address of the court:** _____
 - **Nature of the emergency**
 - **Exact location of medical emergency**
 - **Recommended entrance for medical responder**
- **Perform appropriate first aid/CPR**
- **Always follow universal precautions**
- **Control bleeding** with direct pressure
- **Prevent shock** by elevating feet
- **Do not move** unless absolutely necessary

KEY POINTS**UNCONSCIOUS VICTIMS**

If rescuer is **trained in CPR**:

- **YELL FOR HELP**, and have someone call 9-1-1.
- ABC's of **rescue breathing** for adults

Airway

- **Roll victim unto back, supporting head and neck**
- **Open airway by head-tilt/chin-lift maneuver**
- **Look, listen and feel for breathing for 3 to 5 seconds**
- **If no breathing, proceed to Breathing**

Breathing

- **Pinch victims nose shut, put your mouth over victims, making a tight seal**
- **Give 2 slow breaths. If breaths do not go in, reposition and try again**
- **If breaths still do not go in, refer to Heimlich Maneuver or choking**

Circulation

- **Check carotid pulse for 5 to 10 seconds**
- **If pulse is present, perform rescue breathing at the rate of 12 times per minute**

- Start ventilation or CPR if necessary

KEY POINTS**CONSCIOUS VICTIMS**

- **YELL FOR HELP**, and have someone call 911.
- **Do not move patient** or allow the patient to move around.
- Try to **control** any **heavy bleeding** using direct pressure on the wound.
- Try to **keep** the **patient from going into shock** by maintaining body temperature and elevating the lower extremities if possible.

KEY POINTS**CPR**

- **Call 911**
- Follow ABC's of rescue breathing
- In addition:
 - Run index and middle fingers along lower margin of rib cage to center notch
 - Place heel of hand on breastbone just above this point. Depress approximately 1 ½ - 2 inches
 - Place second hand on top of first
 - Perform 80 to 100 compressions per minute (15 compressions to 2 breaths)
 - After 1 minute check for carotid pulse
 - If no pulse, resume CPR with chest compressions. Check pulse after first minute (4 cycles) then every few minutes.
 - Continue until advanced life support is available.

KEY POINTS**HEIMLICH MANEUVER**

- **Call 911**
- Ask "Are you choking?" Assume "yes" if victim is unable to speak or cough
- Perform maneuver:
 - From behind victim wrap arms around victim's waist
 - Make a fist, thumb toward stomach, and grasp fist with other hand
 - Position fist above navel
 - Press fist into stomach with quick inward and upward thrust until object is expelled or victim becomes unconscious.
- If victim becomes unconscious begin **RESCUE BREATHING**

MEDICAL EMERGENCY CHECKLIST

ISSUE	YES	NO
1. All staff trained in basic first aid		
2. First aid kits available		
3. First aid kits contain “universal precaution” equipment		
4. Staff trained in advanced first aid		
5. Staff trained in CPR		
6. Staff trained in Heimlich Maneuver		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

ESCAPES

The escape plan should include information on dealing with other prisoners, maintaining security for the court, and proper notification to the police.

Other Prisoners

Secure any other individuals in custody to prevent other escapes.

Notifications

- A.** Designate who to notify in the court. Outline information to provide to court staff.
 - 1. Name of escapee
 - 2. Description
 - 3. Last known location building
 - 4. Degree of danger
- B.** Notify outside law enforcement agencies. Outline information to provide them.
 - 1. Name of escapee
 - 2. Description of offender
 - 3. Possible direction of travel
 - 4. Other information (weapons, address etc) which may assist in capture
- C.** Establish Methods for Notification of Apprehension of Escapee.

Security

- A.** Outline the method for initiating an immediate building lock-down.
- B.** Consider a plan that will selectively “route” escapees.
- C.** Establish search pattern of the court and its perimeter.

KEY POINTS

ESCAPES

- **Call 911**
 - **State your name**
 - **Address of the court:** _____
 - **Nature of the emergency**
- **Initiate lock-down** procedures
- **Make court notifications**
 - Name of escapee
 - Description
 - Last known location in building
 - Degree of danger

ESCAPE CHECKLIST

ISSUE		YES	NO
1.	Escape procedure developed with local police		
2.	Lock-down procedure developed		
3.	“Routing” is part of lock-down plan		
4.	Apprehension notification in place		
5.	Holding cell inspection conducted:		
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			

DISASTER RECOVERY**Planning**

Planning for a disaster should include both emergency plans, and disaster recovery plans. The plans should include disaster recovery ideas and temporary court locations.

- A.** Know locations and how to secure heavy equipment in the event of structural damage.
- B.** Know contractors for a number of specialty areas: (A disaster recovery directory is available from the SCAO)
 - 1. Fire recovery specialists
 - 2. Computer recovery
 - 3. Flood damage specialists
 - 4. Emergency telephone backups
 - 5. Temporary office equipment supply

Temporary Location

- A.** Identify designated backup location for the court and how to coordinate setting up site, if necessary.
- B.** Ensure backup site has at least minimal security, including holding areas.
- C.** Have regular data backups done with off site storage

NOTICE

**DUE TO AN EMERGENCY, THIS
COURT IS CLOSED UNTIL:**

**IF YOU MISSED A COURT DATE
BECAUSE OF THIS EMERGENCY,
YOU HAVE UNTIL _____
TO RETURN TO COURT TO TAKE
CARE OF THE MATTER.**

Presiding Judge

COURT SECURITY AUDIT CHECKLIST

**Michigan Supreme Court
State Court Administrative Office
309 N. Washington Square
P.O. Box 30048
Lansing MI 48909
(517) 373-4835**

OPM #: _____

Date: _____

**Michigan Supreme Court
State Court Administrative Office
Hall of Justice
P.O. Box 30048
Lansing MI 48909
(517) 373-4835**

COURT SECURITY AUDIT CHECKLIST

Date _____

Chief Judge _____

Court Administrator _____

Court _____

Address _____

Court Contact: _____

Contact Phone: _____

Security Audit Team completing audit:

Member Name	Title and Office
1. _____	_____
2. _____	_____
3. _____	_____
4. _____	_____
5. _____	_____

Security Overview Received ☐ Yes ☐ No

Initial Inspection ☐ ☐ Follow-up

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF BUILDING (DESCRIBE THE NUMBER OF STORIES, SQUARE FEET, CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL, OTHER BUILDING OCCUPANTS, NORMAL TRAFFIC PER DAY, NUMBER OF PUBLIC ENTRANCES, NUMBER OF PRIVATE ENTRANCES, ETC.). ATTACH FLOOR PLANS IF AVAILABLE:

Briefly describe the city or community where the building is located (population, main businesses, urban, suburban, rural, community highlights, etc.)

Briefly describe the immediate environment of the building in all directions: (business, urban, suburban, residential, high crime, etc.)

Which floors contain Judicial facilities?

What is the type of building construction (concrete, brick, glass siding, steel framed, etc.)?

Building construction date:

Building addition date:

Judicial area last renovated date:

Is the building a historically registered landmark?

☐ Yes ☐ No

	ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES Security Advisory Committee	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is there an established Court Security Advisory Committee?			
2.	To whom does the committee report?			
3.	How frequently do they meet? When was the last meeting?			
4.	Is there a formalized procedure for: <input type="checkbox"/> announcing meetings <input type="checkbox"/> documenting and reporting to <input type="checkbox"/> Court and <input type="checkbox"/> County Officials			
5.	What is the committee's mission or stated goals?			
6.	What is the composition of the members of the committee? <input type="checkbox"/> Judges <input type="checkbox"/> Court administration <input type="checkbox"/> Others: <input type="checkbox"/> Court staff <input type="checkbox"/> Sheriff <input type="checkbox"/> Court security officers <input type="checkbox"/> County administration <input type="checkbox"/> County Commissioners <input type="checkbox"/> Local bar association <input type="checkbox"/> Law enforcement agencies <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency management authority.			
7.	Does the committee have established duties, or written goals and objectives			
8.	Has the committee done any strategic or long-term planning?			
9.	Is the committee responsible for oversight of the <input type="checkbox"/> Security Procedures Manual <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Procedures manual?			
10.	Does the committee review all security and emergency related incident reports?			
11.	Does the committee verify that emergency drills, and testing and maintenance of security and emergency equipment has been completed?			
12.	Has a prior security survey been conducted? By whom and when?			

	ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES	Security Advisory Committee	YES	NO	N/A
13.	<p>How well have security recommendations in prior reports been implemented? Comment:</p> <p>What significant recommendations have not been implemented?</p>				

	ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES	Emergency Procedures	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Does the court have an emergency procedures manual?				
2.	<p>Is the manual?</p> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Loose leaf <input type="checkbox"/> Organized by subject </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Uniformly numbered <input type="checkbox"/> Standard Section format </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Indexed <input type="checkbox"/> Pages dated/revised </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Periodically reviewed/updated <input type="checkbox"/> All copies updated </div>				
3.	<p>Does the manual have phone numbers easily accessible for:</p> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Ambulance <input type="checkbox"/> Fire/Rescue </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Local Police <input type="checkbox"/> Court/Building Security </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Sheriff Dept. <input type="checkbox"/> State Police </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Utility - gas <input type="checkbox"/> Utility - water </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Utility - Electric <input type="checkbox"/> Building Maintenance </div>				
4.	<p>Are there written emergency procedures for:</p> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Medical Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Fire </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Bomb Threat <input type="checkbox"/> General Evacuation </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Civil Disorder/Disturbance <input type="checkbox"/> Power/utility failure </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Natural Disaster <input type="checkbox"/> Civil Disorder </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Tornado <input type="checkbox"/> Hostage Situation </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Severe Weather <input type="checkbox"/> Prisoner Escape </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Flood <input type="checkbox"/> Disaster Recovery </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Winter/Cold </div>				
5.	<p>Does each section:</p> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> identify key decision makers <input type="checkbox"/> define who declares an emergency </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> list authorized actions <input type="checkbox"/> define chain of command </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> give uncomplicated directions </div>				
6.	Who has the final authority to declare an emergency?				
7.	Are security plans coordinated with appropriate local, state, and federal agencies?				

	ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES Emergency Procedures	YES	NO	N/A
8.	Does the manual contain: <input type="checkbox"/> Directory of building tenants and their phone numbers <input type="checkbox"/> Floor plans showing <input type="checkbox"/> windows, doors, and fire exits <input type="checkbox"/> utility shut offs <input type="checkbox"/> control panels <input type="checkbox"/> HVAC controls <input type="checkbox"/> alarm system controls <input type="checkbox"/> first aid kits <input type="checkbox"/> Elevator controls <input type="checkbox"/> fire extinguishers, hoses, and suppression systems			
9.	Are floor plans showing emergency exits and fire hoses and extinguishers posted throughout the building?			
10.	Are periodic security/emergency procedures meetings held with: <input type="checkbox"/> judges <input type="checkbox"/> staff <input type="checkbox"/> attorneys <input type="checkbox"/> tenants <input type="checkbox"/> supervisory staff <input type="checkbox"/> custodial/maintenance personnel			
11.	Are other tenants given periodic instruction about the various emergency procedures?			
12.	Is there a policy and procedure for reporting incidents?			
13.	What types of incidents are required to be reported?			
14.	Who are incidents reported to, and how quickly must they be reported?			

	ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES Alarm Policies	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is there an alarm policy?			
2.	Does the policy define all of the following? <input type="checkbox"/> who is responsible for setting alarms <input type="checkbox"/> when they will be set <input type="checkbox"/> who is responsible to turn them off <input type="checkbox"/> when they will be turned off <input type="checkbox"/> how after hours access will be allowed <input type="checkbox"/> who is responsible for responding to alarms			

	ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES Emergency Equipment and Staff	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Have appropriate court staff received copies and signed for relevant security policies and procedures?			
2.	Have court staff been trained in relevant policies and procedures? (e.g. First Aid, CPR, fire suppression, evacuation, bomb searches)			
3.	Is first aid equipment, including <input type="checkbox"/> oxygen and <input type="checkbox"/> universal precautions, provided throughout the courthouse?			
4.	How frequently is that equipment periodically checked and tested?			
5.	Are staff used in key roles in an emergency? (e.g. floor monitors for evacuation, fire brigade, first aid response) If yes, how:			

	ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES Fire Planning	YES	NO	N/A
6.	Does the local fire marshal/inspector routinely inspect the courthouse?			
7.	When was the courthouse last inspected for fire safety?			
8.	Does the courthouse comply with local fire codes?			
9.	Does the building have fire alarms?			
10.	Does the building have smoke detectors? List locations (e.g. halls only, in offices, etc.)			
11.	Does the building have fire extinguishers?			
12.	Does the building have an automatic sprinkler system?			
13.	Does the building have emergency fire hoses?			
14.	Does the building have standpipes?			
15.	Are extinguishers and hoses clearly marked, and placed appropriately?			
16.	When was the last time the following were checked or tested? <input type="checkbox"/> fire alarms <input type="checkbox"/> smoke detectors <input type="checkbox"/> fire extinguishers <input type="checkbox"/> automatic sprinkler system <input type="checkbox"/> emergency fire hoses <input type="checkbox"/> standpipes			
17.	How are fire extinguishers checked? By whom?			
18.	Are emergency exits clearly marked with an illuminated sign?			

	ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES Fire Planning	YES	NO	N/A
19.	Are emergency exits and passages kept clear and in usable condition?			
20.	What is the estimated response time for the fire department?			

	ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES Jury procedures	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are there specific security policies, procedures and guidelines for juries relative to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> orientation <input type="checkbox"/> first day of trial <input type="checkbox"/> barring discussion <input type="checkbox"/> seclusion <input type="checkbox"/> site viewing <input type="checkbox"/> custody during deliberation <input type="checkbox"/> conduct <input type="checkbox"/> calls <input type="checkbox"/> meals <input type="checkbox"/> medication <input type="checkbox"/> communications to court 			
2.	Are there emergency plans for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> juror illness <input type="checkbox"/> medical emergency <input type="checkbox"/> emergency evacuation <input type="checkbox"/> an off site backup location to take the jury in an emergency. 			
3.	Are security staff forbidden from discussing any trial related matter with jury members?			
4.	Are jurors issued buttons or identification badges?			
5.	Is there generic or model plan for handling a sequestered jury?			
6.	Does the sequestered jury plan include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> establishing a special task force on the high-risk trial jury <input type="checkbox"/> secured transport of the jury <input type="checkbox"/> housing for jury and security staff <input type="checkbox"/> meals and entertainment <input type="checkbox"/> handling communications and visitation <input type="checkbox"/> handling illnesses and medical emergencies <input type="checkbox"/> emergency evacuation <input type="checkbox"/> model orders and model forms <input type="checkbox"/> media limitation and regulation <input type="checkbox"/> methods to harden the grounds, courthouse, and courtroom, <input type="checkbox"/> family visitation <input type="checkbox"/> increased security screening <input type="checkbox"/> establishing a high profile case task force 			

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES CONCERNS

Briefly describe the major concerns regarding this section.

	PERIMETER	Public Perimeter Area	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Do security staff patrol the perimeter of the building?				
2.	How frequently are <input type="checkbox"/> uniformed <input type="checkbox"/> plain clothes patrols and inspections made of the perimeter area?				
3.	Are any perimeter areas monitored by CCTV? Where:				
4.	Are any "restricted area" signs posted in the perimeter area? What is their wording:				
5.	Are there any duress alarms in the perimeter area? Describe the number and locations:				

	PERIMETER	Fences and Gates	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is the perimeter of the courthouse grounds clearly defined by a fence, wall or other type of physical barrier?				
2.	Briefly describe the barrier: Location: Condition: Base/Anchor: Material: Top:				
3.	Does the barrier limit or control vehicle access to the courthouse?				
4.	Does the barrier limit or control pedestrian access to the courthouse?				
5.	Are gates solid and in good condition? Type of Gate:				
6.	Are gates locked properly? Type of Lock:				
7.	Are gate hinges secure and in good condition?				

	PERIMETER	Lights	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is the perimeter lighted?				
2.	Are public perimeter areas (including parking and walkways) sufficiently lighted to discourage attacks against persons or vehicles, and allow a person to avoid a hazard?				
3.	Describe the lighting (coverage, type, etc) of: Walkways, and sidewalks Parking areas Other public areas:				
4.	Is the exterior of the building (particularly entry points) sufficiently lighted to discourage unlawful entry attempts, vandalism, or placement of explosives against the walls?				
5.	Are lights on all night? If no, list hours:				
6.	Are light fixtures suitable for outside use (i.e., weather- and tamper-resistant)?				
7.	Are lights and wiring inspected regularly? If so, by whom?				
8.	Lights are controlled: <input type="checkbox"/> automatically <input type="checkbox"/> manually				
9.	Are lighting control switches secured to prevent tampering?				
10.	Do exterior lights have an auxiliary power source?				

	PERIMETER	Parking Areas	YES	NO	N/A
1.	How is entry to, and exit from parking areas controlled? <input type="checkbox"/> security officer <input type="checkbox"/> attendant <input type="checkbox"/> electronically operated gate <input type="checkbox"/> not controlled				
2.	Who provides the guard/attendant services? What hours is it staffed?				
3.	Are parking areas monitored by CCTV?				
4.	How frequently are inspections made of parking area and vehicles, for areas not guarded or monitored through CCTV?				
5.	Is a reserved parking lot or area: <input type="checkbox"/> on courthouse grounds <input type="checkbox"/> secured during non-business hours <input type="checkbox"/> protected by a fence or wall which restricts vehicle access <input type="checkbox"/> protected by a fence or wall which restricts pedestrian access				

	PERIMETER	Parking Areas	YES	NO	N/A
6.	Are restricted area signs posted there? What do the signs say?				
7.	Do reserved parking spaces block access to the courthouse by fire or other emergency vehicles?				
8.	How is parking reserved for judges? <input type="checkbox"/> Name <input type="checkbox"/> Title <input type="checkbox"/> Number <input type="checkbox"/> Other Describe proximity to building:				
9.	How is parking reserved for court staff? <input type="checkbox"/> Name <input type="checkbox"/> Title <input type="checkbox"/> Number <input type="checkbox"/> Other Describe proximity to building:				
10.	How is parking reserved for witnesses and jurors? Describe proximity to building:				
11.	Are parking spaces rotated?				
12.	Where do police vehicles park?				
13.	Are there duress alarms in the parking area? Describe number and location.				
14.	Are there adequate communications equipment and an alarm in the guard station in the garage?				
15.	Is there direct access for judges from the parking area to non-public elevators or corridors?				

	PERIMETER	Landscaping	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Do landscaping features provide places for potential assailants, intruders, or explosives to hide? (height, clean lines, line of sight, etc.)				
2.	Describe landscaping features:				
3.	Are there items or materials that could be used as weapons, missiles, or tools? (trash receptacles, ash trays, stones, bricks, fencing)				
4.	Describe:				

PERIMETER SECURITY CONCERNS

Briefly summarize the major security concerns identified in this section.

	BUILDING EXTERIOR	Exterior Walls and Doors	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Describe the building exterior walls: (construction, clean lines, line of sight, etc)				
2.	Are all exterior doors at least: <input type="checkbox"/> 1 3/4 inch steel <input type="checkbox"/> metal clad <input type="checkbox"/> solid core wood doors				
3.	Describe all exterior doors (location, construction, use, etc.)				
4.	Are all exterior doors properly equipped with: <input type="checkbox"/> cylinder locks <input type="checkbox"/> deadbolts <input type="checkbox"/> quality padlocks and hasps				
5.	Are all exterior locks <input type="checkbox"/> easily re-keyed (removable cores) <input type="checkbox"/> mounted so that they cannot be pried off <input type="checkbox"/> bolts at least 1" long and constructed or protected to prevent being cut				
6.	Are exterior padlock <input type="checkbox"/> locked to the hasp when the door is unlocked <input type="checkbox"/> hasps installed so that hasp screws cannot be removed <input type="checkbox"/> hasps constructed of a grade of steel which is difficult to cut				
7.	Is the number of doors in use reduced to the minimum necessary?				
8.	Are there any exterior doors with windows?				
9.	How are exterior doors with windows secured? What measures are taken to prevent access to the lock through the window?				
10.	Are exterior doors equipped with intrusion alarms?				
11.	What alarm devices are used?				
12.	How are emergency doors secured to prevent unauthorized use? <input type="checkbox"/> local alarm <input type="checkbox"/> alarm to central location <input type="checkbox"/> delayed exit device <input type="checkbox"/> other:				

	BUILDING EXTERIOR	Exterior Walls and Doors	YES	NO	N/A
13.	How are exterior door hinge pins secured to prevent easy removal? <input type="checkbox"/> located internally <input type="checkbox"/> welded <input type="checkbox"/> other:				
14.	How are emergency doors secured when the building is not in use?				
15.	Are emergency doors secured to prevent unauthorized access but equipped to allow emergency egress?				
16.	Are exterior locks sufficient, or exterior door frames built, so the door cannot be forced open by spreading the frame?				
17.	Are all unused doors locked to restrict access?				
18.	Are all unused doors alarmed?				

	BUILDING EXTERIOR	Windows	YES	NO	N/A
1.	How are windows that could be accessed for intrusion secured? <input type="checkbox"/> locking devices w/o key <input type="checkbox"/> locking devices w/key <input type="checkbox"/> metal bars <input type="checkbox"/> mesh <input type="checkbox"/> intrusion alarms <input type="checkbox"/> glass break <input type="checkbox"/> foil tape <input type="checkbox"/> motion sensor <input type="checkbox"/> other:				
2.	Are metal bars and mesh securely fastened to prevent easy removal?				
3.	Are any accessible windows made of tempered glass?				
4.	Are any accessible windows made of impact resistant plastic?				
5.	How are all other windows protected?				
6.	Are all windows not used for ventilation permanently sealed or locked?				

	BUILDING EXTERIOR	Roof	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is the exterior roof accessible by: <input type="checkbox"/> fire escape <input type="checkbox"/> another building <input type="checkbox"/> a pole or tree <input type="checkbox"/> other means:				
2.	How is internal access to the roof controlled?				
3.	Are all roof openings (doors, skylights, etc) locked or securely fastened from the inside?				
4.	Are all roof openings alarmed?				

	BUILDING EXTERIOR	Other openings and emergency power	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are other openings to the buildings (tunnels, utility and sewer manholes, culverts, service ports) secured to prevent unauthorized access?				
2.	Is the main power source dependable?				
3.	How many power related problems, or disruptions have they had in the last year?				
4.	Describe the emergency power source:				
5.	Is the emergency power source in a secured area?				
6.	How is the emergency power source maintained?				
7.	How often is the emergency power source tested? Who tests it? When was it last tested?				

BUILDING EXTERIOR SECURITY CONCERNS

Briefly summarize the major security concerns identified in this section.

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Intrusion Alarms	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Does the building have an intrusion alarm system?			
2.	Who is responsible for setting alarms?			
3.	When is the alarm system set?			
4.	Who is responsible to turn the alarm system off?			
5.	When is the alarm system turned off?			
6.	Who is responsible for responding to alarms?			
7.	Is after-hours access allowed after the system is set?			
8.	Is there a schedule to test all components of the intrusion alarm system?			
9.	Is the schedule being followed? (verify logs) When was the last time it was tested?			
10.	How is the alarm system tested? Who tests it?			
11.	Does the alarm system have an auxiliary power source?			
12.	Is the system covered under a service and maintenance contract?			
13.	Who is the alarm service and maintenance provider?			
14.	Are system vendors: <input type="checkbox"/> Licensed by the State Police <input type="checkbox"/> Install U/L approved equipment			
15.	Where is the alarm system monitored? <input type="checkbox"/> sheriff's department <input type="checkbox"/> sheriff's department dispatch <input type="checkbox"/> local law enforcement office <input type="checkbox"/> local law enforcement dispatch <input type="checkbox"/> commercial central station <input type="checkbox"/> proprietary system (e.g. security office) <input type="checkbox"/> local alarm (e.g. audible alarm on building exterior) Name:			
16.	Who maintains records of all alarm signals (e.g. time, date, location, cause, and action taken)?			
17.	What is done to review the alarm records?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Intrusion Alarms	YES	NO	N/A
18.	<p>List the EXTERIOR components (e.g. magnetic contact, glass break, motion sensor, etc.):</p> <p>Walls:</p> <p>Roof:</p> <p>Doors:</p> <p>Windows:</p> <p>Describe weaknesses or gaps:</p>			
19.	<p>List the PUBLIC INTERIOR components:(e.g. magnetic contact, photoelectric beam, motion sensor, etc.):</p> <p>Doors:</p> <p>Hallways/Stairway</p> <p>Elevator</p> <p>Describe weaknesses or gaps:</p>			
20.	<p>List the JUDICIAL AREA AND COURT RELATED OFFICES components: (e.g. magnetic contact, photoelectric beam, audio detection, motion sensor, etc.):</p> <p>Office Interior:</p> <p>Doors:</p> <p>Hallways/Stairway</p> <p>Describe weaknesses or gaps:</p>			
21.	<p>List the HIGH RISK AREA components (e.g. magnetic contact, proximity, pressure mats, motion sensor, etc.):</p> <p>Evidence locker</p> <p>Safes/vaults</p> <p>Describe weaknesses or gaps:</p>			
22.	Has a floor plan designating each alarm been developed?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Access Control: Electronic	YES	NO	N/A
1.	What are the components of the electronic access control system? <input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> Key-pad <input type="checkbox"/> fixed position pad <input type="checkbox"/> electronically scrambled pad <input type="checkbox"/> Card-key <input type="checkbox"/> swipe <input type="checkbox"/> card reader <input type="checkbox"/> proximity <input type="checkbox"/> other: <input type="checkbox"/> Biometrics <input type="checkbox"/> finger print <input type="checkbox"/> hand geometry <input type="checkbox"/> palm <input type="checkbox"/> voice <input type="checkbox"/> signature <input type="checkbox"/> iris recognition/retina scan <input type="checkbox"/> other: <input type="checkbox"/> Remote release lock monitored by: <input type="checkbox"/> closed-circuit TV <input type="checkbox"/> intercom <input type="checkbox"/> visual inspection <input type="checkbox"/> other: <input type="checkbox"/> Other:			
2.	Who is responsible for the electronic access control system? <input type="checkbox"/> supervisory level person Name:			
3.	How are the places and times that an individual's card key or code number is allowed to enter determined to limit access?			
4.	Is there a system in place to temporarily give after hours or weekend access, as opposed to open access?			
5.	Are access control cards/codes easily changed, or deactivated?			
6.	Can the access control official tell which cards/codes each individual has been issued?			
7.	Can the access control official determine who has access to any given area?			
8.	How is card access controlled for any given area?			
9.	Is any written authorization required before cards/codes are issued?			
10.	Does the written authorization specify exactly which areas the individual should be given access to?			
11.	How often are combinations to electronic touch pad locks changed?			
12.	Are codes changed or cards deactivated if lost, or not surrendered by terminated employee?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Access Control: Electronic	YES	NO	N/A
13.	How much information is available in the access control records? (e.g. individual, entry time, places, etc) How long is the information maintained?			
14.	If staff forget or lose their card, what do they do?			
15.	How is entry to the access control system secured?			
16.	Are keys issued which bypass use of the electronic system? When are they used?			
17.	Does an alarm ring if keys are used instead of the electronic system? What is the response to the alarm?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Access Control: Mechanical Locks	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are any mechanical push button locks used? List locations:			
2.	How often are combinations to mechanical locks changed?			
3.	When was the combination changed last?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Access Control: Key Control	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Who is responsible for the key control system?			
2.	Is the key control function handled by a supervisory level person?			
3.	Are locks easily re-keyed (e.g. changeable cores)?			
4.	Can the key-control official replace locks and keys at their discretion?			
5.	Is an inventory record maintained to identify all locks (e.g. key number and location) in the building?			
6.	Can the key group and lock number for each location be identified from the key control records?			
7.	Can the key control official tell which keys each individual has been issued?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Access Control: Key Control	YES	NO	N/A
8.	Can the key control official determine who has access to any given area (including master keys)?			
9.	How is distribution of keys controlled for any given area?			
10.	Is written authorization required before keys are issued?			
11.	Does the written authorization specify exactly which areas the individual should be given access to?			
12.	Does a person receiving keys sign a receipt for them?			
13.	How is distribution of building entrance keys controlled?			
14.	Is a separate key (group) required for exterior access to the building?			
15.	Rather than issuing keys, is there a sign out or check out system in place to get keys for after hours or weekend access?			
16.	Is a system in place to periodically change lock cores or locks?			
17.	As areas are re-keyed, are all keys accounted for? How?			
18.	Are areas re-keyed if keys are lost or not surrendered by terminated employee?			
19.	Are building locks zoned to allow use of sub-masters in a particular zone or office?			
20.	Are all keys stamped "RESTRICTED-DO NOT DUPLICATE"?			
21.	Must duplication of keys be approved by the key-control officer?			
22.	Are keys stored in a locked cabinet?			
23.	Where is the key to the key storage cabinet secured?			
24.	How many extra sets of lock cores are maintained?			
25.	How many master or grand-master keys have been issued? How are they secured?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Weapons Screening	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is any screening done to search for weapons or contraband?			
2.	Are there written weapons screening policies or administrative orders?			
3.	Are there signs posted at all entrances announcing weapons screening?			
4.	What do the signs say?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Weapons Screening	YES	NO	N/A
5.	List the location of each weapons screening station, and list the number of staff:			
6.	Are all people and packages searched at all public entrances for weapons and explosives?			
7.	Who is allowed to use private entrances that are unscreened?			
8.	Who is allowed to by-pass weapons screening at public entrances?			
9.	How are individuals screened? (list manufacturer and model) <input type="checkbox"/> Metal detector - walkthrough <input type="checkbox"/> Metal detector - handheld <input type="checkbox"/> Visual inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Other:			
10.	How are purses, briefcases, and packages screened? (list manufacturer and model) <input type="checkbox"/> Visual inspection <input type="checkbox"/> X-ray <input type="checkbox"/> E-scan <input type="checkbox"/> Other:			
11.	Are searches conducted uniformly not to unfairly or arbitrarily single out any group?			
12.	What is considered a weapon and/or contraband?			
13.	How are situations handled when a weapon or contraband is found? For legally possessed weapon/contraband? For illegally possessed weapon/contraband?			
14.	Have security staff been trained to conduct searches?			
15.	Are individuals who set off a metal detector allowed to leave without being searched, if they choose to?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Weapons Screening	YES	NO	N/A
16.	How frequently is the screening equipment tested/recalibrated?			
17.	When was the screening equipment last tested?			
18.	How is the screening equipment tested?			
19.	Who provides maintenance for the screening equipment? How frequently?			
20.	How are staff at screening stations relieved for breaks, etc?			
21.	Have any audits been conducted to insure staff compliance with screening?			
22.	Does the staff adequately screen: <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> wheel chairs <input type="checkbox"/> strollers <input type="checkbox"/> purses <input type="checkbox"/> attorney or staff parcels </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> babies <input type="checkbox"/> diaper bags <input type="checkbox"/> brief cases </div> </div>			
23.	Stand back and watch each post: Is anyone allowed to bypass security screening? What is the potential of someone circumventing system? Are all parcels being screened? If someone is searched further, how thorough is the search?			
24.	What accommodation is made to assist officers faced with having to search the opposite gender?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Courtroom Security Devices	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is the bench equipped with, or contain ballistic resistant protective materials? <input type="checkbox"/> Type I <input type="checkbox"/> Type II-A <input type="checkbox"/> Type II <input type="checkbox"/> Type III-A <input type="checkbox"/> Type III <input type="checkbox"/> Type IV <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <input type="checkbox"/> Describe:			
2.	Is weapons screening available for use for high security trials? List components:			
3.	Are duress alarm buttons installed at: <input type="checkbox"/> none <input type="checkbox"/> the bench <input type="checkbox"/> clerk's station <input type="checkbox"/> bailiff's station <input type="checkbox"/> judges chambers <input type="checkbox"/> judge's secretary's desk <input type="checkbox"/> other (specify):			
4.	Describe the duress alarm button: <input type="checkbox"/> one button <input type="checkbox"/> two button or designed prevent false alarm <input type="checkbox"/> fixed <input type="checkbox"/> portable			
5.	Where does the duress alarm ring?			
6.	Is there an acceptable response capability for courtroom duress alarms? Who responds to the alarm? Who backs up responder?			
7.	Is there a "no call back" policy in place?			
8.	Does this alarm have an audio-monitoring and/or CCTV-monitoring capability?			
9.	Is a sound level sensor duress system in place?			
10.	Are routine checks/tests made of (include last date tested): <input type="checkbox"/> duress alarms <input type="checkbox"/> intrusion alarms <input type="checkbox"/> emergency lighting <input type="checkbox"/> metal detectors			
11.	Does each courtroom have: <input type="checkbox"/> telephone <input type="checkbox"/> public address system <input type="checkbox"/> radio transmitter <input type="checkbox"/> video arraignment equipment <input type="checkbox"/> bailiff equipped with a portable 2-way radio			
12.	Does the bailiff's 2-way radio network with: <input type="checkbox"/> sheriff's base station <input type="checkbox"/> security office <input type="checkbox"/> other (specify):			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Courtroom Security Devices	YES	NO	N/A
13.	What covert restraints are available for use on high risk prisoners?			
14.	Are additional restraining devices available for use in the courtroom? List type and location stored.			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT Safe and Vaults	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are safes and vaults equipped with an intrusion alarm system? List the components (e.g. magnetic contact, proximity, pressure mats, motion sensor, etc.			
2.	Are combinations routinely changed when personnel leave?			
3.	When was the combination last changed?			
4.	Are safes weighing less than 750 pounds securely fastened to the floor, wall, or set in concrete?			
5.	Does the safe or vault area have fire suppression equipment? Describe type.			
6.	Does the safe or vault area have fire detection equipment? Describe type.			
7.	Is the safe or vault fire rated? List UL rating.			

BUILDING INTERIOR: EQUIPMENT SECURITY CONCERNS

Briefly summarize the major related concerns identified in this section.

	BUILDING INTERIOR: PUBLIC Elevators	YES	NO	N/A
3.	Are prisoner elevators equipped with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> access control system <input type="checkbox"/> bypass unnecessary floors <input type="checkbox"/> bars/grates separate prisoners from escorts <input type="checkbox"/> duress alarms <input type="checkbox"/> telephones <input type="checkbox"/> CCTV <input type="checkbox"/> other (specify) 			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: PUBLIC Public Areas	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Do uniformed security staff routinely patrol the interior of the building?			
2.	Are signs and building directories posted at all public entrances?			
3.	Are public waiting areas/rooms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> near the courtrooms <input type="checkbox"/> routinely searched <input type="checkbox"/> equipped with drop or removable ceilings 			
4.	Do any trash receptacles, furnishings, or other features in public areas allow easy concealment of contraband or explosives?			
5.	Are restrooms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> routinely searched <input type="checkbox"/> near the courtrooms <input type="checkbox"/> equipped with drop or removable ceilings 			
6.	Do any trash receptacles or other features in restrooms allow easy concealment of contraband?			
7.	Are emergency directions (directions and floor plans, if appropriate) clearly posted in all public areas?			
8.	Are there any furnishings that could be used as weapons or thrown? (e.g. seating secured, bolted down, etc.) List:			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: PUBLIC Witness waiting	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are witness waiting rooms provided?			
2.	Is it possible to separate prosecution and defense witnesses?			
3.	What is the policy or protocol for use of witness waiting rooms?			
4.	How well publicized is the availability of witness waiting rooms?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: PUBLIC	Witness waiting	YES	NO	N/A
5.	What are the procedures for handling <input type="checkbox"/> opposing witnesses <input type="checkbox"/> hostile individuals <input type="checkbox"/> threatened witnesses				
6.	Is there a procedure for escort or security of threatened witnesses?				
7.	Are lighting control switches readily accessible?				
8.	Describe the furnishings in the witness waiting area (are they secured or loose): lamps: tables: seating:				

	BUILDING INTERIOR: PUBLIC	Attorney/client conference rooms	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are rooms provided in the courthouse for attorney-client conferences?				
2.	Describe the furnishings in the conference area (are they secured or loose): lamps: tables: seating:				
3.	How secure are these facilities to handle conferences with in-custody prisoners? Do the rooms have drop or removable ceilings? Can the rooms be locked?				
4.	Are the rooms routinely searched for contraband before and after use?				
5.	Are conferences with prisoners visually observed at all times?				
6.	How are attorney conferences with prisoners controlled?				

BUILDING INTERIOR PUBLIC AREA SECURITY CONCERNS

Briefly summarize the major concerns identified in this section.

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Storage Areas for Arms and Dangerous Substances	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Which of the following are stored in the courthouse? <input type="checkbox"/> weapons list type and location: <input type="checkbox"/> ammunition list type and location: <input type="checkbox"/> tear gas list type and location: <input type="checkbox"/> other flammable, solvents, hazardous substances list type and location:			
2.	Are items listed above stored in a: <input type="checkbox"/> restricted area <input type="checkbox"/> secured room?			
3.	Does the storage area have <input type="checkbox"/> intrusion alarm <input type="checkbox"/> door at least 1 3/4 inch metal, metal clad, or solid core wood <input type="checkbox"/> fire rated door <input type="checkbox"/> properly equipped with cylinder or deadbolt lock, or quality padlock and hasp <input type="checkbox"/> hinge pins concealed or welded to prevent removal <input type="checkbox"/> windows secured with steel bars, or mesh, or permanently sealed <input type="checkbox"/> good ventilation <input type="checkbox"/> fire detection equipment; describe: <input type="checkbox"/> fire suppression equipment; describe:			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Evidence Storage Areas	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are there policies and procedures to ensure that evidence is protected from tampering, theft, and damage or destruction.			
2.	Are there controls established for handling evidence: <input type="checkbox"/> in court during proceedings <input type="checkbox"/> during breaks <input type="checkbox"/> overnight.			
3.	Do policies define who is responsible for handling evidence: <input type="checkbox"/> in court during proceedings <input type="checkbox"/> during breaks <input type="checkbox"/> overnight.			
4.	Do evidence procedures include recording its removal from a secured area.			
5.	Is evidence stored in a safe or vault?			
6.	Is evidence stored in a secure reinforced room or closet?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Evidence Storage Areas	YES	NO	N/A
7.	How is access to the evidence storage area limited and controlled? <input type="checkbox"/> Intrusion alarm <input type="checkbox"/> Electronic locks <input type="checkbox"/> combinations <input type="checkbox"/> biometric devices <input type="checkbox"/> card key <input type="checkbox"/> Door at least 1 3/4 inch metal, metal clad, or solid core wood <input type="checkbox"/> Properly equipped with cylinder or deadbolt lock, or quality padlock and hasp <input type="checkbox"/> Hinge pins concealed or welded to prevent removal <input type="checkbox"/> Windows secured with steel bars, or mesh, or permanently sealed			
8.	Does the evidence storage area have: <input type="checkbox"/> fire rated door <input type="checkbox"/> fire detection equipment; describe: <input type="checkbox"/> fire suppression equipment; describe:			
9.	Are there special accommodations handling for large sums of cash, drugs, or other valuable objects?			
10.	Are there procedures for periodically inventorying and accounting for evidence?			
11.	Are there special precautions for securing or disabling any evidence that could be used as a weapon? <input type="checkbox"/> guns <input type="checkbox"/> knives <input type="checkbox"/> flammable liquids <input type="checkbox"/> chemicals <input type="checkbox"/> blunt objects			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Storage Areas for Records	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Where are files stored and secured: <input type="checkbox"/> in the clerks office? <input type="checkbox"/> outside of the clerks office? <input type="checkbox"/> while in the courtroom?			
2.	Is the area equipped with an intrusion alarm system? List the components (e.g. magnetic contact, proximity, pressure mats, motion sensor, etc.			
3.	Does the area have fire detection equipment? Describe type.			
4.	Does the area have fire suppression equipment? Describe type.			
5.	Are current records stored in locked rooms or locked filing cabinets during nonbusiness hours?			
6.	Are records storage areas inaccessible to unauthorized persons?			
7.	Are there check-out procedures for all records?			
8.	Who is allowed to remove files from the clerk's office?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Storage Areas for Records	YES	NO	N/A
9.	Is space available in or near the clerk's office for the public to review the documents?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Offices Handling Money	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is access to the cashier's area restricted?			
2.	Does the cashier's window have security features: <input type="checkbox"/> Ballistic resistant protective material <input type="checkbox"/> Pass through tray <input type="checkbox"/> Communication device <input type="checkbox"/> Duress alarm (list termination point:) <input type="checkbox"/> Locking register or cash drawer <input type="checkbox"/> Separate drawers maintained for each cashier <input type="checkbox"/> Other:			
3.	Is a significant amount of cash held in the office overnight or on weekends?			
4.	Is money held after-hours in a safe, vault, or strongbox?			
5.	Are deposits made daily, depositing that day's or previous days receipts?			
6.	Who escorts the employee carrying the deposit to the bank? <input type="checkbox"/> No one <input type="checkbox"/> Sheriff Department <input type="checkbox"/> Local Police <input type="checkbox"/> Court Security Officer <input type="checkbox"/> Other:			
7.	Is the deposit taken to the bank by a private courier? List.			
8.	Supreme Court Finance Audit issues resolved (list):			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Courtroom	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Do spaces above, below, and next to the judicial facility or courtroom present a security hazard?			
2.	Are all unused doors secured?			
3.	Is the courtroom locked at all times when unused?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Courtroom	YES	NO	N/A
4.	Are the keys to all doors strictly controlled? Who has keys?			
5.	Are there separate entrances into the courtroom for: <input type="checkbox"/> judges, court staff, jurors <input type="checkbox"/> in-custody defendants <input type="checkbox"/> spectators			
6.	Are all windows draped to obscure vision (particularly of the bench) from outside?			
7.	Is the prisoner entry door far enough from public areas to prevent passing weapons or contraband?			
8.	Is prisoner seating 6-8 feet from public areas to prevent passing weapons or contraband?			
9.	Is there emergency lighting in the courtroom? <input type="checkbox"/> battery <input type="checkbox"/> generator			
10.	How are lighting control switches secured to prevent tampering?			
11.	Is the litigation arena or well separated from the spectators by a barrier? Describe the barrier: Describe gate and lock:			
12.	Is the judge's bench closed at both ends to prevent access from the well and witness stand?			
13.	Are the defendant's chair and the witness chair constructed to allow use of restraints?			
14.	Are spectator seats solidly built and fastened to the floor?			
15.	Are regular searches of the courtroom made before each session?			
16.	Are potential weapons, such as drinking glasses, water carafes, etc. kept out of the defendant's reach?			
17.	Are microphone stands secured to prevent use as a weapon.			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Courtroom Procedures	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are policies and procedures: <input type="checkbox"/> agreed between sheriff/security and chief judge ? <input type="checkbox"/> signed by sheriff/security and chief judge? <input type="checkbox"/> administratively ordered by the chief judge?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Courtroom Procedures	YES	NO	N/A
2.	Do courtroom policies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> require that all are locked at times when not in use; Who is responsible: <input type="checkbox"/> require regular systematic searches of the courtroom; Who is responsible: <input type="checkbox"/> specify what conduct will or will not be allowed in the courtroom and security staff response <input type="checkbox"/> allow for restraint/removal of disruptive individuals <input type="checkbox"/> require all to obey directive of officers <input type="checkbox"/> require that spectators stay seated during proceedings <input type="checkbox"/> restrict approaching bench and entering litigation arena <input type="checkbox"/> restrict packages and parcels <input type="checkbox"/> restrict weapons for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> public/litigants <input type="checkbox"/> police spectator/litigants <input type="checkbox"/> police witnesses <input type="checkbox"/> security officers 			
3.	Are any administrative orders posted outlining conduct not allowed in the courtroom?			
4.	When are security staff in the courtrooms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> all times while in session <input type="checkbox"/> other: 			
5.	Are there enough court security staff to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> observe each in-session courtroom <input type="checkbox"/> patrol the building at large <input type="checkbox"/> provide high visibility at court entrances 			
6.	Is there a process that may be used to request additional security staff?			
7.	Is any risk analysis done to verify that enough staff are available for any given proceeding?			
8.	Is there a written agreement between the sheriff and/or security service provider, and the court outlining the security policy?			
9.	Does the policy regarding security staffing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> set staffing levels <input type="checkbox"/> designate who may be assigned <input type="checkbox"/> provide for regular rotation of officers between posts <input type="checkbox"/> provide for regular rotation of officers between judges <input type="checkbox"/> suggest placement of officers during hearings and different contingencies <input type="checkbox"/> specify procedures for controlling the public in the courtroom 			
10.	How familiar are security officers with the policy on duties and authority?			
11.	Are security staff in uniform?			
12.	Do security staff have adequate time and attention to devote to their security function (i.e., clerical or other functions do not take precedence over security)?			
13.	What non-security duties are security staff required to perform?			
14.	Are prisoners primarily supervised by security staff in the courtroom?			
15.	Are prisoners kept in restraints except when in the courtroom?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Courtroom Procedures	YES	NO	N/A
16.	Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation from the courtroom?			
17.	Per policy, who is responsible for evacuating: <input type="checkbox"/> prisoners <input type="checkbox"/> judges <input type="checkbox"/> jurors			
18.	Have bailiffs or security staff been trained in the procedures for the emergency evacuation of: <input type="checkbox"/> prisoners <input type="checkbox"/> judges <input type="checkbox"/> jurors			
19.	Is there a procedure for a weapons and contraband search operation for entry to courtrooms?			
20.	Are persons facing sentencing searched prior to entering court?			
21.	Have court staff been trained in relevant policies and procedures?			
22.	Have appropriate court staff received copies and signed for relevant: <input type="checkbox"/> security policies and procedures <input type="checkbox"/> emergency policies and procedures			
23.	Have judges been trained on procedures and their role in emergency evacuation of the courtroom?			
24.	Have court staff been trained on procedures and their role in emergency evacuation of the courtroom			
25.	Do policies and procedures appear to be uniformly applied throughout the court facility and in all courtrooms?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Judicial Chambers	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is there a private secured traffic pattern that allows access to court offices, chambers, and courtroom?			
2.	Are prisoners transported through the chambers area? If yes, list precautions:			
3.	How is visitor access to chambers controlled? <input type="checkbox"/> electronic release locks with: <input type="checkbox"/> CCTV <input type="checkbox"/> intercom <input type="checkbox"/> visual <input type="checkbox"/> other: Who is responsible for screening visitors? Who escorts visitors?			
4.	Are judges' chambers routinely searched?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Judicial Chambers	YES	NO	N/A
5.	Who screens the judges mail? How are suspicious packages or letters examined before delivery to judges?			
6.	Do the chambers have more than one entry/exit?			
7.	Does each chamber have: <input type="checkbox"/> More than one entry/exit <input type="checkbox"/> Lock on each door <input type="checkbox"/> Doors with automatic closing and locking hardware <input type="checkbox"/> Duress alarm <input type="checkbox"/> portable Were does the duress alarm ring <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency lighting <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone <input type="checkbox"/> Windows <input type="checkbox"/> covered (curtains, reflective film, etc) <input type="checkbox"/> screened <input type="checkbox"/> ground level <input type="checkbox"/> barred <input type="checkbox"/> ballistic resistant			
8.	Are the chambers routinely locked when the judge is not present?			
9.	When occupied by the judge, are the chambers' doors usually: <input type="checkbox"/> open <input type="checkbox"/> closed <input type="checkbox"/> locked			
10.	Are outside views into chambers (especially of judges' desk) obscured?			
11.	Do any judges wear their robes outside of the courtroom and chambers?			
12.	Does the door between the chambers and courtroom contain a deadbolt lock?			
13.	Is the lock secured when the judge is not on the bench?			
14.	Are ballistic resistant vests available to judges: <input type="checkbox"/> routinely <input type="checkbox"/> during high-risk or sensitive trials			
15.	Are judges escorted between parking areas, chambers, and the courtroom <input type="checkbox"/> routinely <input type="checkbox"/> during high-risk or sensitive trials?			
16.	Do any judges carry firearms?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Jury Deliberation Room	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Is the jury deliberation room attached to the courtroom or accessible through a controlled passage?			
2.	Are rest rooms provided as an integral part of the deliberation area?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Jury Deliberation Room	YES	NO	N/A
3.	Does each deliberation room have: <input type="checkbox"/> Lock on the door <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency lighting <input type="checkbox"/> Windows <input type="checkbox"/> covered (curtains, reflective film, etc) <input type="checkbox"/> screened <input type="checkbox"/> ground level <input type="checkbox"/> barred <input type="checkbox"/> ballistic resistant			
4.	Is the deliberation room soundproofed well enough to prevent unauthorized persons from eavesdropping?			
5.	Is the deliberation room searched for contraband before occupancy?			
6.	Is the deliberation room locked when unoccupied?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Prisoner Entry	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are prisoners brought from jail to the court facility by (mark all that apply): <input type="checkbox"/> tunnel <input type="checkbox"/> bridge <input type="checkbox"/> vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> foot <input type="checkbox"/> other:			
2.	Are prisoners brought from into court facility through (mark all that apply): <input type="checkbox"/> sally port <input type="checkbox"/> private entrance <input type="checkbox"/> secured elevator <input type="checkbox"/> public hallway <input type="checkbox"/> other: <input type="checkbox"/> public entrance <input type="checkbox"/> secured stairway <input type="checkbox"/> private hallway			
3.	Is the prisoner entrance area equipped with gates/doors that can close the area to the public?			
4.	Is there more than one way for vehicles to exit the area?			
5.	Are gates electronically controlled from a remote station?			
6.	Is an interlocking system used so that the outer gate/door can be closed and locked before the interior door is opened?			
7.	Are law enforcement officers required to leave guns in locked cabinets before entering secure prisoner areas?			
8.	Is this area used exclusively for prisoner movement?			
9.	Which of the following prisoner areas are monitored by closed circuit TV: <input type="checkbox"/> Prisoner entry/reception <input type="checkbox"/> Prisoner passageway <input type="checkbox"/> Prisoner stairway <input type="checkbox"/> Holding Cell <input type="checkbox"/> Secured elevator			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Prisoner Entry	YES	NO	N/A
10.	Which of the following prisoner areas have duress alarms: <input type="checkbox"/> Prisoner entry/reception <input type="checkbox"/> Holding Cell <input type="checkbox"/> Prisoner passageway <input type="checkbox"/> Secured elevator <input type="checkbox"/> Prisoner stairway			
11.	Is the entrance for prisoners out of public view?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Prisoner Holding Cells	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are temporary holding facilities located in the court building? <input type="checkbox"/> Central holding area <input type="checkbox"/> Holding cells adjacent to courtrooms			
2.	If not, where and how are prisoners held?			
3.	How many holding cells are there? List location, capacity, and proximity to the courtrooms.			
4.	Do temporary holding cells open directly into: <input type="checkbox"/> the courtroom <input type="checkbox"/> a restricted passage			
5.	Does each cell have adequate: <input type="checkbox"/> size (70 sq ft minimum) <input type="checkbox"/> fixed benches <input type="checkbox"/> toilet facility <input type="checkbox"/> wash basin <input type="checkbox"/> lighting <input type="checkbox"/> controlled from outside the cell) <input type="checkbox"/> emergency lighting <input type="checkbox"/> view of entire cell <input type="checkbox"/> in-door observation ports			
6.	Are cells built securely and in a way that reduces opportunities for self-inflicted injuries by prisoners (metal bars, phone cords, etc.)?			
7.	Is at least one holding cell equipped for audio and/or visual coverage of courtroom proceedings?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Prisoner Holding Cells	YES	NO	N/A
8.	How are cell doors locked and unlocked: <input type="checkbox"/> electrically <input type="checkbox"/> manually <input type="checkbox"/> remote command center <input type="checkbox"/> directly (e.g. w/key) <input type="checkbox"/> both remotely and directly			
9.	Are keys issued to people other than security personnel for: <input type="checkbox"/> temporary holding cells <input type="checkbox"/> prisoner elevators <input type="checkbox"/> secured passageways			
10.	Are temporary holding area keys ones that cannot normally be duplicated commercially?			
11.	Are security staff prohibited from removing keys from the building?			
12.	Are prisoners searched prior to entering or leaving a holding cell?			
13.	Are cells and areas used by prisoners searched for contraband before and after use?			
14.	Are prisoners kept in restraints except when in the cell?			
15.	Are additional restraining devices available? What are they? Where are they located?			
16.	Are juveniles separated (by sight and sound) from other prisoners?			
17.	Are female prisoners separated (by sight and sound) from male prisoners?			
18.	Are there appropriate accommodations for mentally ill and handicapped prisoners?			
19.	Are there written procedures for the emergency evacuation of prisoners from temporary holding areas?			
20.	Is the emergency evacuation route secured?			
21.	Are a complete set of emergency keys maintained in a secured area? How are they secured?			
22.	Is a self-contained breathing apparatus available? List locations			
23.	Have security and transportation officers been trained on procedures for emergency evacuation of prisoners from temporary holding areas?			
24.	Is there a procedure for handling the medical emergencies of prisoners?			
25.	Have officers been trained in procedures for handling medical emergencies?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR: RESTRICTED Prisoner Secured Passageways	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Do prisoners walk through public areas when going from temporary holding areas to court?			
2.	Are prisoners brought from the courthouse holding area in the courtroom by (mark all that apply): <input type="checkbox"/> public elevator <input type="checkbox"/> secured elevator <input type="checkbox"/> stairway <input type="checkbox"/> public hallway <input type="checkbox"/> private hallway <input type="checkbox"/> private entrance <input type="checkbox"/> public entrance			
3.	Are restricted passages also used by judges and court staff?			
4.	Are keys to secure passageways issued to people other than sheriff's personnel? If so, to whom?			
5.	Are the stairways used for prisoner movement adequately lighted?			
6.	Are stairways and stairwells enclosed with protective metal grilles?			

	BUILDING INTERIOR Gun Cabinets	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are the number of gun cabinets adequate?			
2.	Are gun storage areas locked with keys that cannot normally be duplicated commercially?			

BUILDING INTERIOR RESTRICTED AREA SECURITY CONCERNS

Briefly summarize the major concerns identified in this section.

	SECURITY STAFF Training	YES	NO	N/A
1.	Are security staff certified as police officers by MLEOTC?			
2.	How many hours of formal instruction or training are given to staff newly assigned to court security functions?			
3.	Are security staff required to complete and pass court security specific training?			
4.	Have security staff have been trained in relevant policies and procedures?			
5.	Have appropriate staff received copies and signed for relevant security policies and procedures?			
6.	Do security staff receive instruction on the court's "shoot-don't shoot" policy?			
7.	How often are security staff required to qualify with the weapons and ammunition that they carry on the job?			
8.	Do security staff receive in-service training and are they certified, retrained, or refreshed in high risk areas on a regular basis in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Handguns <input type="checkbox"/> Non-lethal weapons [mace, batons, etc] <input type="checkbox"/> First aid and CPR <input type="checkbox"/> Restraints and use of force <input type="checkbox"/> Self-defense <input type="checkbox"/> Other: 			
9.	Are opportunities offered for ongoing training or refresher courses in the following areas? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Behavioral psychology <input type="checkbox"/> Laws of arrest, search, restraint, and use of force <input type="checkbox"/> Use of lethal and non-lethal weapons, and weapons retention <input type="checkbox"/> Controlling violent persons and Court disruptions <input type="checkbox"/> Bombs and bomb detection <input type="checkbox"/> Securing court facilities <input type="checkbox"/> Concealed and disguised weapons, and contraband identification and detection <input type="checkbox"/> Crowd and riot control <input type="checkbox"/> Use of all security equipment and devices <input type="checkbox"/> Fire safety and control <input type="checkbox"/> Cultural and ethnic sensitivity <input type="checkbox"/> Commands in foreign languages common to the area <input type="checkbox"/> Hostage situations <input type="checkbox"/> Protection of persons at risk <input type="checkbox"/> Jury management, and sequestered juries <input type="checkbox"/> High risk trial policy and procedures <input type="checkbox"/> Prisoner control and transport <input type="checkbox"/> Court structure, protocol, operations, and procedures <input type="checkbox"/> Legal processes <input type="checkbox"/> Familiarization with local processes, procedures and policies <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Response <input type="checkbox"/> Other: 			
10.	How many hours of annual in-service training is required?			

SECURITY STAFF SECURITY CONCERNS

Briefly summarize the major security concerns regarding security staff responsibilities, selection, training, and general guidelines.

**Michigan Supreme Court
State Court Administrative Office
Hall of Justice
P.O. Box 30048
Lansing MI 48909
(517) 373-4835**

COURT SECURITY OVERVIEW

Name of Court: _____

Name of Facility: _____

Street Address: _____

City/State/Zip: _____

Date Completed: _____

INSTRUCTIONS:

The Court Security Overview form is intended to collect information from local courts needed for a court security audit.

- 1) Complete a Court Security Overview form for each building.
- 2) Complete a separate Judicial Chambers Worksheet for each judicial chamber.
- 3) Complete a separate Courtroom Security Worksheet for each courtroom.
- 4) Return the completed forms and all requested attachments to the State Court Administrative Office.

The following terms are defined to assist in the completion of this document.

Building: Any structure that houses any area designated for use by the Judiciary or court staff. Include governmentally owned facilities as well as leased space.

Judicial Facility: The space within the building that is designated for use, in whole or in part, by the Judiciary, judicial staff, or court staff.

Adjacent Building Areas: All areas of the building which are not part of the judicial facility. Areas also include public areas and, non-judicial offices.

General Building Information

Briefly describe the County where the building is located (population, population centers, main businesses, urban, rural, highlights, etc.)

Briefly describe the city or community where the building is located (population, main businesses, urban, suburban, rural, community highlights, etc.)

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE - COURT SECURITY OVERVIEW

Briefly describe the immediate environment of the building in all directions: (business, urban, sub-urban, residential, industrial, etc.)

Is the building publicly or privately owned? Who owns the building?

How many floors does the building have (including sub-levels)?

Which floors contain Judicial facilities?

What is the type of building construction (concrete, brick, glass siding, steel framed, etc.)?

Building Construction Date:

Building Addition(s) Date(s):

Judicial Facility last renovated date:

Is the building a historically registered landmark?

☐ Yes ☐ No

Are there any plans to move, renovate, remodel, or build any part of the judicial facility?

☐ Yes ☐ No

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE - COURT SECURITY OVERVIEW

PARKING:

	<u>Location</u>	<u>Reserved Judicial</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Public</u>
Private or Commercial Lot	_____	_____	_____	_____
Municipal Public Lot	_____	_____	_____	_____
On Street	_____	_____	_____	_____
Building Exterior Lot	_____	_____	_____	_____
Building Interior	_____	_____	_____	_____

BUILDING ENTRANCES:

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Locations</u>
Public:	_____	_____
Private:	_____	_____

ELEVATORS:

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Locations</u>
General Public	_____	_____
Private Use	_____	_____
Prisoner	_____	_____

STAIRWAYS:

Number allowing access to all floors	_____
Number allowing access to Judicial facilities (points of access alarmed <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No)	_____
Number of internal fire escapes	_____
Number of external fire escapes	_____

*** Please attach floor plan(s) for the entire building.

*** Please attach a complete list of tenant agencies/departments by floor.

Building Security Information

Who is responsible for overall building security (private owner, government entity, sheriff, other)?

When was the last physical security audit or survey conducted? _____

Who conducted the last audit or survey? _____

*** Please attach a copy of the last survey and recommendations

PERIMETER

Do uniformed security staff patrol the perimeter of the building?

☐ Yes ☐ No Frequency of patrol: _____

Is the perimeter of the building monitored by closed-circuit TV?

☐ Yes ☐ No Number of cameras: _____

List the locations of the cameras:

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE - COURT SECURITY OVERVIEW

INTRUSION ALARMS

Does the building have intrusion alarm systems covering:

Doors?	<input type="checkbox"/> All	<input type="checkbox"/> Some	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Windows?	<input type="checkbox"/> All	<input type="checkbox"/> Some	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Interior areas?	<input type="checkbox"/> All	<input type="checkbox"/> Some	<input type="checkbox"/> None

Does the judicial facility have intrusion alarm systems covering:

Doors?	<input type="checkbox"/> All	<input type="checkbox"/> Some	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Windows?	<input type="checkbox"/> All	<input type="checkbox"/> Some	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Interior areas?	<input type="checkbox"/> All	<input type="checkbox"/> Some	<input type="checkbox"/> None

List special alarmed points or areas of protection within the judicial facility (safes/vaults, file areas, offices/chambers, etc):

Where does the system send the alarm? (e.g. Sheriff Dept., central dispatch, private company, etc)

*** Please provide a copy of all contracts associated with the alarm system.

WEAPONS SCREENING

Are there signs announcing screening posted at all entrances?

☐ Yes ☐ No

What do the signs say?:

Are people and packages screened at all unsecured entrances?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, how are they screened? (list manufacturer and model for each)

<input type="checkbox"/> Metal detector - walkthrough	<input type="checkbox"/> Metal detector - x-ray
<input type="checkbox"/> Metal detector - handheld	<input type="checkbox"/> Visual inspection
<input type="checkbox"/> x-ray	<input type="checkbox"/> e-scan

Who is allowed to by-pass weapons screening?

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE - COURT SECURITY OVERVIEW

Who accesses building via secured entrances?

Are people and packages ever searched at secured entrances

☐ Yes ☐ No Explain _____

What is screening searching for?

What happens to confiscated items?

*** Please attach copies of the building's and/or court's weapons policy, weapons screening policy, and any administrative orders regarding weapons, or weapons screening.

INTERIOR:

Do uniformed security staff patrol the interior of the building?

☐ Yes ☐ No Frequency of patrol? _____

Is the interior of the building monitored by closed-circuit TV?

☐ Yes ☐ No Number of cameras: _____

List the locations of the cameras:

*** Please attach a complete listing and description each security post and/or description of patrol duties and schedule.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Are there written emergency procedures for:

Medical Emergency	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Fire	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Bomb Threat (evacuation and search)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
General Evacuation	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Natural Disaster	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
-Tornado	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
-Severe Weather	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
-Flood	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
-Winter/Cold	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Power/utility failure	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Civil Disorder	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Hostage Situation	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Prisoner Escape	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

*** Please attach copies of each of the written emergency procedure plans.

When was the last local fire department inspection of this building? _____

*** Attach a copy of the inspection report

Is the building equipped with fire sprinkler system? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Is the building equipped with an emergency generator? ☐ Yes ☐ No

How many First Aid _____ and CPR _____ trained persons are on the court staff?

How many First Aid kits are available? _____

Prisoner Transport and Holding

Who is responsible for transporting prisoners to the courthouse? _____

Is there a secured place to bring prisoners into the courthouse? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Are prisoners transported through a secured passage in the courthouse? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Does the courthouse have holding cells? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Are there adequate facilities to segregate:

Prisoners of different sexes ☐ Yes ☐ No

Juvenile prisoners ☐ Yes ☐ No

Hostile groups ☐ Yes ☐ No

Does the holding cell have any blind spots that can not be observed from the outside of the cell?
☐ Yes ☐ No

Is/are the holding cell(s) equipped with:

fixed benches ☐ Yes ☐ No

toilet facility ☐ Yes ☐ No

wash basin ☐ Yes ☐ No

Audio (to hear proceedings) ☐ Yes ☐ No

Video (to see proceedings) ☐ Yes ☐ No

Who is responsible for prisoners in the courtroom? _____

Are there adequate facilities for attorney-client conferences for prisoners?

Are all prisoners searched prior to putting them into a cell?

What is the established ratio of prisoners to transport officers? _____

Security Guard Force

Are uniformed security personnel provided to the building?

☐ Yes ☐ No

Is the security force (check all that apply):

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Number</u>
Private	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Sheriff's Employee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Sheriff's Contract	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Court Employee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Court Contract	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
County Employee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
County Contract	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____

Other: (describe) _____

*** Please provide copies of all contracts for security services with both public and private entities.

Who is responsible for the hiring and supervision of the security staff?

Who completes, and to what extent are background investigations done on court security staff?

Does the building contain a staffed security office or command post? ☐ Yes ☐ No

What hours is it staffed? _____

<u>Staff Assignments</u>	<u>Number of Staff</u>	<u>Hours of Duty</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Building Security	_____	_____	_____
Weapons Screening	_____	_____	_____
Courtroom Security	_____	_____	_____

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE - COURT SECURITY OVERVIEW

Is the security force issued or allowed to carry:

	Yes	No
Handguns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Handcuffs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Non-lethal weapons:		
Baton	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Flashlights	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tear / Pepper Gas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Two-way radios	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

What training have security personnel received?

If private security personnel carry weapons, what is the legal basis for them doing so?

If private security personnel arrest or detain people until arrested, what is the legal basis for them doing so?

Courtroom Security Survey

Date: _____ Floor and Room Number: _____

Are persons entering the courtroom area required to pass through weapons screening?

☐ Yes ☐ No

How many entrances does the courtroom have?

How many are private entrances?

How many are public entrances?

Is there a private secured route from the judicial chambers into the courtroom?

☐ Yes ☐ No

Is there a private secured route for prisoner transport into the courtroom?

☐ Yes ☐ No

Does the courtroom have:

an Armored Bench ? ☐ Yes ☐ No

List ballistic resistant material and rating if known: _____

Duress Alarms? ☐ Yes ☐ No

List locations: _____

Where do duress alarms ring? _____

Emergency Lighting? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Secured, keyed or light switches inaccessible to the public? ☐ Yes ☐ No

a Telephone? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Windows? ☐ Yes ☐ No

are they covered? ☐ Yes ☐ No

are they screened? ☐ Yes ☐ No

are they on ground level? ☐ Yes ☐ No

are they barred? ☐ Yes ☐ No

List other security related concerns or comments regarding courtroom: _____

Judicial Chambers Security Survey

Date: _____ Floor and Room Number: _____

Judge: _____

Are persons entering the chambers area required to pass through weapons screening?
☐ Yes ☐ No

How many entrances does the chambers area have? _____

How many are private entrances? _____ Number locked at all times: _____

How many are public entrances? _____ Number locked at all times: _____

How are each of the entrances monitored and access controlled? _____

Is there a private secured route from the judicial chambers into the courtroom? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Are prisoners transported through this area? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Does each chamber have:

a Lock on each door? ☐ Yes ☐ No

a Duress Alarm? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Is duress alarm portable? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Where does the duress alarm ring? _____

Emergency Lighting? ☐ Yes ☐ No

a Telephone? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Windows? ☐ Yes ☐ No

are they covered? ☐ Yes ☐ No

are they screened? ☐ Yes ☐ No

are they on ground level? ☐ Yes ☐ No

are they barred? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Is there a private secured elevator in the chambers area? ☐ Yes ☐ No

How is the elevator marked, and access and usage controlled? _____

How does uniformed security staff provide security to this area? _____

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE - COURT SECURITY OVERVIEW

What type of parking is provided for the Judge? _____

How is the parking space designated? _____

How is the parking area secured? _____

Is the parking area serviced by a secured elevator, or secured corridor for easy access to the secured chambers area? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Please describe the most serious incident to occur within your facility or courtroom:

What enhancements would you like to see to improve security or minimize disruption to the judicial process:

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE - COURT SECURITY OVERVIEW

Names of Key Personnel:

Chief Judge: _____

Court Administrator _____

Sheriff: _____

Court Security Chief: _____

Head of Building Maintenance: _____

Court Related Department Heads (e.g. Probation, FOC, Court Clerk)

NAME	Dept	Title
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

Is there an established Security Committee? ☐ Yes ☐ No

How often do they meet? _____

When was their last meeting? _____

What is their established function? _____

*** Please attach a list of security committee members, their department, and title.

*** Please attach copies of minutes from their last several meetings.

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE - COURT SECURITY OVERVIEW

Please make sure you attached all of the following requested materials:

- Copy of the last security survey and recommendations.
- Copies of your weapons policy, weapons screening policy, and any administrative orders regarding weapons, or weapons screening.
- A complete listing and description each security post and/or description of patrol duties and schedule.
- Copies of all contracts associated with the alarm system.
- Copies of each of the written emergency procedure plans.
- Copy of the most recent fire department inspection report
- Copies of all contracts for security services with both public and private entities.
- List of members of the security committee and their department and title.
- Copies of minutes from their last several security committee meetings.

Court Security Standards

Michigan State Court Administrative Office



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INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATION OF STANDARDS MICHIGAN COURT SECURITY STANDARDS

Introduction and Application of Standards

Michigan Courthouses represent justice under law and reason. Court facilities must be as safe and secure as practicable for all those who visit and work there.

The Court Security Standards balance many competing concerns. It is recognized that there has been an increase in violence in our society and that courts deal with emotional issues. It is also recognized that the diversity of the court system—urban and rural, large and small—affects the ability of communities to meet the financial burden of providing security. The standards attempt to balance the diverse interests in each community by the use of local court security advisory committees for each trial and appellate court. The committees will be comprised of a broad range of interested community parties, and will examine each court's security needs, including the facilities and the resources available, and adopt a plan that addresses the unique needs of that court.

These standards are not mandates. Rather, they are goals to which courts and local communities should aspire to ensure safe access to all. Each court should review its security operations and security plan **annually** in order to improve and update both.



1.1 WRITTEN COURT SECURITY MANUAL

All courts should have a written court security manual that contains the following elements:

- **A physical security plan** that addresses landscaping, parking, interior and exterior lighting, interior and exterior doors, intrusion and detection alarms, windows, fire detection and protection, and auxiliary power.
- **Routine security operations.**
- **Special operations plans** that address high-profile trials, emphasizing security and emergency responses.
- **Emergency procedures** that address evacuation, medical emergencies, bombs and bomb threats, hostage situations, escapes, assaults, utility failures, fire, natural disasters, chemical or biological threats, civil disturbances, and the use of universal precautions.
- **A response plan** developed in conjunction with emergency first responders.
- **Lock-down plans** that address situations where safety requires all doors to be locked and all public and staff to remain in place (e.g., hostage and weapon incidents).
- **Essential services contingency plans** that address the need for a backup system to coordinate and run essential court services if a court facility is damaged or otherwise unsuitable for use. This plan should also include providing local law enforcement with addresses and telephone numbers for judges and the court administrator.
- **A plan** for backup and recovery of court records in the event of fire, flood, or other disaster
- **Protocol** for providing building and floor plans to emergency responders for use in training for and in emergencies.
- **Incident reporting procedures.**
- **Mail-handling procedures.**
- **Threatening or inappropriate correspondence.**
- **Court security officer qualifications and duties.**
- **A high risk trial plan.**

Discussion: The manual should be distributed to all affected court staff and updated annually. However, to maintain security, certain sections of the manual may require limited distribution.



1.2 STANDING COMMITTEE ON SECURITY

Each court should have a standing committee on court security. The chief judge or the court administrator should chair this committee, which should include the Court Security Coordinator and Emergency Services Coordinator, representatives from all court divisions, representatives from the sheriff department or other law enforcement agency that provides security for the court, and representatives from the funding unit.

Discussion: The court should regularly and frequently review security measures to stay current with changing events. The security committee should be charged with the development of a practical safety and security process and with updating emergency policies and procedures. The committee should also conduct an annual security audit of the court facility and the surrounding area.

1.3 COURT SECURITY COORDINATOR AND EMERGENCY SERVICES COORDINATOR

Each court should appoint a Court Security Coordinator and an Emergency Services Coordinator.

Discussion: Each court should have one person, the Court Security Coordinator, who is responsible for maintaining the court's security procedures and coordinating training for court staff. The court also needs an Emergency Services Coordinator who would be the liaison with the local Emergency Services Board. The Emergency Services Coordinator ensures that the court's contingency plan is carried out in any emergency. The same person could serve as Court Security Coordinator and Emergency Services Coordinator. However, it is important to establish a clear line of authority to activate emergency/security responses, such as evacuation.

In a facility with multiple courts, the courts should, if possible, have one person handle these duties for all the courts. If the court shares the facility with non-judicial agencies, the court should cooperate with the local funding unit and the other agencies to coordinate security and an emergency plan. In any shared facility, the chief judge has ultimate authority and responsibility for the security of areas the court uses.

The name(s) and contact information for court security and emergency services coordinators should be provided to the State Court Administrative Office and appropriate local law enforcement and emergency services personnel.



1.4 REPORTING OF ALL SECURITY INCIDENTS TO SCAO

All courts should immediately report all security breaches to the law enforcement agency with local jurisdiction. All courts must also report all security incidents to SCAO and their funding unit's risk management department using the Court Security Incident Reporting Form.

Discussion: Because security is so important for the courts, security incidents should be reported accurately whenever they occur. This compiled data will allow the SCAO to recommend system-wide remedies to lessen the occurrence of security incidents.

Definition: "Incident" is defined as a bomb threat, escape, or other serious situation that disrupts court services.

1.5 SECURITY TRAINING FOR ALL COURT EMPLOYEES

All court employees should receive security training when hired and should receive supplemental training annually.

Discussion: Court staff need to know what is expected of them at all times. Security procedures should be reviewed annually with all staff. A mandatory training program should be established to include regular in-service security training.



2.1 LIMITED ACCESS—MAIN ENTRANCE AND EXIT

It is recommended that the court limit access to one main entrance and exit; however, all entrances should have weapon screening. *Everyone entering the court must pass through a screening process.*

Discussion: Limiting access/egress to one area allows better observation and detection and reduces the cost of weapon screening equipment and staff. If the staff and judiciary use a non-public entrance, provisions need to be made for weapon screening at this entrance. Entrances without screening should be locked and equipped with an alarm and a sign reading, "Emergency exit only; alarm will sound."

Courts with loading docks should make arrangements with all suppliers to provide necessary identification for drivers and to notify the court before making deliveries. The loading dock area should have personnel and equipment available to screen all incoming materials. All packages, including UPS, Federal Express, and USPS, should be x-rayed.

Prisoner transport/access areas should be secured and used for prisoners only.

Multi-use buildings create special problems. Courts should make all reasonable efforts to reach agreements with all entities sharing a building. If the court cannot agree with other tenants and the funding unit, the court needs to clearly define and secure its space. Anyone entering the court area should pass through a single point for observation and screening.

2.2 EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION CARDS

All court employees should wear a visible identification card.

Discussion: To be able to identify legitimate workers from visitors and others, employees should wear a pictured ID at all times. This ID may also be used as a key card for access to offices, etc. The ID should only show the employee's first name.



2.3 LOCKING MECHANISMS

All locking mechanisms should be as sophisticated as electronic access cards or better.

Discussion: Strict control of all locking devices should be maintained. The cleaning staff should not have unsupervised access to the court after hours. Keys and keypad locks are too easily compromised. New locking technology provides better security and easier replacement when compromised. The system should be administered by someone directly responsible to the court administrator or chief judge.

Electronic access cards are given to each employee. This individualized card is programmed to allow access only to certain areas. The access card also provides a record of each employee's movement in the building.

Biometric systems are more secure access devices. These systems rely on some human biology factor, such as retina scanners or voice identifiers for access. Also, a biometric system can be programmed to allow access only to certain areas. The biometric system also records each employee's movement in the building.



SECTION 3 - PHYSICAL FACILITY STANDARDS

MICHIGAN COURT SECURITY STANDARDS

3.1 FACILITY AND OFFICE DESIGN

Facility and office design should address security issues. Buildings should be designed so as to protect against attack.

Discussion: New facilities should be designed with three separate zones whenever possible: public zone, private zone for judges and staff, and a secure zone for moving prisoners. These zones should not cross. Additionally, design of offices where staff will be meeting with clients or the public should provide an escape route, either with a second exit or by strategic placement of the office furniture.

Each court should identify any areas, such as courtroom judges' benches, staff workstations, jury box, and public counters that require additional protection. There are options, including bullet-resistant material, that fall within a broad cost range. Courts should also identify what rooms could be used as "safe rooms" where staff can go during an incident.

3.2 INSTALLATION OF PHYSICAL BARRIERS

All courts should make arrangements to install physical barriers around the court building when necessary to limit the approach of cars and trucks.

Discussion: Each court should decide, in cooperation with local law enforcement and the court's funding unit, whether physical barriers are required. Information about where to get barriers and how they will be deployed should be part of any court security plan.



3.3 SECURE PARKING

All courts should have secure parking for judges, staff, jurors, and witnesses who have been threatened.

Discussion: Some security incidents have occurred in parking areas before the victim even reaches the courthouse. Judges and staff, who are vulnerable to attack simply by virtue of their positions, need secure parking. Jurors and threatened witnesses also need secure parking if they are to fulfill their roles in the justice system. However, jurors and witnesses should not park in the judge/staff parking area.

Ideally, parking would be in a fenced area, with vehicle and pedestrian access limited by a gate controlled by a card-key or other access control device. Judges and/or staff should have direct access to secured corridors or elevators from the parking area.

As an alternative, the court may reserve parking spaces for staff and provide occasional patrols. Judicial parking should be in reserved spots adjacent to the building. Signs reserving parking should in no way indicate who is parking in the spots. However, since all courts are not able to secure their parking areas, all staff and jurors should be alert to special circumstances.

3.4 HOLDING AREAS

All courts should have a secure holding area for temporary prisoners.

Discussion: Courts need secure holding areas where prisoners can be locked up and isolated while waiting to appear in court or be returned to jail. Holding areas should:

- Be constructed to lessen the possibility of self-inflicted injury.
- Be inspected daily for contraband.
- Include doors that allow for easy observation.
- Include toilet facilities.
- Be checked by staff every 30 minutes.
- Have CCTV monitoring, if possible.
- Have a self-contained breathing apparatus.

Every court should work with the local sheriff or police to develop emergency procedures for prisoner control and evacuation.



SECTION 3 - PHYSICAL FACILITY STANDARDS

MICHIGAN COURT SECURITY STANDARDS

3.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS

All environmental controls in court facilities should be secured, with access restricted to authorized personnel.

Discussion: In order to avoid tampering and sabotage, access to controls for heating, air-conditioning, ventilation, etc., should be limited to authorized staff. Outside air intake mechanisms should also be secured so they cannot be used as access to the building or as a conduit for biochemical attack.



4.1 SCREENING FOR WEAPONS

All courts should screen for weapons at every access point.

Discussion: Weapons screening is an essential part of court security. *All persons entering the court facility should be subject to security screening.*

A proper weapons screening station has:

- Adequate room for people to congregate inside, out of the weather, without being so crowded as to present additional security problems.
- A magnetometer, x-ray equipment, and hand-held magnetometers for backup screening.
- A duress alarm to summon additional help if needed.
- Closed circuit television monitoring of the access point.
- Adequate staffing of at least two trained staff to monitor traffic flow and at least one officer with a weapon to observe and respond to emergencies.
- Access to a private area to conduct more thorough searches using same gender personnel.

The court's weapons screening policy should include:

- A list of restricted items.
- A secondary screening policy for people who have not successfully passed through after two tries.
- Storage and disposal of confiscated items.
- Protocols for appropriate responses to attempts to bring in weapons and dealing with law enforcement personnel.

4.2 SIGNS ANNOUNCING WEAPON SCREENING

Signs notifying the public about weapons screening should be prominently displayed.

Discussion: The goal of a security system is to deter incidents. Proper signage indicates that the court is conducting weapons screening. Signs should also state that both individuals and their belongings will be searched. This message often will be enough to keep weapons out of the courthouse. The signs should be large, positioned both outside the courthouse and just inside the court entrance, and in appropriate languages. The court should follow the SCAO guidelines for wording and have the chief judge's signature attached.



4.3 INTRUSION AND DURESS ALARMS

The court should have both intrusion and duress alarms.

Discussion: *Intrusion alarms* are designed to alert the court to unauthorized entry after hours. The alarms can be of several varieties, including space alarms, vibration alarms, and door contact alarms. The alarm system can be set to produce a loud sound to alert the police and deter entry, or alarms can be silent to alert police only.

Duress alarms are designed to signal for immediate help. Recommended locations include: judges' benches and/or staff positions in the courtroom, chambers, cashier stations, probation offices, and any office where staff may meet alone with the public. Key issues with duress alarms are:

- Staff must be trained in both the locations and use of the alarms.
- The alarm should sound at the court's security station **and** at the responding law enforcement agency.
- Clear response protocols must be established with responding agencies. The court should accept only a response protocol that includes immediate assistance and no verification or cancellation by telephone.

Door alarms should also be placed in all exits from the building. Staff sometimes prop doors open for breaks and then forget to close them. Side doors should be marked, "Emergency exit only; alarm will sound."

Court policy should address:

- The process for activating and deactivating the building alarms.
- Response to building alarms after hours and requirements for notifying court staff.

4.4 TESTING OF SECURITY EQUIPMENT

All courts and/or funding units should have a schedule for maintaining and testing all security equipment.

Discussion: Equipment should be properly maintained and tested on a schedule in order to ensure that it will work well.



4.5 CALLER ID ON PHONES

All courts should have “Caller ID” installed on their phone systems.

Discussion: Caller ID will allow courts to identify individuals who call in bomb threats or make other threatening calls to the court. Although Caller ID can be blocked, uninformed users may provide their telephone number to the court. For Caller ID to work, staff will need to be provided with telephones that can display the incoming caller number.

4.6 SECURITY POLICY RESTRICTING WEAPONS

Each court should have a security policy that restricts weapons or other items that pose a security risk in the court facility.

Discussion: Pursuant to Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 2001-1, every court must have a security policy that prohibits weapons or other items that pose a security risk in any courtroom, office, or other space used for official court business or by judicial employees, unless the chief judge or other person designated by the chief judge has given prior approval consistent with the court’s written policy. The policy should address whether law enforcement officers may carry their weapons in the court facility, and any restrictions on their doing so. (See Administrative Order 2001-1.)

The policy should also include other potential items that each court determines should be prohibited for security reasons. The policies should be reviewed on a regular basis.

4.7 USE OF FORCE POLICY

Each court should establish a “use of force” policy for court employees providing security.

Discussion: Security employees require specific direction and training on the appropriate use of force. Courts should adopt the policy that is used by the Sheriff department or local law enforcement agency that provides security for the court. If the court employs its own security staff, they should adopt the Sheriff or local law enforcement policy or develop a similar policy. Model policies are available from the SCAO. Sheriff or local law enforcement department policies should govern sheriff-supplied personnel supplied by those agencies.

Appendix A

COURT SECURITY OFFICER DUTIES

INTRODUCTION

The role of the court security officer is to ensure that the business of the court will be done in a secure environment. Therefore the overall goals of the court security officer are to ensure: no disorder, no contraband, and no escape.

To achieve these goals the court security officer has responsibilities to: **secure the building** which includes outside security, access and egress issues, weapons screening and alarm protocols; **provide courtroom security** which includes searches, and managing the courtroom; and **manage prisoners** which includes use of restraints and transportation issues. Each of these broad areas of responsibility is discussed below.

SECURING THE COURT BUILDING

The security of the court building is a major part of the overall security plan. There are four areas of concern regarding the security of the court building: outside security, access and egress, weapons screening, and alarm protocols. Each of these areas has their own issues as discussed below.

Outside Security

The area outside the court building is part of the overall concern for security. The outside area is a place to hide weapons, explosives and/or is an area of vulnerability for those people entering the court.

Each day, and more often during trials, the exterior of the court building should be searched for any problems. If the court has a parking area this area should also be searched. Particular attention should be placed on trash containers or other receptacles where weapons or explosives could be placed.

The court security officer also must observe the landscaping around the building and make sure that proper maintenance is being done.

Access and Egress

Access control is one of the most important components of effective court security. Ideally, ***public access/egress should be restricted to a single entrance***, and this entrance should be staffed by trained security personnel.

Court staff, judges, and prisoners should each have a separate, dedicated entrance. These entrances should be monitored whenever the building is open.

Service and delivery areas should be monitored whenever in use. Delivery personnel must be required to announce their arrival, and produce positive (photo) identification.

Security personnel need to visually and physically inspect all packages entering the court building.

Building exits must be clearly marked and signed “*Emergency Exit Only – Alarm will Sound*”. Alarm systems should be installed on all exit doors to insure the integrity of the security system.

Security staff must be aware of all potential building entry points. These include roof access and any access from underground tunnels, grates, etc. All of these potential entry points must be secured and alarmed.

Weapons Screening

Weapons screening is another important component of the overall security plan. Weapons come in all forms. Given the right situation, almost any item can be fashioned into a weapon. Weapons screening therefore, is a difficult and ongoing task. **There should be a clear understanding by screening personnel as to what constitutes a prohibited item, i.e. contraband.**

A fully equipped weapons screening station has:

- ! Adequate room for people to congregate inside, out of the weather, without being so crowded as to present its own security problem.
- ! A walk through magnetometer, x-ray equipment, and hand-held magnetometers for backup screening
- ! A duress alarm system to summon additional help if needed
- ! CCTV monitoring of access control points
- ! Adequate staffing – ***two to monitor traffic flow*** and at least ***one armed officer to observe and be prepared to respond to emergencies.***

Key considerations – screening

- ! Safety, security, and control are critical elements
- ! **Screening applies to everyone** requesting access to the court building
- ! The effectiveness of the system will determine the integrity of the process

The goals of weapons screening are to:

- ! Protect – citizens and court employees
- ! Prohibit – potential weapons from entering the court building
- ! Control – activity within the court building.

SEARCH ISSUE	POSSIBLE SEARCH TECHNIQUE
People-clothing	Walk through magnetometer
Packages/Briefcases	X-ray equipment
Other items	Hand-held magnetometer

All persons requesting access to the court building **must successfully pass through the screening station.**

Duress Alarms/Alarm Protocols

Duress alarms installed at security checkpoints enable staff to summon help at times of emergency. Two types of alarm systems are common to security checkpoints.

- ! Audible alarm
- ! Silent alarm

While the audible alarm is designed to alert staff of a problem at the screening station, many access control points also have silent alarms that report directly to a police dispatch unit who would summon emergency assistance when needed. Proper and appropriate use of these systems is dependent on: adequate staffing, training, and practice.

Alarm protocols are an essential component of the Critical Emergency Response process. Protocols should alert staff to pending or active emergencies.

Duress Alarm Testing Protocol

Duress alarms should be tested at least daily. The proper testing is to contact the alarm receiver, usually the responding police agency, and announce alarms are being tested. As each alarm is activated ask the receiver a) did they get the alarm?, and, b) which alarm annunciated?

Sample Alarm Protocol

ALARM STATUS	ACTION REQUIRED
No alarm	None: individuals pass through station without problems
Explainable Alarm	Individuals who set off an alarm but can satisfactorily demonstrate the cause of the alarm is innocent (coins, car keys, etc). More extensive screening is required to avoid trickery.
Unexplained Alarm	Unable to explain cause, alert condition exists
Duress Alarm Activation	Critical Emergency, response required

Duress alarms are an important component in the screening process. They should be strategically located at each critical security checkpoint. The Critical Emergency Response plan should include protocol for alarm response.

Sample Duress Alarm Protocol

ALARM STATUS	ACTION REQUIRED
Silent Alarm	Essential staff report to strategic points
Audible Alarm	Eminent threat of danger. Staff to respond to staging areas immediately.

Search Policy

Each court should develop, in conjunction with the local prosecutor or city attorney, a policy regarding confiscation of banned but not illegal, and illegal materials. There should also be a clear policy on charging people with possession of illegal items.

COURTROOM SECURITY

Providing the physical security of the courtroom is an ongoing process. Searching the courtroom and its environs is a critical task of the court security officer. Control is the key issue when dealing with courtroom security, however in order to maintain control, you must first gain control, i.e. by ensuring no weapons are present. In this section we will discuss search elements, search principles, and controlling the courtroom.

Search Elements

Five basic elements will determine the integrity of the courtroom search. The court security officer should:

- ! Be curious – stop, look and listen carefully whenever preparing, or actively searching.
- ! Be systematic – start to finish. Begin in a designated area, and search with a purpose.
- ! Avoid distractions.
- ! Be thorough – have a plan in mind (divide the area to be searched by height: floor to waist, waist to chin, chin to ceiling, and false ceiling) and do not deviate from it.
- ! Be safe – look before touching! Cases have shown that items are planted to injure the court security officer or to draw attention away from completing a thorough search. The court security officer should **wear gloves** and consider a simple “search kit.”

SAMPLE SEARCH KIT

Screwdrivers: Phillips head and standard

Pliers: multiple sizes

Blade: for cutting

Mirror: dentist type and larger

Evidence collection bags-various sizes

- ! Be objective.
- ! Be aware that discovery of one piece of contraband should only encourage additional checking for other pieces of contraband. Depending on local policy do not remove contraband until proper crime scene processing is complete.

Search Principles

In addition to the five basic search elements, there are some basic search principles that should be followed.

- ! ***RESOLVE ALL DOUBT.*** In other words, if the court security officer is not satisfied with the search of an area, it should be searched again.
- ! Common sense and natural curiosity are the court security officer's two most valuable tools. Knowledge of the physical plant is another critical element of successful room and building searches.
- ! Consider identifying "key" employees to assist with the search. These individuals may be able to point out things that seem "out of place."
- ! If a safety threat is located, immediately secure the area and then court.
- ! **DO NOT TOUCH SOMETHING YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND.**
- ! If an object that appears to be an explosive device is encountered, avoid using any electronic device or transmitter. Secure the area immediately.
- ! Keep in mind one more principle. *If you have that feeling, and think, "something is wrong," you are probably right. **Trust your instincts.***

Managing the Courtroom

Managing people is also an essential court security function. Usually the court security officer is charged with the responsibility of managing activity in and around the courtroom. To be effective, the court security officer must: be familiar with the rules of conduct, as defined by the court; and, have plans in place to stop the disruption.

Rules of Conduct

In most courts, a **basic conduct code** includes the following:

- ! No food or beverages of any kind are allowed in the courtroom.
- ! No radios, recording devices, cellular telephones, pagers, or video recorders are allowed without the consent of the presiding judge.
- ! No standing in public gallery.
- ! Disruptive behavior of any kind will not be allowed.
- ! Children and small infants may remain as long as no disruption occurs.

The court security officer's responsibility in managing the courtroom is threefold:

- ! **Communicate** – with the judge and other principles to determine whether special circumstances exist.
- ! **Coordinate** – all activity prior to the proceedings, **including how evidence will be controlled**. The court security officer should be aware of any potential weapons being introduced as evidence, and have plans in place for control of these items.
- ! **Control** – events as they arise.

The court security officer may consider a seating map or chart to avoid potential problems or disruptions. It is the responsibility of the court security officer to monitor and identify anyone that may require special attention.

Courtroom Disruptions

Disruptions are likely to occur at any time during the court process. Court security officers must be acutely aware of the signs and symptoms that are indicative of pending disruption. The awareness of those times and/or activities that trigger disruptive events is critical to that safe operation of the court.

CRITICAL EVENT	POSSIBLE REASON
Arraignment time	Fear of confinement
Sentencing	Dissatisfaction with sentence
Jury Verdict	Desire to escape, anger
Civil disposition	Anger/agitation
Custody orders	Emotional despair
Unruly spectators	Presence of friends
Media	Desire for publicity

It is the responsibility of the court security officer to know the court's rules regarding unruly individuals. Discuss potential problems and alternative solutions with the court in advance.

- ! Be prepared to act.
- ! Develop contingency plans.
- ! Know what/who you are dealing with.
- ! Gather intelligence.
- ! Assess potential threats.
- ! Re-assess your findings as the activity develops.

MANAGING PRISONERS

In this section the issues of searching prisoners, use of restraints, and prisoner transportation are discussed. **The court should have a policy on searching that includes people that have been out on bond/bail, and participants in contested hearings such as; high profile divorce and child custody cases.** These persons should be directed to the court security office where the search should be conducted prior to them entering the courtroom.

Prisoner Searches

The search is one of the most effective prisoner management tools available to the court security officer. When used properly, it sends clear messages to the prisoner about the officer, the officer's level of professionalism, and the officer's desire to follow the rules.

Every prisoner is a potential carrier of contraband and/or an escape risk

There are three basic types of searches.

- ! Pat down or "rub and squeeze" search. This method is described as a clothes body search. It is intended as a safety check for weapons and/or contraband.
- ! Strip search. **Only to be done by certified officers, of the same sex, and following written policy.** This search technique is described as an unclothed body search. Although more intrusive than the clothed search, it **may be conducted by trained staff** in a private location **if exigent circumstances** exist.
- ! Body cavity search. **Not to be done. If suspicion exists that warrant such a search it must be done following policy of the court.** This is an intrusive search that is generally ordered by search warrant and requires medically trained personnel.

For the court security officer the focus is on the “pat down” search. The same search elements we discussed earlier come into play again.

Be Curious, Be Systematic, Be Thorough, Be Safe, Be Objective

Search techniques **for prisoners:**

- ! Remove any jacket or coat the subject may be wearing and place these items in an area out of reach.
- ! Instruct the subject to remove all items from pockets.
- ! Remove shoes (and socks if necessary).
- ! Instruct the subject to face away from the searching officer, feet approximately two feet apart, arms outstretched, and fingers spread.
- ! Search should be conducted in an orderly fashion, beginning with the subject’s head.
- ! Instruct the subject to vigorously run his/her fingers through their hair. A comb may be used for this technique.
- ! Have the subject look up “chin to the ceiling.” Inspect nostrils then mouth having the subject roll his/her tongue side to side, as well as away from gums and teeth. He/she should be required to remove any dentures or plates.
- ! Search the shirt collar, inside and out. Whenever searching clothing, the court security officer should “rub and squeeze” the material rather than pat. Special attention should be given to linings, cuffs, and seams.
- ! Search the shoulder area.
- ! Search the arms, being sure to examine the whole arm. The natural tendency is to search only the outer arm. Items have been secured in hollowed body spaces such as the inside of the elbow joint.
- ! Search the chest area and the belt line. When searching female subjects, special attention should be given to the bra area. (NOTE: Ideally, same sex searches are preferred, however, if a male officer is searching a female, require her to unhook the bra and shake the material vigorously while leaning slightly forward.)
- ! Search the armpits and sides to the belt line.
- ! NOTE: Do not avoid any areas of the body. Although you are required to search areas considered private in nature, do not shy away. It is important to search every area.
- ! Search the back area from the shoulder to the belt line. Pay particular attention to the small of the back.

- ! Search the inside of the waist. The **subject's belt should always be removed and secured** with his/her property during transport, or while in lock-up.
- ! Search the lower abdomen, hips and buttocks. Pay particular attention to the buttocks as an area for weapon concealment.
- ! Search both legs from the subject's crotch to their feet. Do not be timid or allow yourself to be distracted when searching the crotch area.
- ! Inspect the toes and bottoms of both feet.
- ! Search the shoes, socks and outer clothing items removed earlier.
- ! Search the contents removed from the subject's pockets. All items should be inspected thoroughly, regardless of how innocent they may appear. Contraband should be inventoried, secured and reported.

Use of Restraints

Restraint devices are used to maximize control of a person. This is accomplished by limiting the free movement of a person's arms and legs, while still allowing for necessary movement. Because these are sometimes the only barriers to a person's freedom, it is important to understand the functions and limitations of restraining devices.

Knowledge of restraint devices is critical to proper application techniques. **A thorough body search should always precede the application of restraint devices.** Each restraint device has been manufactured with an intended purpose. Avoid creating techniques or using the restraint mechanism for something other than its intended purpose.

There are many types of **restraint systems** and some of the more common ones follow. **HANDCUFFS** are a restraining device that consists of two ratcheting jaws connected by a short chain or hinges. These devices are designed to attach to a person's wrists in order to restrict hand and arm movement. Handcuffs have a double lock function. This prevents the jaws from over tightening on the prisoner's wrists and prevents the jaws from being opened by shoving a shim or other object between the teeth on the jaw and the ratcheting device. On standard handcuffs, a court security officer can use the small pin on the top of the handcuff key to depress the double locking pins. Once double locked, handcuffs cannot be tightened or shimmed.

A court security officer must release the double locking system before removing the handcuffs. This is accomplished by inserting the handcuff key into the keyway and turning it counterclockwise. The key is turned clockwise to release the mechanism and open the handcuffs. **Standard application calls for "Double bar facing out, key hold facing up."**

LEG IRONS are restraining devices very similar in design to handcuffs. Leg irons are two large ratcheting jaws connected by a 15-inch chain. The jaws are designed to attach around the ankles of the prisoner thereby restricting leg movement. Leg irons greatly decrease the prisoner's ability to run and kick. Leg irons have double locking mechanisms and features that function in the same manner as those of handcuffs. Leg irons also use a standard handcuff key.

Leg irons may be utilized as handcuffs for a prisoner whose wrists are too large for standard handcuffs. When using leg irons in this fashion, the chain should be tied in a knot (to reduce its length) and threaded through the "D" ring on a waist chain. This serves to reduce the length of

the chain and further restrict arm movement. **When in use as leg irons, keyholes should face down with the double bars facing out.**

WAIST CHAINS or “belly chains” consist of a large brass “D” ring attached to a length of chain. The prisoner’s hands are attached to the chain via the use of handcuffs, restricting hand and arm movement, and providing security for the transporting officer.

The waist chain was originally designed to further restrict the movement of the prisoner’s arms while allowing safe, yet comfortable situation for transportation.

Some manufactured waist chains have handcuffs built on. These devices use a standard handcuff key. Many waist chains have small clips attached to one end of the chain. The intent of this clip is to secure any excess chain. Many organizations have removed this clip and have substituted a small padlock in its place. **When applying waist chains the keyholes should face up with the double bars facing out.**

The court security officer is **responsible** for any event that occurs as a result of the application or use of the restraint device. Follow the court’s policy and procedure whenever using restraint systems.

Prisoner Escort Procedures

When escorting one or multiple prisoners, the Court Security Officer must, at all times, maintain proper tactical positioning.

Prisoner Escort Principles. Clearly articulate your expectations to the prisoner prior to the movement, i.e. “No sudden movements, talking or stopping unless directed by staff. Follow all directions immediately and without questions”

Prisoner movement is restricted to the right side of all corridors with the Court Security Officer positioned behind the prisoner and to the prisoner’s left.

- ! When escorting one prisoner, with two security officers, they should position themselves on either side of the prisoner and to the rear.
- ! Never allow your span of control to be broken.
- ! Hands-on escorts are suggested.
- ! Never allow the prisoner to lag behind.

Escorting prisoners in restraints. There are two physical difficulties with the escorting of prisoners in restraints. First, is movement up and down stairs, second is entering and exiting vehicles. They appear to be very slow and awkward. Do not be lulled into a false sense of security – it could be a set up.

Multiple prisoner escorts should never be attempted by less than two officers. Prisoners should be positioned in single file formation with one security officer in the front guiding the group (maintain the appropriate reactionary gap), the second officer’s position should allow complete visual observation of the prisoners and partner officer.

Prisoner movement in the courthouse is preferably conducted in circulation routes designed for the sole purpose of moving prisoners. If such security routes are not available the Court Security Officer must employ additional measures.

- ! Escorting prisoners in public hallways should be conducted with a minimum of two officers.
- ! Prior to movement the Security Officers should inspect, clear and secure the established route.
- ! If conditions warrant, additional security officers should be placed in assigned locations along the route.
- ! Avoid all conversations with any civilians, and no civilian should be allowed to approach the prisoners.

Prisoner observation and temporary holding cells. Search and secure each holding cell prior to placing a prisoner inside. The search should include a check for contraband and a check for physical integrity of the locks, walls, windows, surveillance and communications systems.

1. When placing a prisoner in a holding cell a minimum of two officers should be present. One officer will be unarmed and will enter the cell with the prisoner and remove all restraints. The second officer will be armed and in a position where s/he can observe all activity and not be overpowered or disarmed.
2. Court Security Officers should conduct a final security check at the end of their shift to assure that no prisoners have been left unaccounted for and abandoned.
3. Visitors should not be allowed in the holding area. Only authorized personnel, including attorneys, law enforcement and court staff should be allowed to enter. Court Security Officers should always maintain visual observation when authorized visitors enter the area. A detailed log should be maintained recording the time in/out, date, purpose and person entering the area.

Prisoner Transportation

The transportation of prisoners is a critical and sensitive mission that requires concentration and attention to detail. Transportation is a high-risk responsibility. Each transport assignment is as unique as the individual being transported. The Transporting Officer must maintain a **constant vigilance**, identifying unusual events and activities.

Pre planning. In preparation for a transport assignment, the officer should identify the prisoner(s) to be transported.

- ! File check the individual for any special warning and/or considerations.
- ! Check the classification level of the prisoner. Assess the threat potential.
- ! Develop a transportation plan. Include estimated departure and arrival times, intended route and selected alternate routes.
- ! **File the transportation plan** with the dispatch office and supervisor.

Vehicle search. Prior to loading and departure, a thorough search of the vehicle must be conducted. The search should include all areas of the vehicle: exterior, interior, and mechanical.

Conduct a complete inventory and equipment check as part of the vehicle search. Insure that the fuel is topped off, and oil is checked. Check the condition of the tires as well. If there is doubt regarding the condition of the vehicle, contact a supervisor.

- ! Inventory the interior contents of the vehicle. Make sure the first aid kit is stocked.
- ! Test all communications and signaling devices.
- ! Re-search the vehicle following a transport activity.

Seating configurations. Assigning seating positions in the vehicle is necessary for officer safety reasons. **Do not deviate from safe practices.** Recommended seating configurations are listed below:

VEHICLE CONFIGURATION	SEATING
Vehicle with security screen	Prisoner in right rear seat
No screen and one officer	Prisoner secured in right front seat
No screen and two officers	Prisoner secured in left rear seat
No screen, two officers and two prisoners	Prisoner 1 secured right rear seat, 2 secured in middle seat. Unarmed officer in left rear seat

General rules of transportation. Understanding the critical role of the transportation officer is essential. The requirements of constant vigilance, and enhanced awareness cannot be overstated. The following is a list of suggested guidelines for safe transport.

- ! Prisoners will not be permitted to select places, routes of travel, rest stops, or in any other manner influence the travel itinerary.
- ! Officers should be alert to conversations by and between prisoners that may indicate an escape attempt. Promptly report any conversation that leads to the belief safety is jeopardized.
- ! No smoking allowed during transport or in the transport vehicle.
- ! The transport officers should search all prisoners prior to a transportation detail. Any prisoner who has been out of the officer's control for even the slightest period of time should be re-searched.
- ! Restraint device keys should not be carried on the same ring as vehicle keys.
- ! Restraining devices **must not** be removed at anytime during the transport detail. Each time a prisoner is placed into, or removed from the vehicle all restraints must be thoroughly checked to determine that each device used is secure.

- ! Never alter the travel plan unless required by an emergency situation. In the event of an emergency, contact the nearest law enforcement agency for assistance.
- ! Do not make any unscheduled stops without contacting the nearest law enforcement agency for assistance.
- ! Utilize local jails and lock-ups to secure prisoners for stopping points.
- ! Never allow a prisoner to suggest a stopping point.

DAILY CHECKLIST Date: _____

EXTERIOR		YES	NO
!	Building walk around completed	___	___
!	All landscaping checked	___	___
!	Trash receptacles checked	___	___
!	Lighting checked	___	___
!	Loading dock checked	___	___
!	Parking area checked	___	___
PUBLIC AREAS			
!	Trash receptacles searched	___	___
!	All chairs (including behind and bottom of chair) checked	___	___
!	Public restrooms searched	___	___
!	Towel dispensers checked	___	___
!	Under all sinks checked	___	___
!	All commodes checked	___	___
!	All hallways checked including visual scan of false ceilings	___	___
!	Fire extinguishers checked	___	___
!	Utility control panels locked	___	___
!	Access to restricted areas locked	___	___
!	Emergency lights tested	___	___
COURTROOMS			
!	Duress alarms tested	___	___
!	Emergency lights tested	___	___
!	Gallery area searched including all chairs (behind and the bottom of the chair)	___	___
!	Attorney area tables searched	___	___
!	Bench area secured	___	___
!	Court reporter/recorder area searched	___	___
!	Fire extinguishers checked	___	___
!	Utility control panels locked	___	___
!	Access to restricted areas locked	___	___
!	Jury area searched	___	___
!	Jury room searched	___	___
RESTRICTED AREAS			
!	Duress alarms tested	___	___
!	Emergency lights tested	___	___
!	Access doors locked	___	___
!	Hallways checked	___	___
PRISONER AREAS			
!	Cell(s) searched	___	___
!	SCBA checked	___	___
!	Duress alarms tested	___	___
!	Emergency lights tested	___	___
!	All monitors checked	___	___

WEAPONS SCREENING CHECKLIST

PRIOR TO OPENING:		YES	NO
!	Building search completed	___	___
!	Alarms tested	___	___
!	Magnetometer checked with test weapon	___	___
!	CCTV, if available, turned on and checked	___	___
!	Hand-held magnetometers available	___	___
!	Trays available	___	___
!	Signs properly displayed	___	___
!	Roping (to control lines) in place	___	___
ON-GOING			
!	Single file lines maintained	___	___
!	Periodic external search conducted	___	___
!	Observation maintained	___	___
END OF DAY			
!	Search of building conducted	___	___
!	Outside search conducted	___	___
!	All contraband properly disposed	___	___
!	All equipment tuned off and secured	___	___

Incident Report Form
Closure or Interruption of Court Operations
Due to Bomb Threat or Other Threat

Court: _____ Name of Person Filing the Form: _____

Date _____ G Bomb Threat G Other Incident If "Other", please explain in Comments section.

Court operations suspended? G Yes G No If Yes, # of hours/minutes _____

Comments: _____

(Attach additional sheets if necessary.)

FAX incident report to the appropriate Regional Office:

Region 1 at 313-456-0633 (or call them at 313-456-0625)

Region 2 at 517-373-8760 (or call them at 517-373-9353)

Region 3 at 989-773-0457 (or call them at 989-772-5934)

Region 4 at 989-732-4237 (or call them at 989-732-3311)

Appendix C

State Court Administrative Office Mail Handling Procedures

Be on Alert for Suspicious Parcels

What constitutes a “suspicious parcel?”

Some typical characteristics postal inspectors have detected over the years, which ought to trigger suspicion, include parcels that:

1. Are unexpected or from someone unfamiliar to you.
2. Are addressed to someone no longer with your organization or are otherwise outdated.
3. Have no return address, or have one that can't be verified as legitimate.
4. Are of unusual weight, given their size, or are lopsided or oddly shaped.
5. Are marked with restrictive endorsements, such as “Personal” or “Confidential.”
6. Have protruding wires, strange odors or stains.
7. Show a city or state in the postmark that doesn't match the return address.

What to do if you receive a suspicious parcel in the mail or if you receive an Anthrax threat by mail:

- Do not handle the mail piece or package suspected of contamination.
- Notify your supervisor, who will immediately contact the court's designated security coordinator.
- Make sure that damaged or suspicious packages are isolated and the immediate area cordoned off.
- All persons who have touched the mail piece wash their hands with soap and water.
- If prescribed medication by medical personnel, take it until otherwise instructed or it runs out.
- If you have further questions, contact the Center for Disease Control Emergency Response at (770) 488-7100.

Court Security Coordinator Duties:

- Contact the local law enforcement agency.
- Notify the State Court Administrative Office.

NOTE: Local Law Enforcement will initiate the following steps:

- Notify local, county, and state health departments.
- Notify the county or state emergency management coordinator.
- Identify all persons who have touched the letter and/or envelope.
- Place all items worn when in contact with the suspected mail piece in plastic bags and keep them wherever you change your clothes and have them available for law enforcement agents.

Appendix D

[LOCAL COURT LETTERHEAD]

Administrative Order [Year] - [Number]

SECURITY POLICY FOR COURT FACILITIES

This administrative order is issued in accordance with Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 2001-1. The purpose of this order is to address the presence of weapons in court facilities.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. No weapons are allowed in the (*courthouse, courtroom, office, or space used for official court business or by judicial employees*). This prohibition does not apply to court security personnel in the performance of their official duties or to law enforcement officers who are transporting prisoners. The Chief Judge may authorize additional exceptions in extraordinary circumstances..

2. All persons and their belongings (unless specifically excepted) and all parcels are subject to screening by (*Sheriff's Deputies, Court officers, Security personnel*) for the purpose of keeping weapons from entering the facility.

If at any time there is an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a weapon may be found, a person or object is subject to search. The search shall be no more intrusive than necessary to protect against the dangers presented.

3. Notice shall be posted that "No weapons are permitted in this (*Courthouse, courtroom, office, or space used for official court business or by judicial employees*). All persons and parcels are subject to a search for weapons and restricted items as a condition of entry. Persons in violation of this order may be held in contempt of court."

Date: _____

CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGE

Date: _____

CHIEF PROBATE JUDGE

Date: _____

CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

NOTICE!

No weapons are permitted in this Courthouse.

All persons and parcels are subject to a search for weapons and restricted items as a condition of entry. Persons in violation of this order may be held in contempt of court.

E-Memorandum

To: Chief Judges
cc Court Administrators

From: John D. Ferry, Jr.

Date: March 29, 2001

Re: Supreme Court Administrative Order 2001-1
Security Policy for Court Facilities

Attached is Supreme Court Administrative Order 2001-1: Security Policy for Court Facilities which was entered on March 27, 2001. The order provides that weapons are not permitted in any courtroom, office, or other space used for official court business or by judicial employees. Public comments on the order will be invited and it will be considered at the Supreme Court's June 14, 2001, public hearing.

The order calls for each court to submit a written weapons policy to the State Court Administrative Office. To assist courts in developing such a policy, we have attached a model administrative order and a notice that can be used.

If you have questions, please feel free to contact Dan Voss (517/373-7498 or vossd@jud.state.mi.us) or Bill Bartels (517/373-5975 or bartelsb@jud.state.mi.us).

March 27, 2001

Administrative Order 2001-1

Security Policies for
Court Facilities

It appearing that the orderly administration of justice would be best served by prompt action, the following order is given immediate effect. The Court invites public comment regarding the merits of the order. Comments may be submitted in writing or electronically to the Supreme Court Clerk by *June 1, 2001*. P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or MSC_clerk@jud.state.mi.us. When submitting a comment, please refer to File No. **01-15**.

This matter will be considered by the Court at a public hearing to be held June 14, 2001, in Kalamazoo. Persons interested in addressing this issue at the hearing should notify the Clerk by *June 12, 2001*. Further information about the hearing will be posted on the Court's website, www.supremecourt.state.mi.us. When requesting time to speak at the hearing, please refer to File No. **01-15**.

The issue of courthouse safety is important not only to the judicial employees of this state, but also to all those who are summoned to Michigan courtrooms or who visit for professional or personal reasons. Accordingly, the Supreme Court today issues the following declaration regarding the presence of weapons in court facilities.

It is ordered that weapons are not permitted in any courtroom, office, or other space used for official court business or by judicial employees unless the chief judge or other person designated by the chief judge has given prior approval consistent with the court's written policy.

Each court is directed to submit a written policy conforming with this order to the State Court Administrator for approval, as soon as is practicable. In developing a policy, courts are encouraged to collaborate with other entities in shared facilities and, where appropriate, to work with local funding units. Such a policy may be part of a general security program or it may be a separate plan.

Appendix E

BALLISTIC RESISTANT PROTECTIVE MATERIAL RATINGS

- Type I Protects against standard test rounds for 22 LR and 38 Special. Also provides protection against lesser threats such as 12 gauge No. 4 lead shot and most handgun rounds in calibers 25 and 32.
- Type II-A Protects against standard test rounds for lower velocity 357 Magnum and 9 mm. Also provides protection against lesser threats such as 12 gauge 00 buckshot, 45 Auto., 38 Special \pm P and some other factory loads in caliber 357 Magnum and 9 mm, as well as Level I threats.
- Type II Protects against standard test rounds for higher velocity 357 Magnum and 9 mm. Also provides protection against most other factory loads in caliber 357 Magnum and 9 mm, as well as Level I threats.
- Type III-A Protects against standard test rounds for 44 Magnum and Submachine Gun 9 mm. Also provides protection against most handgun threats, as well as Level I, II-A, and II threats.
- Type III Protects against standard test round for high-powered rifle. Also provides protection against most lesser threats such as 223 Remington (5.56 mm FMJ), 30 Carbine FMJ, and 12 gauge rifle slug, as well as Level I, II-A, II, and III-A threats.
- Type IV Protects against standard test round for armor-piercing rifle. Also provides at least single hit protection against Level I, II-A, II, III-A, and III threats.

Abbreviations:
LR - Long Rifle
FMJ - Full Metal Jacketed

UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES INC.

Ratings of Bullet-Resistant Materials With cross reference to NIJ standards

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Ammunition</u>
Level 1	9mm FMJ - higher velocity handgun. (Equivalent round to NIJ level II)
Level 2	.357 JSP- lower velocity handgun. (Equivalent round to NIJ level II-A)
Level 3	.44 Magnum SWC. (Equivalent round to NIJ III-A)
Level 4	.30 Caliber Rifle SP. (No NIJ equivalent round size and velocity between NIJ III and IV, but this bullet is soft lead NIJ is FMJ.)
Level 5	7.62mm FMJ (.308 Winchester) (Equivalent round NIJ III, ONE hit only NIJ requires 5 hit protection)
Level 6	9mm FMJ (Equivalent and protection to round NIJ III-A)
Level 7	5.56mm Rifle FMJ (.223 Cal) (No NIJ equivalent round, slightly higher velocity but less half of the mass of NIJ III)
Level 8	7.62mm FMJ (.308 Winchester) (Equivalent round and protection to NIJ III)

Abbreviations:

FMJ - Full Metal Jacket
JSP - Jacketed Soft Point
SP - Soft Point lead core
SWC- Semi Wad Cutter



National Institute of Justice

Law Enforcement and Corrections Standards and Testing Program

Ballistic Resistance of Personal Body Armor

NIJ Standard–0101.04

ABOUT THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AND TESTING PROGRAM

The Law Enforcement and Corrections Standards and Testing Program is sponsored by the Office of Science and Technology of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), U.S. Department of Justice. The program responds to the mandate of the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, which directed NIJ to encourage research and development to improve the criminal justice system and to disseminate the results to Federal, State, and local agencies.

The Law Enforcement and Corrections Standards and Testing Program is an applied research effort that determines the technological needs of justice system agencies, sets minimum performance standards for specific devices, tests commercially available equipment against those standards, and disseminates the standards and the test results to criminal justice agencies nationally and internationally.

The program operates through:

The *Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Advisory Council (LECTAC)*, consisting of nationally recognized criminal justice practitioners from Federal, State, and local agencies, which assesses technological needs and sets priorities for research programs and items to be evaluated and tested.

The *Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES)* at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which develops voluntary national performance standards for compliance testing to ensure that individual items of equipment are suitable for use by criminal justice agencies. The standards are based upon laboratory testing and evaluation of representative samples of each item of equipment to determine the key attributes, develop test methods, and establish minimum performance requirements for each essential attribute. In addition to the highly technical standards, OLES also produces technical reports and user guidelines that explain in nontechnical terms the capabilities of available equipment.

The *National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC)*, operated by a grantee, which supervises a national compliance testing program conducted by independent laboratories. The standards developed by OLES serve as performance benchmarks against which commercial equipment is measured. The facilities, personnel, and testing capabilities of the independent laboratories are evaluated by OLES prior to testing each item of equipment, and OLES helps the NLECTC staff review and analyze data. Test results are published in Equipment Performance Reports designed to help justice system procurement officials make informed purchasing decisions.

Publications are available at no charge through the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center. Some documents are also available online through the Internet/World Wide Web. To request a document or additional information, call 800-248-2742 or 301-519-5060, or write:

National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center
P.O. Box 1160
Rockville, MD 20849-1160
E-Mail: asknlectc@nlectc.org
World Wide Web address: <http://www.nlectc.org>

<p>The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.</p>
--

Ballistic Resistance of Personal Body Armor

NIJ Standard–0101.04

*Supersedes NIJ Standard–0101.03, Ballistic Resistance
of Police Body Armor dated April 1987*

Coordination by:
Office of Law Enforcement Standards
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899–8102

Prepared for:
National Institute of Justice
Office of Science and Technology
Washington, DC 20531

September 2000

NCJ 183651

National Institute of Justice

Julie E. Samuels
Acting Director

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Kathleen M. Higgins, Director. The participants in the research
and revision of this standard were: Carter K. Lord,
Former Test Coordinator and Ballistics Range Manager, OLES,
Steven L. Lightsey, President, The Tekne Group, Inc.,
Ken Malley, National Technical Systems (NTS), Fredricksburg, VA,
Nathaniel E. Waters, Engineering Technician, OLES,
and the Staff of National Technical Systems (NTS), Camden, AR.
The preparation of this standard was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice,
Dr. David G. Boyd, Director, Office of Science and Technology.

FOREWORD

This document, NIJ Standard–0101.04, “Ballistic Resistance of Personal Body Armor,” is an equipment standard developed by the Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It is produced as part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Standards and Testing Program of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ).

This standard is a technical document that specifies the performance requirements that equipment should meet to satisfy the needs of criminal justice agencies for high quality service. While purchasers can use the test methods described in this standard to determine whether a particular piece of equipment meets the essential requirements, users are encouraged to have this testing conducted only in properly accredited laboratories. Procurement officials may also refer to this standard in their purchasing documents and require that equipment offered for purchase meet its requirements. Compliance with the requirements of this standard may be attested to by an independent laboratory or guaranteed by the vendor.

Because this standard is designed as a procurement aid, it provides precise and detailed test methods. For those who seek general guidance concerning the selection and application of law enforcement and corrections equipment, user guides have also been published. The guides explain in nontechnical language how to select equipment capable of the level of performance required by a purchasing agency.

NIJ STANDARD–0101.04 IS NOT INTENDED TO RESTRICT OR OTHERWISE INFLUENCE THE PROCUREMENT AND USE OF NIJ STANDARD–0101.03 COMPLIANT BODY ARMORS. THE PUBLICATION AND USE OF THIS REVISION FOR NEW MODEL COMPLIANCE TESTING DOES NOT INVALIDATE OR RENDER UNSUITABLE ANY BODY ARMOR MODELS PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED TO BE COMPLIANT USING NIJ STANDARD–0101.03 REQUIREMENTS.

NIJ standards are subjected to continuing research, development, testing, change, and review. This standard and its successors will be reevaluated annually for success in achieving the technical goals of this revision. These reviews will be based on data collected through the Compliance Testing Program and its certified test laboratories, as well as from valid comments from the user and manufacturing communities. Technical comments and recommended revisions are welcome. Please send all written comments and suggestions to the Director, Office of Science and Technology, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 810 7th St., NW, Washington, DC 20531.

Before citing this or any other NIJ standard in a contract document, users should verify that the most recent edition of the standard is used. Write to the Director, Office of Law Enforcement Standards, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8102, Gaithersburg, MD 20899–8102.

Dr. David G. Boyd, Director
Office of Science and Technology
National Institute of Justice

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This standard has been reviewed and approved by the Weapons and Protective Systems Subcommittee and the Executive Committee of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Advisory Council (LECTAC) and also by the National Armor Advisory Board (NAAB), currently comprised of representatives from:

Accordis Fibers, Inc.
American Body Armor and Equipment Co.
California Department of Corrections
Chesterfield County Police Department, Virginia
Department of Justice
DHB Armor Group
DuPont Advanced Fiber Systems
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Fraternal Order of Police
Guardian Technologies, International
Hexcel Schwebel High Performance Fibers
Honeywell/Allied Signal, Inc.
International Association of Chiefs of Police
International Brotherhood of Police Officers
National Association of Police Organizations
National Sheriff's Association
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Protective Apparel Corporation of America
Safariland Ltd., Inc.
U.S. Armor Corporation
U.S. Secret Service, TSD/P&D

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STANDARD SPECIFIC ABBREVIATIONS

ACP =	Automatic Colt Pistol	LR =	Long Rifle
ANSI =	American National Standards Institute	LRN =	Lead Round Nose
AP =	Armor Piercing	NLECTC =	National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center
BFS =	Backface Signature		
BL =	Ballistic Limit	P-BFS =	Penetration and Backface Signature
BMF =	Backing Material Fixture	PP =	Partial Penetration
CP =	Complete Penetration	RN =	Round Nose
CPO =	Compliance Program Office	S&W =	Smith & Wesson
CTP =	Compliance Testing Program	SAAMI =	Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute
CTR =	Compliance Test Report		
FMJ =	Full Metal Jacket	SJHP =	Semi Jacketed Hollow Point
JHP =	Jacketed Hollow Point	SJSP =	Semi Jacketed Soft Point
JSP =	Jacketed Soft Point		

COMMONLY USED SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A	ampere	H	henry	nm	nanometer
ac	alternating current	h	hour	No.	number
AM	amplitude modulation	hf	high frequency	o.d.	outside diameter
cd	candela	Hz	hertz	Ω	ohm
cm	centimeter	i.d.	inside diameter	p.	page
CP	chemically pure	in	inch	Pa	pascal
c/s	cycle per second	IR	infrared	pe	probable error
d	day	J	joule	pp.	pages
dB	decibel	L	lambert	ppm	parts per million
dc	direct current	L	liter	qt	quart
°C	degree Celsius	lb	pound	rad	radian
°F	degree Fahrenheit	lbf	pound-force	rf	radio frequency
diam	diameter	lbf·in	pound-force inch	rh	relative humidity
emf	electromotive force	lm	lumen	s	second
eq	equation	ln	logarithm (base e)	SD	standard deviation
F	farad	log	logarithm (base 10)	sec.	section
fc	footcandle	M	molar	SWR	standing wave ratio
fig.	figure	m	meter	uhf	ultrahigh frequency
FM	frequency modulation	min.	minute	UV	ultraviolet
ft	foot	mm	millimeter	V	volt
ft/s	foot per second	mph	miles per hour	vhf	very high frequency
g	acceleration	m/s	meter per second	W	watt
g	gram	N	newton	λ	wavelength
gr	grain	N·m	newton meter	wt	weight

area=unit² (e.g., ft², in², etc.); volume=unit³ (e.g., ft³, m³, etc.)

PREFIXES

d	deci (10 ⁻¹)	da	deka (10)
c	centi (10 ⁻²)	h	hecto (10 ²)
m	milli (10 ⁻³)	k	kilo (10 ³)
μ	micro (10 ⁻⁶)	M	mega (10 ⁶)
n	nano (10 ⁻⁹)	G	giga (10 ⁹)
p	pico (10 ⁻¹²)	T	tera (10 ¹²)

COMMON CONVERSIONS (See ASTM E380)

0.30480 m = 1 ft	4.448222 N = 1 lbf
2.54 cm = 1 in	1.355818 J = 1 ft·lbf
0.4535924 kg = 1 lb	0.1129848 N m = 1 lbf·in
0.06479891 g = 1 gr	14.59390 N/m = 1 lbf/ft
0.9463529 L = 1 qt	6894.757 Pa = 1 lbf/in ²
3600000 J = 1 kW·hr	1.609344 km/h = 1 mph

Temperature: T_C = (T_F-32)×5/9

Temperature: T_F = (T_C×9/5)+32

NIJ STANDARD FOR BALLISTIC RESISTANCE OF PERSONAL BODY ARMOR

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this standard is to establish minimum performance requirements and test methods for the ballistic resistance of personal body armor intended to protect the torso against gunfire. This standard is a general revision of NIJ Standard—0101.03, dated April 1987, updating the labeling requirements, acceptance criteria, test ammunition, procedures, and other items throughout the standard.

The scope of the standard is limited to ballistic resistance only; this standard does not address threats from knives and sharply pointed instruments, which are different types of threat.

2. NIJ BODY ARMOR CLASSIFICATION

Personal body armors covered by this standard are classified into seven classes, or types, by level of ballistic performance. The ballistic threat posed by a bullet depends, among other things, on its composition, shape, caliber, mass, angle of incidence, and impact velocity. Because of the wide variety of bullets and cartridges available in a given caliber and because of the existence of handloaded ammunition, armors that will defeat a standard test round may not defeat other loadings in the same caliber. For example, an armor that prevents complete penetration by a 40 S&W test round may or may not defeat a 40 S&W round with higher velocity. In general, an armor that defeats a given lead bullet may not resist complete penetration by other bullets of the same caliber of different construction or configuration. The test ammunition specified in this standard represent general, common threats to law enforcement officers.

As of the year 2000, ballistic resistant body armor suitable for full time wear throughout an entire shift of duty is available in classification Types I, IIA, II, and IIIA, which provide increasing levels of protection from handgun threats. Type I body armor, which was first issued during the NIJ demonstration project in 1975, is the minimum level of protection that any officer should have. Officers seeking protection from lower velocity 9 mm and 40 S&W ammunition typically wear Type IIA body armor. For protection against high velocity 357 Magnum and higher velocity 9 mm ammunition, officers traditionally select Type II body armor. Type IIIA body armor provides the highest level of protection available in concealable body armor and provides protection from high velocity 9 mm and 44 Magnum ammunition.

Type IIIA armor is suitable for routine wear in many situations; however, departments located in hot, humid climates may need to carefully evaluate their use of Type IIIA body armor for their officers. Types III and IV armor, which protect against high powered rifle rounds, are

clearly intended for use only in tactical situations when the threat warrants such protection (see app. C).

The classification of an armor panel that provides two or more levels of NIJ ballistic protection at different locations on the ballistic panel shall be that of the minimum ballistic protection provided at any location on the panel.

2.1 Type I (22 LR; 380 ACP)

This armor protects against .22 caliber Long Rifle Lead Round Nose (LR LRN) bullets, with nominal masses of 2.6 g (40 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 320 m/s (1050 ft/s) or less, and 380 ACP Full Metal Jacketed Round Nose (FMJ RN) bullets, with nominal masses of 6.2 g (95 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 312 m/s (1025 ft/s) or less.

2.2 Type IIA (9 mm; 40 S&W)

This armor protects against 9 mm Full Metal Jacketed Round Nose (FMJ RN) bullets, with nominal masses of 8.0 g (124 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 332 m/s (1090 ft/s) or less, and 40 S&W caliber Full Metal Jacketed (FMJ) bullets, with nominal masses of 11.7 g (180 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 312 m/s (1025 ft/s) or less. It also provides protection against the threats mentioned in section 2.1.

2.3 Type II (9 mm; 357 Magnum)

This armor protects against 9 mm Full Metal Jacketed Round Nose (FMJ RN) bullets, with nominal masses of 8.0 g (124 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 358 m/s (1175 ft/s) or less, and 357 Magnum Jacketed Soft Point (JSP) bullets, with nominal masses of 10.2 g (158 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 427 m/s (1400 ft/s) or less. It also provides protection against the threats mentioned in sections 2.1 and 2.2.

2.4 Type IIIA (High Velocity 9 mm; 44 Magnum)

This armor protects against 9 mm Full Metal Jacketed Round Nose (FMJ RN) bullets, with nominal masses of 8.0 g (124 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 427 m/s (1400 ft/s) or less, and 44 Magnum Jacketed Hollow Point (JHP) bullets, with nominal masses of 15.6 g (240 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 427 m/s (1400 ft/s) or less. It also provides protection against most handgun threats, as well as the threats mentioned in sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.

2.5 Type III (Rifles)

This armor protects against 7.62 mm Full Metal Jacketed (FMJ) bullets (U.S. Military designation M80), with nominal masses of 9.6 g (148 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 838 m/s (2750 ft/s) or less. It also provides protection against the threats mentioned in sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.

2.6 Type IV (Armor Piercing Rifle)

This armor protects against .30 caliber armor piercing (AP) bullets (U.S. Military designation M2 AP), with nominal masses of 10.8 g (166 gr) impacting at a minimum velocity of 869 m/s (2850 ft/s) or less. It also provides at least single hit protection against the threats mentioned in sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.

2.7 Special Type

A purchaser having a special requirement for a level of protection other than one of the above standard types and threat levels should specify the exact test round(s) and minimum reference impact velocities to be used, and indicate that this standard shall govern in all other aspects.

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1 Angle of Incidence

The angle between the line of flight of the bullet and the perpendicular to the front surface of the backing material fixture as shown in figure 1.




Figure 1. Angle of incidence

3.2 Armor Carrier

A component of the armor sample or armor panel whose primary purpose is to retain the ballistic panel and provide a means of supporting and securing the armor garment to the user. These carriers are not generally ballistic resistant.

3.3 Armor Panel

The portion of an armor sample that generally consists of an external carrier and its internal ballistic protective component(s) (e.g., the front and back panels).

3.4 Armor Sample

One complete armor garment comprised of a single wraparound style jacket, or a set (two) of front and back armor panels.

3.5 Backface Signature (BFS)

The depth of the depression made in the backing material, created by a nonpenetrating projectile impact, measured from the plane defined by the front edge of the backing material fixture. For armor tested on built up or curved backing material, the BFS is measured from the plane defined by the top edges of the depression or crater formed by the impact.

3.6 Backing Material

A homogenous block of nonhardening, oil base modeling clay, placed in contact with the back of the armor panel during ballistic testing.

3.7 Backing Material Fixture

A box fixture containing the backing material, typically comprised of a rigid frame constructed of wood or metal with a removable wooden back. The wooden back is not used during Ballistic Limit testing.

3.8 Baseline Ballistic Limit

The experimentally derived, statistically calculated impact velocity at which a projectile is expected to completely penetrate an armor component (sample, panel or ballistic panel) 50 % of the time (V_{50}). This velocity is also the velocity at which a projectile is expected to be stopped by the armor 50 % of the time (V_{50}).

3.9 Ballistic Panel

The protective component of an armor sample or panel, primarily consisting of ballistic resistant materials, usually enclosed in a nonremovable cover. The ballistic panel is normally retained within the armor sample or panel by a separate fabric carrier, and may be removable from the carrier.

3.10 Certification of Compliance

Manufacturer's affidavit (certification) that a production unit of body armor meets (complies with) all of the requirements of this standard (sec. 4.0) for the labeled protection classification (sec. 2.0).

3.11 Compliance

NIJ approval, after successful ballistic performance testing to this standard, of a body armor model submitted to the NIJ Compliance Testing Program (CTP).

3.12 Compliance Test Group

A group of armor samples, either six, four, or nine complete garments, submitted to the NIJ CTP for testing according to this standard (sec. 4.7).

3.13 Deformation

The maximum momentary displacement of the rear surface of an armor panel, caused by a fair hit that does not penetrate the armor, when the armor is in initial contact with the backing material.

3.14 Fair Hit

A bullet that impacts the armor sample or panel at an angle of incidence no greater than $\pm 5^\circ$ from the intended angle of incidence, no closer to the edge of the ballistic panel than 76 mm (3.0 in) and no closer to a prior hit than 51 mm (2.0 in), at an impact velocity within ± 9.1 m/s (30 ft/s) of the required reference test velocity.

A bullet that impacts the armor sample or panel at an angle of incidence no greater than $\pm 5^\circ$ from the intended angle of incidence, no closer to the edge of the ballistic panel than 76 mm (3.0 in) and no closer to a prior hit than 51 mm (2.0 in), at an impact velocity less than 7.6 m/s (30 ft/s) below the required reference test velocity which produces a penetration or an excessive backface signature.

A bullet that impacts the armor sample or panel at an angle of incidence no greater than $\pm 5^\circ$ from the intended angle of incidence, no closer to the edge of the ballistic panel than 76 mm (3.0 in) and no closer to a prior hit than 51 mm (2.0 in), at an impact velocity more than 7.6 m/s (30 ft/s) above the required reference test velocity which does not produce a penetration or an excessive backface signature.

3.15 Full Metal Jacketed Bullet (FMJ)

A bullet consisting of a lead core completely covered, except for the base, with copper alloy (approximately 90 % copper and 10 % zinc). “Total Metal Jacket (TMJ),” “Totally Enclosed Metal Case (TEMC),” and other commercial terminology for bullets with electro deposited copper and copper alloy coatings have been tested and are considered comparable to Full Metal Jacketed (FMJ) bullets for this standard.

3.16 Insert

A removable or nonremovable unit of ballistic material which can be part of either the armor or ballistic panel, which is utilized to enhance the ballistic performance of an armor in a specific area (also known as “trauma packs” or “trauma plates”).

3.17 Jacketed Hollow Point Bullet (JHP)

A bullet consisting of a lead core which has a hollow cavity or hole located in the nose of the bullet and is completely covered except for the hollow point with a copper alloy (approximately 90 % copper and 10 % zinc) jacket.

3.18 Jacketed Soft Point Bullet (JSP)

A lead bullet, also known as a Semi Jacketed Soft Point (SJSP), completely covered, except for the point, with copper alloy (approximately 90 % copper and 10 % zinc) jacket.

3.19 Lead Bullet

A bullet made entirely of lead, which may be alloyed with hardening agents.

3.20 Minimum Velocity

The designated NIJ Standard–0101.04 reference impact velocity (sec.5.4, table 1) less 9.1 m/s (30 ft/s).

3.21 Model

A manufacturer's designation (name, number, or other description) that serves to uniquely identify a specific configuration of body armor based upon the details of the ballistic panel construction (i.e., the number of layers of one or more types of ballistic resistant material assembled in a specific manner or the manner in which the armor is held in place upon the torso).

NIJ verifies the ballistic resistance of a **model** based on ballistic testing of **model** samples in accordance with this standard. As an example, differences in stitching (e.g., box stitch versus quilt stitch) would make the ballistic panels different **models**. If a **model** of armor fails compliance testing, the manufacturer may never resubmit any armor under that model designation.

3.22 Obliquity

The same determination of striking condition as “angle of incidence” (sec. 3.1).

3.23 Penetration

Complete Penetration (CP): The complete perforation of an armor sample or panel by a test bullet or by a fragment of the bullet or armor sample itself, as evidenced by the presence of that bullet or fragment (armor or bullet) in the backing material, or by a hole which passes through the armor and/or backing material.

Partial Penetration (PP): Any impact that is not a complete penetration is considered a partial penetration.

3.24 Reference Bullet Velocity

The designated impact velocity of NIJ Standard–0101.04 test threat ammunition (sec. 5.4, table 1), obtained using specified ANSI/SAAMI unvented velocity test barrels.

3.25 Retest

The NIJ CTP procedure for resolving ballistic performance issues with NIJ Standard–0101.04 compliant body armor models (sec. 5.22).

3.26 Round Nose Bullet (RN)

A bullet with a blunt or rounded nose. A bullet with a generally blunt or rounded nose or tip, which possesses a small flat surface at the tip of the bullet shall also be considered a round nose bullet for this standard.

3.27 Semi Jacketed Hollow Point Bullet (SJHP)

A bullet consisting of a lead core with a copper alloy (approximately 90 % copper and 10 % zinc) jacket covering the base and bore riding surface (major diameter), which leaves some portion of the lead core exposed, thus forming a lead nose or tip, which has a hollow cavity or hole located in the nose or tip of the bullet.

3.28 Semi Jacketed Soft Point Bullet (SJSP)

A bullet, also known as a Jacketed Soft Point (JSP), consisting of a lead core with a copper alloy (approximately 90 % copper and 10 % zinc) jacket covering the base and bore riding surface (major diameter), which leaves some portion of the lead core exposed, thus forming a lead nose or tip.

3.29 Strike Face

The surface of an armor sample or panel, designated by the manufacturer, as the surface that should face the incoming ballistic threat.

3.30 Wear Face

The surface of an armor sample or panel, designated by the manufacturer, as the surface that should be worn against the body.

3.31 Yaw

The angular deviation of the longitudinal axis of the projectile from its line of flight, measured as close to the target as practical.

4. REQUIREMENTS

4.1 Acceptance Criteria

An armor model satisfies the requirements of this standard if all six armor samples (sec. 4.7) meet workmanship (sec. 4.3) and labeling (sec. 4.5) requirements and, when tested in accordance with section 5.0, each component part of the armor sample (front, back, side, groin and coccyx) meets the penetration and backface signature requirements of sections 4.6, 5.4, and table 1.

Each submitted armor sample will also be tested to determine a baseline Ballistic Limit velocity (sec. 5.17), to be used for any future NIJ retest examination of that armor model (sec. 5.22).

4.2 Test Sequence

Tests shall be conducted in the order presented in section 5.0 of this standard. The Compliance Test Report (CTR), found in appendix A, shall be used to record and document the results of the tests.

4.3 Workmanship

Each armor sample shall be free from wrinkles, blisters, cracks or fabric tears, crazing, chipped or sharp corners and edges, or other evidence of inferior workmanship. Additionally, all samples shall be identical in appearance, size, and manner of construction.

4.4 Traceability

Manufacturers will submit along with their samples, or have on file with NIJ's CTP Office, documentation of the method(s) they use to assure configuration control, uniformity of production methods, and materials traceability.

4.5 Labeling

Each set or sample of ballistic resistant armor shall be durably and clearly marked (labeled), in a readable type and font size, in accordance with the requirements set forth below.

4.5.1 Ballistic Panels

Every ballistic panel shall have a label. The label shall be permanently attached to either exterior surface of the panel. The label shall contain the following information, written in the English language (fig. 2.):

- (a) Name, logo or other identification of the manufacturer.
- (b) The rated level of protection, according to section 2.0 of this standard, and referenced to this edition of the standard (i.e., Type II in accordance with NIJ Standard–0101.04).
- (c) Size (if custom fitted, provision for the name of the individual for whom it is made).
- (d) Lot number.

- (e) Date of manufacture.
- (f) Date of issue line (to be filled in by user).
- (g) A model designation that uniquely identifies the panel for purchasing purposes (panels designed to fit the male and female torsos shall have separate model designations).
- (h) Strike face or wear face - the surface of the garment that is to face the threat or to be worn next to the body must be identified.
- (i) Serial number.
- (j) Care instructions for the ballistic material in accordance with 16 CFR 423 (Part 423, Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel and Certain Piece Goods, as amended effective January 2, 1984; Federal Trade Commission Regulation Rule).
- (k) For Type I through Type IIIA armor, a warning in type at least twice the size of the rest of the type on the label, exclusive of the information required in “a” above, stating that the armor is not intended to protect the wearer from rifle fire and, if applicable, that the armor is not intended to protect the wearer from sharp edged or pointed instruments.
(Note: printing color changes are acceptable but cannot be substituted for the type size requirement herein).
- (l) For armor that has been successfully tested for compliance to this standard through NIJ’s voluntary CTP at an NIJ-approved testing facility, the following statement shall be included on the label: *“The Manufacturer certifies that this model of armor has been tested through NLECTC and has been found to comply with Type (insert appropriate type designation) Performance for NIJ Standard–0101.04.”*
- (m) **THE COMPLIANCE STATEMENT ABOVE SHALL NOT APPEAR ON ARMOR THAT HAS FAILED NIJ COMPLIANCE TESTING, OR ON ARMOR THAT HAS NOT BEEN TESTED FOR COMPLIANCE AS SPECIFIED BY THIS STANDARD. ONCE AUTHORIZED TO PLACE THIS STATEMENT ON A MODEL OF ARMOR, THE MANUFACTURER SHALL NOT ALTER OR MODIFY THIS STATEMENT IN ANY WAY.**

MANUFACTURER'S NAME	
MANUFACTURER'S ADDRESS (Logo may be used)	
PERSONAL BODY ARMOR	
SIZE: _____	MODEL: _____
DATE OF MFG: _____	SERIAL NO.: _____
DATE OF ISSUE: _____	LOT NO.: _____
<p><i><u>The Manufacturer certifies that this model of armor has been tested through NLECTC and has been found to comply with Type II Performance in accordance with NIJ Standard—0101.04.</u></i></p>	
<p><u>WARNING!</u></p>	
<p><u>This Garment is Rated ONLY for the Ballistic Threat Level Stated Above. It is NOT Intended to Protect Against Rifle Fire, or Sharp Edged or Pointed Instruments.</u></p>	
<p><u>THIS SIDE TO BE WORN AWAY FROM BODY</u></p>	
<p>Care Instructions for Ballistic Panel: <i>(Sample Instructions Shown)</i></p> <p>1) Do Not Wash or Dry Clean</p> <p>2) Wipe With a Damp Cloth</p>	

Figure 2. Sample ballistic panel label

4.5.2 Armor Carriers with Nonremovable Ballistic Panels

Armor with ballistic panels that are nonremovable shall, in addition to the label required for the ballistic panel, have a label on the carrier (fig.3) that is in conformance with the requirements for the ballistic panels (sec. 4.5.1) unless the armor is so constructed that the ballistic panel label is not covered by the carrier.

4.5.3 Armor Carriers with Removable Ballistic Panels

Armor carriers with removable ballistic panels shall have label(s) on either exterior surface of the carrier. If the carrier is one piece (i.e., all parts are sewn together into one garment) one label in conformance with the requirements of this section is sufficient. If the front and back of the carrier are separable, the front and back parts shall each be labeled. The label shall contain the following information (fig. 3):

- (a) Name, logo or other identification of the manufacturer.
- (b) A statement telling the user to look at the ballistic panels to determine the level of ballistic protection.

- (c) Size (if custom fitted, provision for the name of the individual for whom it is made to be filled in by user).
- (d) Date of issue line (to be filled in by user).
- (e) A model designation that uniquely identifies the garment for purchasing purposes (armor designed to fit the male and female torso shall have separate model designations).
- (f) For armors where the carrier extends beyond the ballistic panel more than 40 mm (1.5 in), the edge of the panel shall be clearly identified on the carrier by a label stating: “NO BALLISTIC PROTECTION BEYOND THIS POINT” (fig.4), and a stitch line through both sides of the carrier at this location to keep the ballistic panel from shifting within the carrier.
- (g) Care instructions for the armor carrier in accordance with 16 CFR 423.

MANUFACTURERS NAME MANUFACTURER’S ADDRESS (Logo may be used)	
PERSONAL BODY ARMOR	
<hr style="border: 2px solid black;"/>	
NAME: _____	
SIZE: _____	MODEL: _____
DATE OF MFG: _____	SERIAL NO.: _____
DATE OF ISSUE: _____	LOT NO.: _____
<i><u>This carrier offers no ballistic protection without ballistic panels being inserted.</u></i> <i><u>See ballistic panel labels for protection level provided in accordance with</u></i> <i><u>NIJ Standard-0101.04.</u></i>	
<u>CARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR CARRIER:</u> <i>(sample instructions shown – to be provided by Manufacturer)</i>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Remove Ballistic Panels from Front and Back of Outer Shell Vest (Carrier). 2) Ensure Hook and Pile Fasteners are in Closed Position during Washing Cycle. 3) Automatic Machine Wash the Outer Shell Vest (Carrier) Only, Using the Permanent Press Cycle and Warm Water Settings (Approximately 120° F). 4) Use Low Sudsing Detergent According to Detergent Manufacturer’s Directions. 5) <u>DO NOT USE BLEACH.</u> 6) Carrier Only may be Tumble Dried at Medium Temperature Setting or may be Line Dried. 7) Carrier Only may be Dry Cleaned. 8) Carrier Must be Completely Dry Before Inserting Ballistic Panels. 	

Figure 3. Sample carrier label




Figure 4. Sample label locations

4.5.4 Armors with Built In Trauma Packs

For armor models that contain built in inserts or trauma packs, manufacturers must submit a detailed diagram of the location of each trauma pack. If a manufacturer fails to notify the NIJ CTP Office of the existence of a built in insert or trauma pack and it is discovered during testing, the test results for that model will be invalidated. The manufacturer may resubmit the model for testing under the same model designation after resolving the lack of documentation concerning the location of the insert or trauma pack.

4.6 Ballistic Penetration and Backface Signature Criteria

Each part of one complete body armor sample shall be tested for resistance to ballistic penetration and backface signature (depth of depression in backing material) after wet conditioning in accordance with the procedures in section 5.0. Complete penetration or any designated depth measurement of BFS in the backing material greater than 44 mm (1.73 in) by any fair hit (as defined in sec. 3.14) shall constitute a failure.

If any armor sample part fails at any time during compliance testing, data for that shot shall be recorded and the testing continued until all required testing is completed. The detailed test requirements are summarized in section 5.4, table 1. Type I, IIA, II, or IIIA armor designed to include a removable insert for additional penetration or BFS protection over a localized area of the armor sample or panel shall be tested without the insert.

4.7 Sampling

4.7.1 Types I, IIA, II, and IIIA

Six complete armors, sized to fit a 117 cm (46 in) to 122 cm (48 in) chest circumference for males and a 107 cm (42 in) to 112 cm (44 in) chest circumference for females, shall constitute the compliance test group. Five of these armor samples shall be selected at random from the group and used for ballistic testing. Four armor samples will be used for Penetration and Backface Signature testing (sec. 5.4), and one armor sample will be used for baseline Ballistic Limit determination (sec. 5.17). The remaining armor sample will be returned to the manufacturer if not used in the ballistic testing.

4.7.2 Type III

Four complete armor samples, or panels, no smaller than 254 mm x 305 mm (10.0 in x 12.0 in) shall constitute a compliance test group. Two of these armor samples shall be selected at random from the group and used for the testing. Two armors will be used for Penetration and Backface Signature testing, and at least one armor sample will be used for baseline Ballistic Limit determination (sec. 5.17). Any remaining armor samples will be returned to the manufacturer if not used in the ballistic testing.

4.7.3 Type IV

Nine complete armor samples/panels/inserts, no smaller than 203 mm x 254 mm (8.0 in x 10.0 in) shall constitute a compliance test group. Eight of these armor samples shall be selected at random and used for the testing. Two armor samples will be used for Penetration and Backface Signature testing, and at least six complete armor samples will be used for baseline Ballistic Limit determination (sec. 5.17). Any remaining armor samples will be returned to the manufacturer if not used in the testing.

4.8 Armor Backing Material

4.8.1 Backing Material Fixture (BMF)

A minimum of three Backing Material Fixtures filled with appropriate backing material are required. The inside dimensions of the BMF shall be 610 mm x 610 mm x 140 mm \pm 2 mm (24.0 in x 24.0 in x 5.5 in \pm 0.06 in) deep. The tolerance on all dimensions will be \pm 2 mm (0.06 in).

The back of the fixture shall be removable and constructed of 19.1 mm (0.75 in) thick wood or plywood.

4.8.2 Fixture Construction

The sides of the box fixture shall be constructed of rigid wood or metal, preferably with a metal front edge to reliably guide the preparation of the flat front surface of the backing material. The backing material shall be worked into the fixture (box) with as few voids as possible. The backing material surface shall be cut, “struck,” or otherwise manipulated to result in a smooth, flat front surface even with the front edges of the box fixture.

4.8.3 Backing Material

It has been determined that Roma Plastilina No.1¹ oil-based modeling clay is acceptable for the backing material application. In the interest of conformity only, it is being specified as the designated backing material for all NIJ Standard–0101.04 Body Armor Compliance Testing. This material is available from art supply stores.

4.8.4 Backing Material Replacement and Identification

Clay used as backing material in NIJ Compliance Testing shall be replaced on an annual basis as a minimum, and the replacement date shall be recorded on the backing material fixture.

4.9 Test Surveillance

NIJ representatives may witness compliance testing at any time. NIJ or its designated representatives shall be afforded the opportunity to examine the range and test setup before beginning any new series of compliance testing. The manufacturer shall inform NIJ CTP personnel of the intent to test at least two weeks before the start of testing.

¹The use of brand names in this standard does not constitute endorsement by the U.S. Department of Justice; National Institute of Justice; U.S. Department of Commerce; National Institute of Standards and Technology; Office of Law Enforcement Standards; or any other agency of the United States Federal Government, nor does it imply that the product is best suited for its intended applications.

4.10 Compliance Test Documentation

All NIJ compliance testing will be formally documented using the CTR found in appendix A. Submission of this form will be made to the NIJ CTP Office within 10 working days following the completion of testing.

5. TEST METHODS

5.1 Purpose

This section constitutes the formal test procedure for Penetration and Backface Signature (P-BFS) and baseline Ballistic Limit (BL) determination testing of personal body armor intended for use by Law Enforcement and Corrections personnel. It specifies the equipment and techniques to be used by NIJ-approved and certified testing agents to qualify voluntarily submitted body armor models for P-BFS compliance and baseline ballistic limit determination.

To achieve NIJ compliance to this standard, each submitted armor model must successfully complete a two-part performance test series. The first test series, P-BFS, is designed to measure the overall ballistic performance of the armor according to pass/fail criteria (sec. 4.6). The second test series, baseline BL determination, is a test to penetration failure and is designed to statistically measure penetration performance (sec. 5.17). No pass/fail criteria are attached to the BL portion of the testing.

5.2 Sampling

Five armor samples will be selected at random from the compliance test group for ballistic testing.

5.3 References

The following references form a basis for and support the procedures described in this section:

- [1] National Institute of Justice. NIJ Standard–0101.03, *Ballistic Resistance of Police Body Armor* (1987).
- [2] American National Standards Institute. SAAMI Z299.1–1992, *Voluntary Industry Standards for Pressure and Velocity of Centerfire Rifle Sporting Ammunition for the Use of Commercial Manufacturers*.
- [3] American National Standards Institute. SAAMI Z299.3–1993, *Voluntary Industry Standards for Pressure and Velocity of Centerfire Pistol and Revolver Ammunition for the Use of Commercial Manufacturers*.
- [4] American National Standards Institute. SAAMI Z299.4–1992, *Voluntary Industry Standards for Pressure and Velocity of Rimfire Sporting Ammunition for the Use of Commercial Manufacturers*.
- [5] Department of Defense. MIL–STD–662F, *DoD Test Method Standard, V50 Ballistic Test for Armor*. (1997).

- [6] U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command. TOP 2-2-710, *Test Operations Procedure, Ballistic Tests of Armor Materials*. (1984), or latest version.

5.4 Ballistic Penetration and Backface Signature Test (P-BFS)

All armor models submitted to NIJ for compliance testing will undergo a series of ballistic impact tests using the ammunition (threat rounds) specified in section 5.4, table 1. These impact tests measure two Backface Signatures (BFS) and demonstrate the armor's pass/fail penetration capability. This test series requires the use of a plastically deforming witness media (clay backing material) held in direct contact with the back surface of the armor panel. This configuration is used to capture and measure the BFS depression produced in the backing material during nonpenetrating threat round impacts.

The use of clay backing material and the subsequent BFS depth measurement does not reflect, represent, replicate, or duplicate the physical characteristics of the human torso or its physical response to this type of stimulus.

5.4.1 Handloads

With the exception of the .22 caliber Long Rifle threat round, handloads may be used in P-BFS tests. The bullets shall be as specified in appendix D. Verification of the handload velocity for each threat round will require firing at least 10 shots per threat caliber prior to each compliance test series. The arithmetic mean of the 10 shot handload series shall be within ± 3 m/s (10 ft/s) of the reference velocities specified in section 5.4, table 1. Individual shots within the 10 shot group may vary up to ± 9 m/s (30 ft/s) from the reference velocity. The results of the handload velocity tests shall be recorded where indicated in the CTR.

5.4.2 Test Weapons

The test weapons shall be ANSI/SAAMI unvented velocity test barrels. No firearms will be used (with the possible exception of Type Special).

5.4.3 Test Weapon Fixtures

The ANSI/SAAMI test barrels will be mounted in an ANSI/SAAMI Universal Receiver (sec. 5.3, Ref. [2]) or in an alternative NIJ-approved substitute mounting fixture. The receiver/mount will be attached to a table or other fixture having sufficient mass and restraint to ensure accurate targeting of repetitively fired rounds. Test barrels may be fabricated without the Universal Receiver collar to permit use of alternative mounting devices.

Table 1. NIJ Standard–0101.04 P-BFS performance test summary

Armor Type	Test Round	Test Bullet	Bullet Weight	Reference Velocity (± 30 ft/s)	Hits Per Armor Part at 0° Angle of Incidence	BFS Depth Maximum	Hits Per Armor Part at 30° Angle of Incidence	Shots Per Panel	Shots Per Sample	Shots Per Threat	Total Shots Req'd
I	1	.22 caliber LR LRN	2.6 g 40 gr.	329 m/s (1080 ft/s)	4	44 mm (1.73 in)	2	6	12	24	48
	2	.380 ACP FMJ RN	6.2 g 95 gr.	322 m/s (1055 ft/s)	4	44mm (1.73 in)	2	6	12	24	
IIA	1	9 mm FMJ RN	8.0 g 124 gr.	341 m/s (1120 ft/s)	4	44 mm (1.73 in)	2	6	12	24	48
	2	40 S&W FMJ	11.7 g 180 gr.	322 m/s (1055 ft/s)	4	44 mm (1.73 in)	2	6	12	24	
II	1	9 mm FMJ RN	8.0 g 124 gr.	367 m/s (1205 ft/s)	4	44 mm (1.73 in)	2	6	12	24	48
	2	357 Mag JSP	10.2 g 158 gr.	436 m/s (1430 ft/s)	4	44 mm (1.73 in)	2	6	12	24	
IIIA	1	9 mm FMJ RN	8.2 g 124 gr.	436 m/s (1430 ft/s)	4	44 mm (1.73 in)	2	6	12	24	48
	2	44 Mag JHP	15.6 g 240 gr.	436 m/s (1430 ft/s)	4	44 mm (1.73 in)	2	6	12	24	
III	1	7.62 mm NATO FMJ	9.6 g 148 gr.	838 m/s (2780 ft/s)	6	44 mm (1.73 in)	0	6	12	12	12
IV	1	.30 caliber M2 AP	10.8 g 166 gr.	869 m/s (2880 ft/s)	1	44 mm (1.73 in)	0	1	2	2	2
Special	*	*	*	*	*	44 mm (1.73 in)	*	*	*	*	*

Panel = Front or back component of typical armor sample.

Sample = Full armor garment, including all component panels (F & B).

Threat = Test ammunition round by caliber.

5.5 Velocity Measurement Equipment

5.5.1 Requirements

Test round velocities will be determined using two independent sets of instrumentation. Velocities from each set of instrumentation will be recorded, and the arithmetic mean of the two velocities will be calculated and recorded. The measured individual test velocities recorded from each set shall be within 3 m/s (10 ft/s) of each other to be considered a fair velocity. If the specified correlation is not achieved, the test velocity shall be that obtained from the widest instrument spacing (as applicable).

5.5.2 Equipment

Recommended types of equipment for velocity measurement are:

- (a) Photo electric light screens.
- (b) Printed make circuit screens.
- (c) Printed break circuit screens.
- (d) Ballistic radar.

Independent sets of velocity measurement may be obtained using two pairs of photo electric light screens, two sets of make screens, two sets of break screens, or any paired set combination. Chronographs, A→B counters, storage scopes, or other digital instruments used to record the measurement equipment's signals will, as a minimum, be capable of recording to 0.3 m/s (1.0 ft/s), or one tenth (0.1) of one μs (10^{-6} s).

5.5.3 Configuration

The first chronograph start trigger screen will be placed a minimum of $2 \text{ m} \pm 3 \text{ mm}$ ($78.7 \text{ in} \pm 0.12 \text{ in}$) from the muzzle of the test barrel (sec. 5.10.2, fig. 6). The screens will be arranged so that they define vertical planes perpendicular to the line of flight of the bullet. The screens will be securely mounted to maintain their required position and spacing (measurement accuracy of $\pm 1 \text{ mm}$ ($\pm 0.04 \text{ in}$)).

5.5.4 Calibration

Velocity measuring instrumentation will be calibrated according to the manufacturer's instructions. Calibration shall be accomplished at the following intervals:

- (a) Prior to any NIJ laboratory certification for compliance testing.
- (b) Prior to any NIJ recertification of the testing laboratory.
- (c) As recommended by the equipment manufacturer.
- (d) Annually.

5.5.5 Calibration Records

Test instrumentation calibration records will be maintained and made available to the NIJ CTP upon request. All calibration procedures and values will be traceable to NIST requirements.

5.6 Wet Conditioning

5.6.1 Environmental Condition

Body armor undergoing P-BFS performance testing will be tested in a wet condition. This condition will be produced by exposing the armor panel under test to a specified flow and distribution of water prior to beginning the ballistic testing (sec. 5.6.2).

5.6.2 Spray Conditioning Equipment

The minimum conditioning surface area of the spray enclosure will be 762 mm x 762 mm (30.0 in x 30.0 in). This surface should be constructed of a material that will permit the unobstructed flow of water through it, without allowing build-up on the spray facing surface. The enclosure will be constructed in such a manner that the flow of water cannot accumulate, to prevent complete immersion of the armor panel. A single spray nozzle will be mounted in the top of the enclosure.

5.6.3 Conditioning Requirements

The average flow rate from the spray nozzle shall be $100 \text{ mm/h} \pm 20 \text{ mm/h}$ ($4.0 \text{ in/h} \pm 0.8 \text{ in/h}$), determined by calculating the arithmetic mean of five rain gauges symmetrically arranged within the prescribed conditioning surface area (sec. 5.6.4, b). The source water temperature will be 10°C to 21°C (50°F to 70°F).

5.6.4 Spray Conditioning Calibration

The spray conditioning system will be calibrated once daily during all compliance test series. Calibration will be completed prior to beginning any armor sample conditioning, using the methodology and equipment described below. Spray calibration results will be recorded in the CTR (app. A).

- (a) Divide the conditioning surface area (sec. 5.6.2) into four equal quadrants, permanently marking the center of each quadrant, and the center of all four quadrants.
- (b) In the center of each quadrant, and at the center of the four quadrants, place a rain gauge capable of measuring increments of 2.5 mm (0.1 in) or better (five gauges total). A one piece design consisting of five gauges attached to a metal cross frame has been shown to work well.
- (c) Time the conditioning event using a stopwatch capable of 1 s measurement intervals. A minimum duration of 15 min will be used to establish the flow rate, measured using the five rain gauges.
- (d) Inspect the gauges and record the level of water at each location. Calculate the arithmetic mean of the five water levels. The calibration results will be recorded on the CTR.

- (e) If the calculated arithmetic mean flow rate, measured in each quadrant and at the center of the quadrants, is not within specified tolerances, the calibration process must be repeated until the specifications are met.

5.7 Backing Material Fixture Preparation

5.7.1 Backing Material Fixtures (BMF)

The fixtures will conform to the requirements in section 4.8.

5.7.2 Surface Preparation

The clay in each BMF will be manipulated to produce a block free of voids, and with a smooth, flat front surface for the accurate and consistent measurement of depression depths. The front surface of the backing material shall be even with the surface plane defined by the fixture edges. Additional clay, conditioned along with each BMF, shall be used to fill voids and restore the front surface as needed.

5.7.3 Backing Material Conditioning

The clay backing material shall initially be conditioned in its fixture, using a heated chamber or enclosure, for at least 3 h at temperatures above 29 °C (85 °F). Actual conditioning temperature and recovery time between uses will be determined by drop test results (sec. 5.7.5). New backing material may require temperatures above 35 °C (95 °F) to consistently achieve 5.7.5 criteria. Conditioning time, temperature, and corresponding drop test performance may change as a function of backing material age and usage.

5.7.4 Conditioning Chamber

The conditioning chamber shall be constructed such that the backing material fixture(s) are positioned with adequate (152 mm (6.0 in)) spacing between them to permit even temperature soaking. The chamber shall be convective in design, with provision for continuous air circulation within the chamber during conditioning cycles.

5.7.5 Backing Material Calibration

Calibration of the Roma Plastilina #1 clay backing material will be accomplished before (pretest), and after (post test) each six shot firing sequence (sec. 5.4, table 1). Calibration will be accomplished using the equipment and techniques specified below:

- (a) Drop weight: Steel Sphere.²
- (b) Drop weight size: 63.5 mm ± 0.05 mm (2.5 in ± 0.001 in) in diameter.
- (c) Drop weight mass: 1043 g ± 5 g (2.29 lb ± 0.01 lb).
- (d) Drop height: 2.0 m (6.56 ft).
- (e) Drop spacing: 76 mm ± 3 mm (3.0 in ± 0.125 in) from edges and 203 mm

²A sphere, reference P/N 3606, supplied by Salem Specialty Ball Co., Inc., P.O. Box 145, West Simsbury, CT 06092, has been found to be satisfactory, although any steel sphere meeting the requirements listed in this section is acceptable.

$\pm 25 \text{ mm}$ (8.0 in ± 1.0 in) between indent centers.

Each calibration drop will consist of a free fall of the steel sphere onto the conditioned backing material. A minimum of five drops will be completed, with the five drop arithmetic mean depth of depression to be $20 \text{ mm} \pm 3 \text{ mm}$ (0.787 in ± 0.12 in). Depth of depression will be measured from the original flat surface of the prepared backing material using a depth gauge measurement tool. The general pretest drop locations will be located according to figure 5.




Figure 5. General pretest drop locations

5.7.6 Female Body Armor Backing Material

For body armor sized and shaped for females, the bust cups shall be built up and supported with backing material conditioned to the same temperature as the main body of the backing material and in the same manner as referenced in section 5.7; however, calibration drop testing does not have to be performed in the built up area.

5.7.7 Backing Material Fixture Rotation

A newly conditioned and drop test calibrated BMF will be used whenever calibration drop test results dictate. Failure to meet post test drop depth requirements (sec. 5.7.5) will result in the invalidation of the previous six shot series. All drop test calibration results will be recorded in the CTR. It is recommended that a minimum of two fixtures be rotated among the test and conditioning cycles to ensure meeting these requirements.

5.8 Workmanship Examination

5.8.1 Armor Carriers

All armor sample carriers and ballistic panel coverings received for compliance testing will be individually inspected for damage, material flaws, or poor workmanship as defined in section 4.3. All tears, fraying, holes, loose stitching, or other identified flaw(s) will be noted on the CTR form; documentary photographs will be taken for use in deficiency notification reporting (sec. 5.8.4).

5.8.2 Ballistic Panels

Pretest – Before testing, all armor sample ballistic panels and inserts received for compliance testing will be individually inspected for damage, material flaws, or poor workmanship as defined in section 4.3. All tears, fraying, holes, loose stitching, or other identified flaw(s) will be noted on the CTR form, and documentary photographs will be taken for use in deficiency notification reporting.

Post Test - Each armor sample's ballistic components (e.g., front and back panels) will be physically inspected immediately after testing and their respective configuration reported in the CTR for submission to the NIJ CTP (layers, weave, stitching, material, etc.).

5.8.3 Label Examination

The complete armor sample and each part (carrier and ballistic panels) will be examined for conformance to the labeling requirements of section 4.5. Note any deviations from requirements in the CTR.

5.8.4 Inspection Deficiency Notification

The NIJ CTP and the armor manufacturer will be notified within 24 h of discovery of any shipping damage, major product flaws, or poor quality workmanship, or label inconsistency. Notification will consist of a summary letter and documentary photographs. Such discoveries and notices will result in suspension of the compliance test until NIJ CTP resolution or approval to proceed is received by the testing laboratory.

5.9 Armor Conditioning

5.9.1 Temperature/Humidity Conditioning

All armor samples received for compliance testing shall be stored and conditioned for a minimum of 12 h at ambient range conditions (sec. 5.10.1).

5.9.2 Inserts

All armor samples will be tested in their final design and end use configuration, including all system components (e.g., carriers and straps), with the exception of removable trauma inserts/packs, which will be removed before conditioning.

5.9.3 Wet Conditioning

The complete armor panel (including removable carriers) shall be conditioned for wet armor testing by exposing it to a 6 min cycle of water spray, using the equipment and conditions specified in section 5.6. Each face of the armor panel will be laid flat upon the conditioning surface (sec. 5.6.2) and exposed to the spray for 3 min, with the strike face of the panel conditioned last. Ballistic testing shall begin immediately after the armor panel is removed from the wet conditioning chamber. If the armor is equipped with waterproof bladders or covers, they shall not be modified or altered in any way.

5.9.4 Test Duration

After wet conditioning, the duration of the six shot firing sequence for each armor panel, front or back, will be no longer than 30 min, with the first round fired within 10 min after completion of the wet conditioning cycle. If testing has not been completed in the time permitted, the test data shall be discarded and testing must begin again with a new wet conditioned armor panel. Test start and stop times will be recorded in the CTR.

5.10 Range Configuration

5.10.1 Ambient Test Conditions

Unless otherwise specified, the ambient conditions of the test range shall be:

- (a) Temperature: $21^{\circ}\text{C} \pm 2.9^{\circ}\text{C}$ ($70^{\circ}\text{F} \pm 5^{\circ}\text{F}$).
- (b) Relative humidity: $50\% \pm 20\%$.
- (c) Range conditions will be recorded in the CTR before and after each armor sample firing sequence (12 shots).

5.10.2 Range Preparation

Set up the test equipment as shown in figure 6. Use a test barrel appropriate for the ammunition required to test the armor (sec. 5.4, table 1), mounted in an appropriate fixture with the barrel horizontal. Dimensions A and B shall be determined from the barrel muzzle. The BMF will be rigidly held by a suitable (metal) test stand, which shall permit the entire armor and backing material assembly to be shifted vertically and horizontally such that the entire assembly can be targeted by the test barrel.

5.10.3 Measurement Tolerances

Range configuration measurements A and B (fig. 6) are to be made within a tolerance of ± 25 mm (± 1.0 in).

5.10.4 Instrumentation

All electronic equipment will be turned on and allowed to warm up until stability is achieved.




Figure 6. Test range configuration

5.11 Test Preparation

5.11.1 Test Barrel Conditioning

Select the required test bullet for the armor type as specified in section 5.4, table 1. Beginning with threat round number one, fire a minimum of three pretest rounds to ensure that the first test round fired will strike the target as aimed, using a suitable targeting device (e.g., a pointing laser). These pretest rounds will also serve to “warm” or stabilize the temperature of the barrel before further testing.

5.11.2 Handload Verification

Before the first armor panel test sequence, fire the 10 shot handload series (sec. 5.4.1) and record the result in the CTR.

5.11.3 Shot Location Marking

Clearly mark the shot locations directly on the sample (fig. 7) following the spacing criteria of section 3.14.




Figure 7. General armor panel impact locations (front and back)

5.11.4 Armor Strapping

Armor samples or panels will be secured to the backing material fixture using 51 mm (2.0 in) wide elastic straps, held together using Velcro® attachments. Figure 8, diagram 1 details the type and location of the strapping devices. The placement of the straps will be such that they do not interfere with the impact points on the panels.

Using a pencil or other appropriate tool, lightly trace the outline of the sample onto the backing material to document the original position of the sample.




Figure 8. Acceptable strapping methods

5.12 Firing Sequence for Type I, IIA, II, and IIIA Armor

5.12.1 Requirements

- (a) Four complete armor samples, consisting of either a front and back set of armor panels or one full jacket; two samples per test threat.
- (b) Six fair hit impacts per armor panel or jacket front and back surface, four armor panels (two front and two back) or two armor jackets for each test threat, for a total of 24 impacts per test threat; and 48 total impacts per compliance test.
- (c) BFS of two normal obliquity impacts in each armor panel, a total of 16 measurements per compliance test sequence. A BFS reading shall be taken at shot location No. 1 for each panel. The remaining BFS shall be taken at the shot location having the highest fair hit velocity of shot locations No. 2 and 3.

5.12.2 Acceptance Criteria for Penetration and BFS Compliance

- (a) No perforation through the panel, either by the bullet or by any fragment of the bullet or armor.
- (b) No measured BFS depression depth greater than 44 mm (1.73 in).

5.12.3 Test Range Configuration

Position the front face of the backing material $5\text{ m} \pm 25\text{ mm}$ ($16.4\text{ ft} \pm 1.0\text{ in}$) from the muzzle of the test barrel (fig. 6). Position the velocity measurement instrumentation according to figure 6, item B. Prepare the required test round as specified in section 5.4, table 1. Complete the handload verification requirement (sec. 5.11.2), or fire a sufficient number of pretest rounds (minimum of three) to ensure that the handloaded test round will strike the armor with a velocity within the specified velocity range. Use an appropriate aiming system to ensure proper placement of the test bullet.

5.12.4 Sample Preparation, Mounting and Firing

5.12.4.1 For armor panels sized and shaped for females, the bust cups shall be filled with backing material conditioned in the same manner as referenced in section 5.7; however, the drop test for consistency does not have to be performed in this area. Further, impact locations four or five of the shot sequence shall be such that at least one of the 30° angle of incidence shots impact on a bust cup. If the bust cup contains one or more seams, the manufacturer shall submit a detailed diagram to identify the location of each seam, and one shot shall impact a seam.

5.12.4.2 For armor employing a front opening system, shot location one shall be adjusted, if necessary, to prevent the shot from impacting a double or overlapping layer of ballistic material. Further, impact locations four and five of the shot sequence shall be adjusted such that at least one of the 30° angle of incidence shots shall impact the closure seam.

5.12.4.3 Start with the wet conditioned (sec. 5.9) front panel of armor sample 1. Place the exposed surface of the calibrated backing material in intimate contact with the backface of the armor panel under test and restrict the movement of the panel from its original position by securing it with two vertical and three horizontal elastic straps, 51 mm (2.0 in) wide with Velcro[®] closures, supplied by the testing laboratory (fig. 8, diagram 1). Using a pencil or other appropriate tool, lightly trace the outline of the sample onto the backing material to document the original position of the sample.

5.12.4.4 The straps shall be positioned to restrict the movement of the panel from its original position, leaving the strike face impact area(s) exposed. If the strapping is an integral part of the armor panel, the manufacturer may supply sample panels with extended strapping devices to allow the armor, as a unit, to be mounted on the backing material fixture (fig. 8, diagram 2). The laboratory shall indicate in the CTR which strapping arrangement was used.

5.12.4.5 Position the backing material fixture to assure proper impact placement and angle of incidence (0°) of the test round at location one, as shown in figure 7.

5.12.4.6Fire Shot No. 1: Fire the first test round against the armor panel at location one (fig. 7), and record the velocity. Examine the armor panel and the backing material to determine whether the bullet made a fair hit and whether complete penetration occurred. If no complete penetration (CP) occurred and the bullet made a fair hit, measure and record the BFS depression depth after “striking” the surface of the clay to reestablish the original surface plane (if necessary to accurately measure BFS). Record the BFS on the CTR, and proceed to section 5.12.3.8.

5.12.4.7If no complete penetration occurred and the bullet made an unfair hit, a second attempt will be made to attain a fair hit. This second attempt will be made to impact the same general area of the armor as the first shot but more than 51 mm (2.0 in) from the previous shot and more than 76 mm (3.0 in) from any edge of the panel. If a fair hit is still not attained, the firing sequence will be terminated and a new armor panel prepared in accordance with section 5.9. The firing sequence will then be repeated using the newly conditioned panel of armor. No more than a total of eight impacts is permitted on any armor panel.

5.12.4.8Remount Armor Sample: Adjust the armor panel back to its original condition (i.e., smooth and manipulate the ballistic material to return it to its original configuration) and replace it on the backing material in its original position using the traced outline in the backing material as a guide. Do not recondition the backing material; do not repair the BFS depression in the backing material; do not remove the test bullet if it is trapped in the panel. When conducting the remaining firing sequence, inspect the armor panel following each impact to verify that the impact was a fair hit with no complete penetration, and smooth out the panel in preparation for the next shot.

5.12.4.9Fire Shot No. 2: Reposition the backing material fixture with the armor panel in position so that the shot will impact the panel at location two (fig. 7). Fire the test round. Do not change the position of the armor panel on the backing material, but adjust the panel and mounting straps as necessary to restore its original condition. Do not remove any trapped bullets from the panel and do not disturb the BFS depressions in the backing material.

5.12.4.10 Fire Shot No. 3: Reposition the backing material fixture with the armor panel in position so that the shot will impact the panel at location three (fig. 7). Fire the test round. Do not change the position of the armor panel on the backing material, but adjust the panel and mounting straps as necessary to restore its original condition. Do not remove any trapped bullets from the panel and do not disturb the BFS depressions in the backing material.

5.12.4.11 Fire Shot No. 4: Reposition the backing material fixture so that the defined angle of incidence between the perpendicular to the armor panel and the line of flight of the test round is 30° (fig. 1), ensuring the bullet will be directed toward the center of the armor panel, such that the bullet will impact the armor at location four (fig. 7). Fire the test round. Do not change the position of the armor panel on the backing material, but adjust the panel and mounting straps as necessary to restore its original condition. Do

not remove any trapped bullets from the panel and do not disturb the BFS depressions in the backing material.

5.12.4.12 Fire Shot No. 5: Reposition the backing material fixture so that the defined angle of incidence between the perpendicular to the armor panel and the line of flight of the test round is 30° (fig. 1), ensuring the bullet will be directed toward the center of the armor panel, such that the bullet will impact the armor at location five (fig. 7). Fire the test round. Do not change the position of the armor panel on the backing material, but adjust the panel and mounting straps as necessary to restore its original condition. Do not remove any trapped bullets from the panel and do not disturb the BFS depressions in the backing material.

5.12.4.13 Fire Shot No. 6: Reposition the backing material fixture with the armor panel in position so that the defined angle of incidence between the perpendicular to the armor and the line of flight of the test round is 0° (fig. 1) and the bullet will impact the armor at location six (fig. 7). Fire the test round. Remove and thoroughly examine the armor panel and backing material for complete penetrations by bullets or fragments.

5.12.4.14 Measure Second BFS: Identify the highest velocity fair hit impact of shots two and three. Strike the backing material surface to reestablish the original surface plane (as necessary) and measure the BFS depth of the selected highest velocity fair hit impact using a depth measuring tool (sec. 5.12.3.6). Record this BFS on the CTR.

5.12.4.15 Post Test Drop Calibration: Without repairing the BFS depressions from the firing sequence, perform five drop tests on the backing material in the general areas of figure 5. Post test drop locations shall be at least 51 mm (2.0 in) away from any BFS depression or other drop impact. Record all measurements on the CTR and determine compliance with drop calibration criteria. Failure to meet clay backing material calibration specifications invalidates the previous six shots. If the backing material meets post test drop specifications, repair the backing material and repeat the pretest drop calibration. If the repaired backing material fixture passes the pretest calibration, it may be reused for the second panel firing sequence, subject to passing another post test drop upon conclusion of the firings.

5.12.4.16 Test Second Armor Panel: Mount the rear panel of the armor sample to a pretest drop calibrated backing material fixture, and repeat the test sequence above using the same test round from section 5.4, table 1 as required for the armor type being tested. Record all results on the CTR.

5.12.4.17 Test Second Armor Sample: Repeat the sequence above for armor sample 2, using the same test round as used for armor sample 1. Record all results on the CTR.

5.12.4.18 Test Third Armor Sample: Replace the backing material fixture with a newly conditioned and drop test calibrated fixture (if necessary). Repeat the test sequence above using test round two from section 5.4, table 1 against armor sample three. Record all results on the CTR.

5.12.4.19 Test Fourth Armor Sample: Repeat the sequence above for armor sample four, using the same test round as used for armor sample three. Record all results in the CTR.

5.12.4.20 Record Results: Record the results of all testing in the CTR (app. A).

5.13 Firing Sequence for Type III Armor

5.13.1 Requirements

- (a) One complete armor sample, or two to six primary ballistic panels, plates or inserts, if removable from the armor sample (e.g., front panel protection only).
- (b) Six fair hit impacts against each primary ballistic panel, plate(s), or insert(s), a total of 12 impacts per armor sample.
- (c) BFS of shot one and the highest remaining velocity shot for each armor panel, plate, or insert.

5.13.2 Acceptance Criteria for Penetration and BFS Compliance

- (a) No perforation by the bullet, fragment of the bullet, or fragment from the plate/insert through the armor.
- (b) No measured BFS depression depth greater than 44 mm (1.73 in).

5.13.3 Test Range Configuration

Position the front face of the backing material 15 m \pm 25 mm (50 ft \pm 1.0 in) from the muzzle of the test barrel (fig. 6). Position the velocity measurement instrumentation according to figure 6, item B. Prepare the required test round as specified in section 5.4, table 1. Complete the handload verification requirement (sec. 5.11.2), or fire a sufficient number of pretest rounds (minimum of three) to ensure that the handloaded test round will strike the armor with a velocity within the specified velocity range. Use an appropriate aiming system to ensure proper placement of the test bullet.

5.13.4 Sample Preparation, Mounting, and Firing

5.13.4.1 For armor panels sized and shaped for females, the bust cups shall be filled with backing material conditioned in the same manner as referenced in section 5.7; however, the drop test for consistency does not have to be performed in this area. If the bust cup contains one or more seams, the manufacturer shall submit a detailed diagram to identify the location of each seam, and one shot shall impact a seam.

5.13.4.2 For armor that utilizes a rigid plate or plates such that the armor panel does not make full contact with the backing material surface, the backing material will be built up in a manner that conforms to the armor panel's shape. This buildup will use additional clay backing material conditioned in the same manner as the backing material fixture.

5.13.4.3 Mark the front armor panel, plate, or insert for six impacts, evenly spaced on the panel according to the spacing criteria of a minimum of 76 mm (3.0 in) from any edge to

center and 51 mm (2.0 in) from any previous impact (center to center). Wet condition the armor panel, plate, or insert per the requirements of section 5.9.3.

5.13.4.4 Place the exposed surface of the conditioned and drop test calibrated backing material in intimate contact with the backface of the armor panel, plate, or insert and secure it with two vertical and three horizontal elastic straps, 51 mm (2.0 in) wide with Velcro[®] closures, supplied by the testing laboratory (fig. 8, diagram 1).

5.13.4.5 The straps shall be positioned to leave the strike face impact areas exposed while not permitting the armor to shift on the backing material when impacted. Alternatively, if the strapping is an integral part of the ballistic panel, the manufacturer may supply samples with extended strapping devices to allow the armor as a unit to be mounted on the BMF (fig. 8, diagram 2). The laboratory shall indicate in the CTR which strapping arrangement was used.

5.13.4.6 Firing Sequence: Conduct all six of the firings in accordance with the sequence specified in sections 5.12.4.5 through 5.12.4.14 except for the oblique impacts in items 5.12.4.11, and 5.12.4.12. All shots for Type III armor samples will be at 0° obliquity.

5.13.4.7 Second Panel Testing: Repeat sections 5.13.4.2 through 5.13.4.6 for the second primary ballistic panel, plate, or insert of the sample.

5.13.4.8 Record Test Results: Record the result of all testing in the CTR (app. A).

5.14 Firing Sequence for Type IV Armor

5.14.1 Requirements

- (a) One complete armor sample, including at least two primary ballistic panels, plates, or inserts, if removable from complete armor unit (e.g., front panel protection only).
- (b) One fair hit impact against the primary ballistic panels, plates, or inserts, a total of two impacts per armor sample.
- (c) BFS of each impact.

5.14.2 Acceptance Criteria for Penetration and BFS Compliance

- (a) No perforation of the projectile, fragment of the projectile, or fragment of the plate/insert through the armor.
- (b) No measured BFS depression depth greater than 44 mm (1.73 in).

5.14.3 Test Range Configuration

Position the front face of the backing material 15 m ± 25 mm (50 ft ± 1.0 in) from the muzzle of the test barrel (fig. 6). Position the velocity measurement instrumentation according to figure 6, item B. Prepare the required test round as specified in section 5.4, table 1. Complete the handload verification requirement (sec. 5.11.2), or fire a sufficient number of pretest rounds (minimum of three) to ensure that the handloaded test round will strike the armor with a velocity

within the specified velocity range. Use an appropriate aiming system to ensure proper placement of the test bullet.

5.14.4 Sample Preparation, Mounting, and Firing

5.14.4.1 For armor panels sized and shaped for females, the bust cups shall be filled with backing material conditioned in the same manner as referenced in section 5.7; however, the drop test for consistency does not have to be performed in this area. If the bust cup contains one or more seams, the manufacturer shall submit a detailed diagram to identify the location of each seam, and the shot shall impact a seam.

5.14.4.2 For armor that utilizes a rigid insert, plate or plates such that the armor panel does not make full contact with the backing material surface, the backing material will be built up in a manner that conforms to the armor panel's shape. This buildup will use clay backing material conditioned in the same manner as the backing material fixture.

5.14.4.3 Mark the center of the front armor panel, plate, or insert for one impact, with a minimum of 76 mm (3.0 in) from any edge. Wet condition the armor panel, plate, or insert per the requirements of section 5.9.3.

5.14.4.4 Place the exposed surface of the conditioned and drop test calibrated backing material in intimate contact with the backface of the armor panel, plate, or insert and secure it with at least two vertical and horizontal elastic straps, 51 mm (2.0 in) wide with Velcro® closures, supplied by the testing laboratory (fig. 8, diagram 1).

5.14.4.5 Firing Sequence: Fire one shot at the center of the plate/insert and record the velocity. Examine the plate/insert and the backing material to determine whether the bullet made a fair hit and whether complete penetration occurred. If the bullet failed to make a fair hit as defined by section 3.8, the test must be repeated with another plate/insert sample. If no complete penetration occurred and the bullet made a fair hit, measure the BFS depth of depression using a depth measurement tool. If the depth of the depression complies with the requirement of section 5.14.2, proceed to section 5.14.4.6.

5.14.4.6 Second Plate/Insert Testing: Repeat sections 5.14.4.1 through 5.14.4.5 for the second plate/insert of the sample.

5.14.4.7 Record Test Results: Record the results of all testing in the CTR (app. A).

5.15 P-BFS Test (Special Type)

If the armor is principally made of soft materials (e.g., fabric), use the test procedure defined in section 5.12. If the armor is principally nonfabric, rigid, or “hard” (metal plates or ceramic with a small amount of fabric to act as a trauma shield or to catch backface fragments from the main ballistic resistance element), use the test procedure defined in section 5.13 or 5.14, depending on the NIJ type classification claimed.

5.16 P-BFS Test for Groin and Coccyx Protectors

Groin and coccyx protectors shall each be impacted with three fair hits, evenly spaced not less than 51 mm (2.0 in) apart, and not less than 76 mm (3.0 in) from an edge, at 0° obliquity. The BFS due to the first fair hit shall be measured to determine compliance. No fair hit bullet as defined by section 3.14 shall completely penetrate the armor.

5.17 Baseline Ballistic Limit Determination Test

All NIJ compliance testing for body armor baseline BL assessment will be conducted in accordance with the following procedures.

5.17.1 Types I, IIA, II, and IIIA

Ballistic Limit testing will be completed against complete units (e.g., ballistic fabric panels, covers, carriers, and strapping). Removable trauma inserts/packs will not be included as part of the complete armor unit used for BL determination.

5.17.2 Types III and IV

Testing will be conducted against the complete armor unit as above, except when the armor's NIJ protection type determination and design rely solely upon rigid panels, plates, or inserts to provide ballistic resistance to impact. In those instances, only the rigid panels, plates, or inserts will be tested for baseline BL probability.

5.17.3 Test Sample and Shot Requirements

All NIJ baseline BL testing will be conducted against dry condition armor panels.

Table 2. NIJ baseline Ballistic Limit determination test summary

Armor Samples Required	Ballistic Panels Required	Test Threat	Minimum Shots Required	Minimum Penetration Results
Type I through IIIA One Full Armor	Front	9 mm	12	5 Complete, 5 Partial, Complete at Highest Velocity
	Rear	124 gr. FMJ	12	5 Complete, 5 Partial, Complete at Highest Velocity
Type III One Full Armor	2 - 6*	7.62 mm M80 FMJ	6	3 Complete, 3 Partial, Velocity Range of 27 m/s (90 ft/s)
Type IV One Full Armor	2 - 6*	.30 caliber M2 AP	6	3 Complete, 3 Partial, Velocity Range of 27 m/s (90 ft/s)
Special*	TBD*	TBD*	TBD*	TBD Complete, TBD Partial, Complete at Highest Velocity

*Quantity determined by section 5.17.2 and panel, plate, or insert size and ability to withstand multiple impacts.

5.17.4 Test Range

The ambient conditions and configuration of the test range shall conform to section 5.10 and figure 6 of this document.

5.17.5 Test Rounds

All threat ammunition will be handloaded to achieve the desired velocities.

5.18 Ballistic Limit Testing Equipment

5.18.1 Calibration

All testing equipment shall be calibrated as required by section 5.5.4.

5.18.2 Backing Material Fixture

All NIJ compliance tests for BL testing will use the Backing Material Fixture and Roma Plastilina No. 1 clay backing material as specified in section 4.8, except that the removable wooden back will be removed.

5.18.3 Armor Strapping

The armor panels will be secured to the Backing Material Fixtures in accordance with section 5.11.4.

5.18.4 Test Barrels

All handloaded test rounds will be fired from unvented ANSI/SAAMI velocity test barrels, according to section 5.4.2. All ammunition handling and firing procedures will follow applicable SAAMI specifications and guidelines.

5.18.5 Velocity Measurement

Velocities will be measured in accordance with section 5.5 and figure 6 of this document.

5.19 Ballistic Limit Test Preparation

5.19.1 Shot Location Marking

Types I, IIA, II, and IIIA: The front and rear armor panels will be marked for impact aim points according to figure 9. Types III, IV, and Special: In the case of rigid plates/inserts, the six test round impacts will be evenly distributed over the surface area of the samples according to the spacing criteria in section 3.14.

5.19.2 Sample Conditioning

The armor samples will be conditioned for a minimum of 12 h at the ambient range conditions specified in section 5.10.

5.19.3 Backing Material Conditioning

The backing material fixtures will be prepared and conditioned to the same temperatures as those used to conduct the P-BFS tests for that armor model. Drop test calibration will not be required; however, backing material temperature will be recorded before and after each 12 shot series of firings (one armor panel).




Figure 9. Impact locations for baseline BL determination testing - Type I through IIIA

5.20 BALLISTIC LIMIT FIRING SEQUENCE

ALL BALLISTIC LIMIT DETERMINATION TESTING FOR NIJ COMPLIANCE ARMORS WILL FOLLOW THE GENERAL GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES OF MIL-STD-662F AND TOP 2-2-710 WITH INCLUSION AND ADHERENCE TO THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS:

- (a) All Type I through IIIA test samples will be tested in their final design and end use configuration, including all system components (e.g., carriers, straps), with the exception of trauma inserts/packs, which will be removed. Type III and IV test samples will be tested according to the relevant requirements of section 5.17.2, determined by NIJ CTP personnel upon receipt of the armor for compliance testing.
- (b) Impact locations for all shots will be permanently marked on the armor panel impact face according to the pattern requirements of figure 9 and section 5.19.1.
- (c) The minimum aim point spacing between the edges of the ballistic panel insert, not the external carrier, will be 76 mm (3.0 in), and the minimum spacing between each impact will be 51 mm (2.0 in).
- (d) The armor panel shall be rigidly supported across the entire rear face area by the backing material fixture specified in section 4.8 of this document, except that the removable wooden back shall be removed from the backing material fixture.
- (e) The armor panel shall be positioned and maintained in intimate contact with the backing material prior to and during the impact event, using the strapping devices specified in section 5.11.4 and figure 8 of this document.
- (f) The armor panel will be adjusted between shots as required to maintain a consistent armor panel surface, original condition, alignment of the ballistic panels/layers, and intimate contact with the backing material.
- (g) A modified Langlie Method of test firing (TOP 2-2-710, Ref. [6]) will be used to acquire the data set for Types I, IIA, II, and IIIA BL evaluations (app. B). The “up and down” method of firing (MIL-STD-662F, Ref. [5]) will be utilized for Types III and IV testing.
- (h) The lower velocity limit for beginning the modified Langlie sequence will be supplied to the laboratory by the NIJ CTP as part of the submission request. If the lower velocity is not provided, the lower limit will be the model’s NIJ Type reference velocity plus 69 m/s (225 ft/s). The lower velocity limit should produce a partial penetration.
- (i) The upper velocity for beginning the modified Langlie firing sequence will be the lower velocity limit plus 46 m/s (150 ft/s). This may be adjusted as needed during testing to ensure meeting steps j and k below.
- (j) The highest velocity impact obtained during the modified Langlie test sequence must be a complete penetration.
- (k) If the highest velocity fired during the modified Langlie test sequence produces a partial penetration, firing will continue at 15 m/s (50 ft/s) increments until a single complete penetration is achieved.

5.21 Ballistic Limit Determination

5.21.1 Minimum Number of Data Points

- a) Levels I, IIA, II, and IIIA: A minimum of 12 data points are required, including at least five partial and five complete penetration results.
- b) Levels III and IV: A minimum of six data points are required, consisting of three partial and three complete penetration results.
- c) Special: The minimum number of data points will be determined by user specification and NIJ approval, and shall require an equal number of partial and complete penetrations for the BL calculation.

5.21.2 Data Set Tabulation

The data set will be tabulated and sorted according to velocity and penetration results. The sorted data must include the lowest complete penetration (CP) velocity result and the highest partial penetration (PP) velocity result.

5.21.3 Ballistic Limit Calculation

Levels I, IIA, II, and IIIA: The arithmetic mean of 10 qualified (5 CP, 5 PP) velocities is calculated, producing the armor panel's 10 shot baseline BL. The standard deviation (σ) of the 10 shot group of velocities will also be determined and recorded along with the model's baseline BL in the CTR.

Levels III and IV: The arithmetic mean of six qualified (3 CP, 3 PP) velocities is calculated, producing the armor sample's six shot baseline BL. The standard deviation (σ) of the six shot group of velocities will also be determined and recorded along with the model's baseline BL in the CTR.

Special: The arithmetic mean of either six or 10 qualified velocities is calculated, producing the armor panel's six or 10 shot baseline BL. The standard deviation (σ) of the six or 10 shot group of velocities will also be determined and recorded along with the model's baseline BL in the CTR.

5.22 Ballistic Limit Retesting of Compliant Armor

When compliant body armor models are submitted to NIJ for BL retest, two complete sets or samples will be required according to section 4.7, section 5.17.2, and table 2. The samples will be the same size as originally submitted. The BL and standard deviation of each sample/panel from one of the retest armor samples will be determined in accordance with sections 5.17 through 5.21. The remaining armor sample will be retained for use as needed, should the armor sample fail to meet the retest criteria.

Retested armor will continue to be compliant if the BL of the retested sample is $\pm 3 \sigma$ from each of the baseline BL determined during its original compliance testing. Armor found noncompliant with its baseline BL will undergo additional discretionary investigation by the NIJ

CTP. Compliance determinations using NIJ Standard–0101.04 BL procedures and retest criteria apply to new, unworn, manufacturer supplied body armor samples only.

6. DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING

6.1 Test Documentation

6.1.1 Data Recording

The results of each armor test performed will be recorded on the CTR (app. A). All test data and activities shall be recorded in sufficient detail such that a reconstruction of the test based on the information contained in the CTR can be performed.

6.1.2 Data Certification

When completed, the responsible test laboratory representative shall sign the CTR and any attachments.

6.1.3 Data Storage

All CTRs and accompanying data will be archived, in either digital or hardcopy form, by the test laboratory for a minimum of five years following the completion of each compliance test series.

6.2 Test Report

6.2.1 Requirements

A summary report will be submitted to the NIJ CTP Office within 10 working days of the completion of testing. Inclusion of the following minimum support documentations will be required:

- (a) Submission letter stating the outcome of the testing.
- (b) Compliance Test Report (signed).
- (c) Failure documentation (if applicable).
- (d) At least one photograph showing the strike face(s) of a representative armor sample (e.g., front and back) before testing, with scale and identification sign.
- (e) At least one photograph showing the strike face(s) of the tested armor sample (e.g., front and back panels), with scale and identification sign.

APPENDIX A

COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT FORM

The Compliance Test Report (CTR) form shall be used in conjunction with NIJ Standard–0101.04, Ballistic Resistance of Personal Body Armor, and shall become a part of the official records of the compliance testing of each armor model submitted for testing. All sections of the form shall be completed.

An electronic file of this report form is available from the NIJ Compliance Test Program Office, National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center - National (NLECTC-National). Requests for this file can be sent to, NLECTC-National, NIJ Body Armor Compliance Test Program, P.O. Box 1160, Rockville, MD 20849–1160, Attn: Compliance Test Program Manager, or to: E-mail: asknlectc@nlectc.org.

**NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT**

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

COMPLIANCE TESTING INFORMATION

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

Test Laboratory: _____
Test Start Date: _____

Report Number: _____
Report Date: _____

ARMOR DESCRIPTION:

Manufacturer: _____
Date Rec'd: _____
*Ballistic Material: _____

Model: _____
Style: _____
Male/Female: _____

NIJ Armor Type: _____
0101.03 Compliant: _____

*Choices:

<i>Aramid</i>	<i>PBO</i>	<i>Ceramic</i>	<i>Metal</i>
<i>Polyethylene</i>	<i>Hybrid</i>	<i>Composite</i>	<i>Other</i>

SAMPLE DESCRIPTION:

	Sample 1		Sample 2		Sample 3		Sample 4		Sample 5	
	Front	Back	Front	Back	Front	Back	Front	Back	Front	Back
Size:										
Serial Number:										
Lot Number:										
Gross Weight (lb.):										

TEST DESCRIPTION:

	P-BFS								BL (V50)	
	Sample 1		Sample 2		Sample 3		Sample 4		Sample 5	
	Front	Back	Front	Back	Front	Back	Front	Back	Front	Back
Test Condition:	Wet	Wet	Wet	Wet	Wet	Wet	Wet	Wet	Dry	Dry
Threat Ammunition:		0	0	0		0	0	0		0
Reference Vo (± 30 ft/s):		0	0	0		0	0	0		0
Bullet (grain/type):		0	0	0		0	0	0		0
Bullet Manufacturer:		0	0	0		0	0	0		0
Factory Lot Number:		0	0	0		0	0	0		0
Barrel Manufacturer:		0	0	0		0	0	0		0
Caliber:		0	0	0		0	0	0		0
Length (in):		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0
Receiver:		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Starting Vo for BL (provided)

ARMOR CONSTRUCTION:

	Front Panel	Rear Panel
Front Closure (Y/N):	_____	_____
Removable Carrier (Y/N):	_____	_____
Number of Layers:	_____	_____
Description of Stitching:	_____ _____ _____	_____ _____ _____
Individual Layer Description:	_____ _____ _____	_____ _____ _____

REMARKS:

TESTING CERTIFICATION:

Laboratory Representative: _____
Name

Signature

Witnessed by: _____
Name Representing

Signature

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Manufacturer: 0 **Report Number:** 0
Model: 0 **Report Date:** 01/00/00


Calibration Date:					
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--

	Interval (min)						
Gauge Location	15	15	15	15	15	15	
1							inches
2							inches
3							inches
4							inches
5							inches

Average:	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	inches
Requirement:	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	inches
Pass:	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	

Required Flow Rate:	4.0 +/- 0.8 in/hr	1.0 +/- 0.2 in./25 hr
Conditioning Surface Dimensions:	<div></div> x <div></div>	<div></div> inches square

Gauge Locations



Top View

Spray Condition Cal

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Drop Test Results

Sample/Panel: Sample 1 Front
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Test Date:
Range Conditions:
Temperature: F
RH: %

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00

Pre-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID:
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Post-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID: 0
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Sample/Panel: Sample 1 Back

Test Date: 01/00/00
Range Conditions:
Temperature: 0 F
RH: 0 %

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00

Pre-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID:
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Post-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID: 0
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Drop Test Results

Sample/Panel: Sample 2 Front
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Test Date:
Range Conditions:
Temperature: F
RH: %

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00

Pre-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID:
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Post-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID: 0
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Sample/Panel: Sample 2 Back

Test Date: 01/00/00
Range Conditions:
Temperature: 0 F
RH: 0 %

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00

Pre-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID:
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Post-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID: 0
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Drop Test Results

Sample/Panel: Sample 3 Front
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Test Date:
Range Conditions:
Temperature: F
RH: %

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00

Pre-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID:
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Post-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID: 0
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Sample/Panel: Sample 3 Back

Test Date: 01/00/00
Range Conditions:
Temperature: 0 F
RH: 0 %

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00

Pre-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID:
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Post-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID: 0
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

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Drop Test Results

Sample/Panel: Sample 4 Front
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Test Date:
Range Conditions:
Temperature: F
RH: %

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00

Pre-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID:
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Post-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID: 0
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Sample/Panel: Sample 4 Back

Test Date: 01/00/00
Range Conditions:
Temperature: 0 F
RH: 0 %

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00

Pre-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID:
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

Post-Test Drop Calibration:

Block ID: 0
Time of Day: hrs
Clay Temperature: deg. F

Depth of Indent:

Drop 1	Drop 2	Drop 3	Drop 4	Drop 5	Avg.
					#DIV/0!

Requirement: 20 ± 3
Pass: #DIV/0!

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Penetration and BFS Firing Data

Sample No: Sample 1
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Ammunition: 0
Conditioning: Wet
Test Date: 01/00/00

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00
NIJ Armor Type: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

FRONT PANEL							BACK PANEL							COMPLIANCE	
Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Fair (Y/N)	Penetrate (Y/N)	Remarks	BFS (mm)	Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Fair (Y/N)	Penetrate (Y/N)	Remarks	BFS (mm)	Front Panel	Back Panel
1							1								
2							2								
3							3								
4							4								
5							5								
6							6								
7							7								
8							8								

Firing Sequence Start: hrs
Firing Sequence End: hrs
Duration: min

Firing Sequence Start: hrs
Firing Sequence End: hrs
Duration: min

TEST CONDITIONS:

Ambient Temp: 0.0 F
Rel. Humidity: 0.0 %

TEST RANGE:

Range Length: m
 ft.

Handload Verification: ft/s

Reference Velocity: 0 ft/s

Velocity Range: -30 30 ft/s

Velocity Results:	Min	Max
Front Panel:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u> ft/s
Back Panel:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u> ft/s

REMARKS:

- a - 30 degree obliquity impact
- b - Excessive velocity
- c - Insufficient velocity
- d - Too close to edge

- e - Too close to prior impact
- f - Excessive total impacts (test terminated)
- g - Excessive area impacts (test terminated)
- h - Impact on seam

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Penetration and BFS Firing Data

Sample No: Sample 2
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Ammunition: 0
Conditioning: Wet
Test Date: 01/00/00

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00
NIJ Armor Type: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

FRONT PANEL							BACK PANEL							COMPLIANCE	
Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Fair (Y/N)	Penetrate (Y/N)	Remarks	BFS (mm)	Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Fair (Y/N)	Penetrate (Y/N)	Remarks	BFS (mm)	Front Panel	Back Panel
1							1								
2							2								
3							3								
4							4								
5							5								
6							6								
7							7								
8							8								

Firing Sequence Start: hrs
Firing Sequence End: hrs
Duration: min

Firing Sequence Start: hrs
Firing Sequence End: hrs
Duration: min

TEST CONDITIONS:

Ambient Temp: 0.0 F
Rel. Humidity: 0.0 %

TEST RANGE:

Range Length: 0.0 m
0.0 ft.

Handload Verification: ft/s

Reference Velocity: 0 ft/s

Velocity Range: -30 30 ft/s

Velocity Results:	Min	Max
Front Panel:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u> ft/s
Back Panel:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u> ft/s

REMARKS:

- a - 30 degree obliquity impact
- b - Excessive velocity
- c - Insufficient velocity
- d - Too close to edge

- e - Too close to prior impact
- f - Excessive total impacts (test terminated)
- g - Excessive area impacts (test terminated)
- h - Impact on seam

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Penetration and BFS Firing Data

Sample No: Sample 3
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Ammunition: 0
Conditioning: Wet
Test Date: 01/00/00

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00
NIJ Armor Type: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

FRONT PANEL							BACK PANEL							COMPLIANCE	
Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Fair (Y/N)	Penetrate (Y/N)	Remarks	BFS (mm)	Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Fair (Y/N)	Penetrate (Y/N)	Remarks	BFS (mm)	Front Panel	Back Panel
1							1								
2							2								
3							3								
4							4								
5							5								
6							6								
7							7								
8							8								

Firing Sequence Start: hrs
Firing Sequence End: hrs
Duration: min

Firing Sequence Start: hrs
Firing Sequence End: hrs
Duration: min

TEST CONDITIONS:

Ambient Temp: 0 F
Rel. Humidity: 0 %

TEST RANGE:

Range Length: m
 ft.

Handload Verification: ft/s

Reference Velocity: 0 ft/s

Velocity Range: -30 30 ft/s

Velocity Results:	Min	Max
Front Panel:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u> ft/s
Back Panel:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u> ft/s

REMARKS:

- a - 30 degree obliquity impact
- b - Excessive velocity
- c - Insufficient velocity
- d - Too close to edge

- e - Too close to prior impact
- f - Excessive total impacts (test terminated)
- g - Excessive area impacts (test terminated)
- h - Impact on seam

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Penetration and BFS Firing Data

Sample No: Sample 4
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Ammunition: 0
Conditioning: Wet
Test Date: 01/00/00

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00
NIJ Armor Type: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

FRONT PANEL							BACK PANEL							COMPLIANCE	
Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Fair (Y/N)	Penetrate (Y/N)	Remarks	BFS (mm)	Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Fair (Y/N)	Penetrate (Y/N)	Remarks	BFS (mm)	Front Panel	Back Panel
1							1								
2							2								
3							3								
4							4								
5							5								
6							6								
7							7								
8							8								

Firing Sequence Start: hrs
Firing Sequence End: hrs
Duration: min

Firing Sequence Start: hrs
Firing Sequence End: hrs
Duration: min

TEST CONDITIONS:

Ambient Temp: 0 F
Rel. Humidity: 0 %

TEST RANGE:

Range Length: 0.0 m
0.0 ft.

Handload Verification: ft/s

Reference Velocity: 0 ft/s

Velocity Range: -30 30 ft/s

Velocity Results:	Min	Max
Front Panel:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u> ft/s
Back Panel:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u> ft/s

REMARKS:

- a - 30 degree obliquity impact
- b - Excessive velocity
- c - Insufficient velocity
- d - Too close to edge

- e - Too close to prior impact
- f - Excessive total impacts (test terminated)
- g - Excessive area impacts (test terminated)
- h - Impact on seam

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Ballistic Limit Firing Data

Sample No: Sample 5
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Ammunition: 0
Conditioning: Dry
Test Date:

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 01/00/00
NIJ Armor Type: 0

Serial No: 0
Weight: 0 lb.

Serial No: 0
Weight: 0.00 lb.

FRONT PANEL							BACK PANEL						
Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Shot Result		Remarks	Used (Y/N)	Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Shot Result		Remarks	Used (Y/N)
			Complete	Partial						Complete	Partial		
1							1						
9							7						
7							6						
6							8						
12							9						
5							12						
3							5						
4							4						
10							10						
11							2						
8							11						
2							3						
13							13						
14							14						
15							15						

Total: 0 0 0

Total: 0 0 0

TEST CONDITIONS:

Ambient Temp: F
Rel. Humidity: %

TEST RANGE:

Range Length: 0.0 m
0.0 ft.

NIJ Reference Velocity: ft/s

NIJ Calculated Start Velocity: 0 ft/s

Provided Start Velocity: 0 ft/s

Upper Velocity: 150 ft/s

REMARKS:

- a - Too close to edge
- b - Too close to prior impact
- c - Impact on seam

Velocity Results:	Min	Max
Front Panel:	0	0 ft/s
Back Panel:	0	0 ft/s

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Ballistic Limit Firing Data Sheet

Sample No: Sample 5
Manufacturer: 0
Model: 0

Ammunition: 0
Conditioning: Dry
Test Date: ####

Report Number: 0
Report Date: 0
NIJ Armor Type: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

Panel Serial No: 0

10 - SHOT BALLISTIC LIMIT - TYPE I, IIA, II, IIIA									
FRONT PANEL					BACK PANEL				
Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Shot Result		Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Shot Result	
			Complete	Partial				Complete	Partial

NIJ BASELINE BL:

Front: #DIV/0! ft/s
Vo Range: 0 ft/s
Std Dev. (σ) #DIV/0! ft/s

Back: #DIV/0! ft/s
Vo Range: 0 ft/s
Std Dev. (σ) #DIV/0! ft/s

Difference F-to-B: #DIV/0! ft/s
Avg. F-to-B 6-shot V50: #DIV/0! ft/s

6 - SHOT BALLISTIC LIMIT - TYPE III, IV									
FRONT PANEL					BACK PANEL				
Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Shot Result		Shot No.	Velocity (m/s)	Velocity (ft/s)	Shot Result	
			Complete	Partial				Complete	Partial

NIJ BASELINE BL:

Front: #DIV/0! ft/s
Vo Range: 0 ft/s
Std Dev. (σ) #DIV/0! ft/s

Back: #DIV/0! ft/s
Vo Range: 0 ft/s
Std Dev. (σ) #DIV/0! ft/s

Difference F-to-B: #DIV/0! ft/s
Avg. F-to-B 6-shot V50: #DIV/0! ft/s

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE COMPLIANCE TEST REPORT

NIJ Standard 0101.04
September 2000

Summary of Results

Armor Manufacturer: 0 **Armor Style:** 0 **Report Number:** 0
Armor Model No: 0 **NIJ Armor Type:** 0 **Report Date:** 01/00/00

PENETRATION AND BACKFACE SIGNATURE												
Test Samples (b)					Ballistic Threat					Results (a)		
Item Number	Serial Number	Panel	Weight (lbs)	No. of Plies	Caliber (a)	Obliquity (degrees)	Req'd Shots	Velocity (ft/s)		Penetration (Y/N)	Deformation (mm)	
								Max.	Min.		Shot 1	Shot 2
Sample 1	0	Front	0	0	0	0 30	4 2	0 0	0 0	N	0	0
	0	Back	0	0	0	0 30	4 2	0 0	0 0	N	0	0
Sample 2	0	Front	0	0	0	0 30	4 2	0 0	0 0	N	0	0
	0	Back	0	0	0	0 30	4 2	0 0	0 0	N	0	0
Sample 3	0	Front	0	0	0	0 30	4 2	0 0	0 0	N	0	0
	0	Back	0	0	0	0 30	4 2	0 0	0 0	N	0	0
Sample 4	0	Front	0	0	0	0 30	4 2	0 0	0 0	N	0	0
	0	Back	0	0	0	0 30	4 2	0 0	0 0	N	0	0

Notes:

(a) Maximum allowable BFS: 44 mm
 (b) Ballistic Material: 0

P-BFS Compliance:

Penetration: Pass
 BFS: Pass

NIJ Baseline BL:

Front Panel: #DIV/0! ft/s
 Std Dev. (σ): #DIV/0! ft/s
 Rear Panel: #DIV/0! ft/s
 Std Dev. (σ): #DIV/0! ft/s

CERTIFICATION:

Test Data Certification: 0
 Name _____
 Signature _____

Witnessed by: 0 0
 Name _____ Representing _____
 Signature _____

APPENDIX B

MODIFIED LANGLIE METHOD OF BALLISTIC LIMIT FIRING

1. VELOCITY CLASS DETERMINATION

1.1 Velocity Limits

Select a lower and upper projectile velocity limit so that the probability of obtaining a complete penetration at the lower velocity or a partial penetration at the upper velocity is highly unlikely.

- (a) The lower velocity should be provided by NIJ or the manufacturer — if not, the lower velocity limit shall be the highest of the two NIJ Standard–0101.04 Type ammunition reference velocities plus 69 m/s (225 ft/s).
- (b) The upper velocity will be determined by adding 46 m/s (150 ft/s) to the lower velocity limit.

2. PROCEDURE

2.1 Firing Sequence

- (a) Attempt to fire the first round at a velocity midway between the lower and upper limit velocities.
- (b) If no upper limit is known, attempt to fire the first round at a velocity 46 m/s (150 ft/s) above the lower limit.
- (c) If the first round results in a complete penetration, attempt to reduce the velocity of the second round halfway between the first round velocity and the lower limit velocity; if the first round results in a partial penetration, attempt to raise the velocity of the second round halfway between the first and upper limit velocity.
- (d) If the first two rounds result in a reversal (one partial, one complete penetration), attempt to fire the third round halfway between the velocity of the first two rounds.
- (e) If the first two rounds result in two partial penetrations, attempt to fire the third round at a velocity halfway between the second round velocity and the upper velocity limit.
- (f) If the first two rounds result in two complete penetrations, attempt to fire the third round halfway between the second round velocity and the lower velocity limit.

Fire the remaining rounds using the following rules:

- (g) If the preceding pair of rounds resulted in a reversal (one partial, one complete penetration), attempt to fire at a velocity halfway between the two velocities.

- (h) If the last two rounds did not produce a reversal, look at the last four rounds. If the number of partial and complete penetrations is equal, attempt to fire the next round halfway between the velocity of the first and last round of the group.
- (i) If the last four rounds did not produce an equal number of partial and complete penetrations, look at the last six, eight, etc., until the number of partial and complete penetrations are equal. Attempt to fire the next round halfway between the lower and upper velocities of that group.
- (j) Always attempt to fire at a velocity halfway between the lower and upper velocity of the group examined.
- (k) If the conditions of section 1.1 cannot be satisfied and the last round fired resulted in a complete penetration, attempt to fire the next round at a velocity halfway between the last round and the lower velocity limit; otherwise, if the last round was a partial penetration, attempt to fire halfway between the last round and the upper velocity limit.
- (l) Continue on in the manner above until the requirement for the number of rounds has been satisfied, i.e., a minimum of 12 rounds, with at least five partial and five complete penetrations, with the highest velocity round resulting in a complete penetration.

2.2 Velocity Class Adjustment

In cases where it becomes rapidly obvious that the lower velocity limit is too high or too low, adjustment of the velocity classes can be made by selecting a new lower velocity limit and adjusting the upper limit to be 46 m/s (150 ft/s) higher than the new lower limit.

APPENDIX C

BODY ARMOR SELECTION

Police administrators should make every effort to encourage their officers to wear body armor throughout each duty shift. Although designed primarily to provide protection against handgun assault, body armor has prevented serious and potentially fatal injuries in traffic accidents (both in automobiles and while operating motorcycles), from physical assault with improvised clubs, and to some extent from knives. Law enforcement officer fatality statistics are compiled annually by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Analysis of the statistics suggests that a large percentage of the officer fatalities reported each year could have been prevented if the officer had been wearing armor. Before purchasing body armor one should read NIJ Guide 100–98, “Selection and Application Guide to Personal Body Armor,” which discusses armor in depth.

The fundamental considerations in selecting body armor are the threat to which officers are exposed and the nature of their service weapons. Knowledge of the street weapons in the local area (confiscated weapons are a good indicator) is essential, for the armor should be selected to protect against the street threat and the department’s service weapons. Throughout the last decade, one in six officers killed with a firearm was shot with his or her duty weapon. Full coverage of the torso is critical because fatalities among officers wearing body armor have resulted from bullets having entered an officer’s side through the opening between front and rear panels. NIJ Standard–0101.04 classifies body armor into seven different threat levels that, in order from lowest to highest level of protection, are Type I, Type IIA, Type II, Type IIIA, Type III, Type IV, and Special.

As of the year 2000, ballistic resistant body armor suitable for full time wear throughout an entire shift of duty is available in classification Types I, IIA, II, and IIIA, which provide increasing levels of protection from handgun threats. Type I body armor, which was first issued during the NIJ demonstration project in 1975, is the minimum level of protection that any officer should have. Officers seeking protection from lower velocity 9 mm and 40 S&W ammunition should wear Type IIA body armor. For protection against high velocity 357 Magnum and higher velocity 9 mm ammunition, officers traditionally select Type II body armor. Type IIIA body armor provides the highest level of protection available in concealable body armor and provides protection from high velocity 9 mm and 44 Magnum ammunition.

As noted above, while 100 % protection in all circumstances is impossible, the routine use of appropriate body armor significantly reduces the likelihood of fatal injury. Body armor selection is to some extent a tradeoff between ballistic protection and wearability. The weight and bulk of body armor are inversely proportional to the level of ballistic protection it provides; therefore, comfort decreases as the protection level increases. All departments should strive to select body armor that their officers will wear, consistent with their ballistic protection requirements. Agencies should ensure that each officer knows and understands the protection that it affords, as well as its limitations. Body armor that is not worn provides *no* protection.

APPENDIX D

ACCEPTABLE BULLETS FOR HANDLOADING

All jacket materials shall be of copper or copper alloy (approximately 90 % copper and 10 % zinc). No steel, brass, or other jacket material is permitted.

Totally Enclosed Metal Case (TEMC), Total Metal Jacket (TMJ), Total Metal Case (TMC), and any other nomenclature for electro-deposited copper or cupro-nickel jackets are acceptable for use in testing when FMJ is specified.

THREAT LEVEL	CALIBER	BULLET WT. (g/gr.)	BULLET DESCRIPTION	BULLET DIA. (nominal)
I	22 LR*	2.6/40	LRN	5.6 mm (.222 in)
	380 ACP	6.2/95	FMJ RN	9 mm (.355 in)
IIA	9 mm	8.0/124	FMJ RN	9 mm (.355 in)
	40 S&W	11.7/180	FMJ	10 mm (.400 in)
II	9 mm	8.0/124	FMJ RN	9 mm (.355 in)
	357 Mag	10.2/158	JSP	9.1 mm (.357 in)
IIIA	9 mm	8.0/124	FMJ RN	9 mm (.355 in)
	44 Mag	15.6/240	JHP	10.9 mm (.429 in)
III	7.62 mm NATO	9.6/147	FMJ- SPIRE PT BT**	7.62 mm (.308 in)
IV	30.06 M2 AP	10.8/166	FMJ – SPIRE PT AP****	7.62 mm (.308 in)

* Commercially loaded ammunition may be used—handloading of this round is not required. See section 5.4.1.

** Verify that jacket and/or core is nonferrous (use of a magnet is acceptable).

*** Obtained from U.S. Military M2 AP ammunition.

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno
Attorney General

Daniel Marcus
Acting Associate Attorney General

Mary Lou Leary
Acting Assistant Attorney General

Julie E. Samuels
Acting Director, National Institute of Justice

Office of Justice Programs
World Wide Web Site:
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov>

National Institute of Justice
World Wide Web Site:
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij>

Appendix G

This appendix can be accessed through the following Internet link:

http://www.ewashtenaw.org/government/departments/emergency_management/em_bioterrorism.html

Appendix H

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

"Justice Without Fear: Are We Safe in our Court Houses?" by Don Hardenbergh STATE COURT JOURNAL Winter 1993. Article on basic elements of a Court Security system.

Court Security: A Teaching Guide by Hon. Fred A. Geiger, 2nd Appellate District, Illinois. Comprehensive information on Court Security. Available through the National Center for State Courts.

Court Security for Judges, Bailiffs & Other Court Personnel by Judge Richard W. Carter, Notebook that covers many specific topics related to court security. Available from Judge Carter, P.O. Box 614, Arlington TX 76004

Court Security, A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, National Sheriffs' Association, Washington DC (April 1978)

Court Security: Training Guidelines and Curricula, William H. Petersen and Barbara E. Smith Ph.D for National Sheriffs' Association (May 1991)

Managing Notorious Cases, Timothy R. Murphy, Geneva Kay Loveland, and G. Thomas Munsterman for the National Center for State Courts (1992)

Personal Security Handbook - How You and Your Family Can Minimize Risks to Personal Safety, U.S. Marshals Service, Washington DC (1988)

The Courthouse, A Planning and Design Guide for Court Facilities, by Don Hardenbergh, R Tobin, Sr, and Chang-Ming Yeh, National Center for State Courts (1992)

Court Security Guide, National Association for Court Management, Williamsburg, VA (1995)

Court Security and the Transport of Prisoners: A National Study, National Sheriffs' Association, Washington DC (October 1995)

Appendix I

INFORMATION SOURCES

ORGANIZATIONS

National Sheriffs' Association, 1450 Duke St. Alexandria VA 22314 (703) 836-7827

U. S. Marshals Service, Associate Director of Operations, 1 Tysons Corner Center, McLean VA 22102, (703) 285-1004.

National Center for State Courts, Court Services Division, 1331 Seventeenth Street, Suite 402, Denver, CO 80202-1554, (800) 466-3063

National Association for Court Management, 300 Newport Avenue, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8798, (804) 259-8798

PRODUCTS

Security Industry Association, representing manufacturers and distributors of a variety of security products and providing vendor contacts. (703) 683-2075

Security Industry Buyers Guide is a collaboration between the American Society of Industrial Security and Phillips Business Information. The cost is approximately \$170.00. For additional information call (800) 775-5006

Appendix J

TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES:

Court Security Seminar, U.S. Marshals Service, Glynco GA, (912) 267-2345

Court Security Management, Institute for Court Management, P.O. Box 8798, Williamsburg VA 23187-8798, (804) 220-0449

Court Security, Pubic Agency Training Council, 6100 N. Keystone #245, Indianapolis IN 46220 (800) 365-0119

National Center for State, Local, And International Law Enforcement Training; Glynco, Georgia 31524, (800) 743-5382

Michigan Judicial Institute, 222 Washington Square North, P.O. Box 30205, Lansing, Michigan 48909, (517) 334-7805

Appendix K

OUTLINE FOR A SECURITY MANUAL

Michigan Court Administration Reference Guide

Court Security Chapter 14

Proposed Outline for Security Manual

- 1) General Information**
 - a) Key Personnel and Agencies
 - b) Security Staff Organization and Post Assignments
- 2) Regular Security Procedures**
 - a) Records and Evidence
 - b) Judges
 - c) Witnesses and Their Waiting Areas
 - d) Normal Jury Procedures
 - e) Sequestered Juries
 - f) Handling Custody Defendants
 - g) Special Courtroom Considerations (Arraignments and Sentencing, Domestic Court, Unruly Spectators, Searches of Litigants and Defendants on Bond, etc.)
- 3) Security Systems**
 - a) Key Control
 - b) Alarms
 - (1) Setting
 - (2) Access
 - (3) Maintenance
 - c) Telemonitor
 - d) Inventory Control
- 4) Special Operations Plans**
 - a) Search of Courtrooms and Related Spaces
 - b) Visitor Control
- 5) Hostage Situations**
- 6) High-Risk Trials**
- 7) Emergency Procedures (Fire, Bomb, Disaster)**
- 8) Post Event Review**

Appendix L

TELEPHONE REFERENCE CHECK

Name of Applicant: _____

Name of Company Contacted: _____ Phone #: _____

Contact Person (Name and Title): _____

Ask the following questions of the reference.

1. What was the title and general description of the position that the applicant occupied?
2. (Verify the dates of employment). The applicant indicates having worked for your company from: _____ to: _____, is this correct?
3. How would you characterize the professional/technical skills of the applicant?
4. How would you describe the applicant's attendance record?
5. Describe the applicant's interpersonal communication skills.
6. Would you rehire the individual?
7. In your opinion, is there any reason we should not consider this applicant for employment with the Michigan Supreme Court?
8. Are there other comments you would care to add?

_____ Date: _____

Name of Person Conducting Reference Check:

Appendix M

CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS REVIEW RELEASE FORM

I, the undersigned, authorize the Department of State Police, Central Records Division, to conduct a criminal history file check by name and identifiers to determine the existence of any arrest resulting in conviction and furnish a response to the State Court Administrative Office.

Signed: _____

Dated: _____

DOB: _____

SSN: _____

DLN: _____

Appendix N

LETTER FOR CRIMINAL FILE SEARCH

<date>

MI Department of State Police
Central Records Division
Freedom of Information Unit
7150 Harris Drive
Lansing, MI 48913

RE: CRIMINAL HISTORY FILE SEARCH

Please search your files for conviction information on employee listed below:

Name:

Date of Birth:

Race and Sex:

Social Security:

Driver's License:

Requested by:

Jane Doe
Personnel Administrative Assistant
State Court Administrative Office
P.O. Box 30048
309 N. Washington Square
Lansing, MI 48909

Appendix O

LEGAL BASIS FOR COURT SECURITY

The following is provided as background information only and should not be construed as an opinion as to the legality of any specific security policy, procedure or practice. Federal Appellate Court decisions and rulings from other state courts may not have any standing in the State of Michigan.

There are a number of issues that are involved in providing for secure courts. The following is an overview of several of the issues involved with providing court security.

1. SEARCHES

Courts are considered as guardians of constitutional rights. Subjecting persons to searches to enter a court facility, to some may cause concern; courts have tendencies to protect citizens from searches to prevent unreasonable intrusion, rather than subjecting them to searches. This specific issue has been contested and tested in the courts in a number of cases. Many deal with searches as a condition of entering a public (court) facility. Out of necessity, like airports, more and more courts have had to begin establishing security programs to protect themselves from attack. As protection procedures are implemented, occasionally they are legally tested. Now, cases referring to "administrative searches," use airports and courthouses searches as an example and standard to determine the reasonableness of the search in question. (e.g. Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 113 Mich App 311; 317 NW2d 619, and People v. Whisnat, 103 Mich App 772; 303 NW2d, 887).

There are a number of cases that address administrative searches as they relate to entering public buildings and courthouses. They offer a general outline to what is considered to be "reasonable" and "unreasonable" in conducting an administrative search. The American Law Reports have two separate articles on the subject of searches conducted as a condition of entering a public building (28 A.L.R.4th 1250, 53 A.L.R.Fed. 888); they offer a concise review of a number of cases on the topic.

Generally, the case law would suggest a number of things with regard to (administrative) searches and (court) security:

People v. Mangiapane, 219 Mich 62; 188 NW 401 (1922). It is proper for the prosecuting attorney, with the court's sanction, to station an officer outside the courtroom door to take the names of persons attending the trial, and search them to ascertain if they carry weapons.

People v. Webb, 96 Mich App 493, 292 NW2d 239 (1980). A non-law enforcement government employee with a duty to insure order in a courtroom may search a persons personal belongings upon reasonable suspicion that they contain a threat to discipline and security in the courtroom; the reasonableness of the search under these circumstances, is not governed by probable cause standard, but by the less restrictive reasonable suspicion standard.

Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (1972), 4th Amendment. A cursory search was made for the limited purpose of determining that no explosives or dangerous weapons were transported into the federal courthouse. The search did not include the examination of personal papers to learn their contents, nor any undue restraint against entry to a building, and therefore was not held to be "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. "...in times of emergency, government may take reasonable steps to assure that its property and personnel are protected against damage, injury, or destruction by resorting to the very minimal type of interference with personal freedom ... the regulations and acts challenged in this case, in light of ... the dangers confronting the Government, were both reasonable and fair."

Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F.Supp 266 (1971), 5th and 6th Amendment. Inspection of briefcases and packages of persons entering a federal courthouse does not violate a person's Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, nor does it constitute an unreasonable search. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel and "the attorney-client privilege" is not violated, nor does it infringe on effective representation by counsel, where the inspection of an attorney's parcels and packages is cursory in nature and the contents of the packages are not read.

It should be noted that in this case that there was a sign giving prior notice of the intended inspection. Also, public notice was given in local newspapers that inspections were going to begin. "...When the interest in protection of the government property and personnel from destruction is balanced against any invasion to the entrant's constitutional rights, the government's substantial interest in conducting a cursory inspection outweighs the personal inconvenience suffered by the individual." "... persons whose packages are inspected generally fall within a morally neutral class. Because everyone carrying the enumerated parcels is required to have them inspected, the inspection is not accusatory in nature, thus it cannot be said that a finger of suspicion is unfairly or arbitrarily being pointed at an individual as falling within a highly selective or inherently suspect group."

McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (1978), 4th and 14th Amendments. "Although an attorney's consent to a search is exacted as the price of entering the courthouse it is nevertheless consensual in the same way as in airport searches." Searches as a condition of entry into the courthouse did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, since these searches are "administrative searches." Criteria to qualify as an administrative search, the search must: (1) "be clearly necessary to secure a vital governmental interest," (e.g. protecting sensitive facilities from a real danger of violence); (2) "be limited and no more intrusive than necessary to protect against the danger to be avoided, but nevertheless to reasonably effective to discover the materials sought," and (3) "be conducted for a purpose other than the gathering of evidence for criminal prosecutions." In establishing the vital government interest and the need for protection, the Court took "judicial notice that threats of violent acts directed at courthouses have given rise to an urgent need for protective measures." The noted threats of acts committed against courts and other governmental agencies, both regionally and nationally, were sufficient to give a finding of a

vital state interest, and a need to establish a regulatory search. "A magnetometer is a relatively inoffensive method of conducting a search, and it is less intrusive than alternative methods." In this case, persons were searched only after twice activating the magnetometer and consenting to being searched. At any time, even after activating the magnetometer, a person was free leave the building if they did not want to be searched.

Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 113 Mich App 341; 317 NW2d 619 (1982). The right to privacy is not absolute. Whether a search is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances, including the reasonable expectation of privacy of the person being searched. The court considered "three factors which courts have relied upon in determining that warrantless searches in airports and courthouses are constitutional: (1) the public necessity, (2) the efficacy of the search, and (3) the degree and nature of the intrusion.

People v. Alba, 440 NYS2d 230 (1981), app dismd 450 NYS2d 787, 436 NE2d 193. Found defendant had given implied consent to be searched by freely acquiescing and choosing to permit inspection by entering and remaining in the courthouse which had conspicuously posted visible signs warning that all persons entering the building and courtrooms were subject to search. The intrusiveness of an entry search is reduced by implied consent. The limited regulatory search should be performed only (1) after notices of the need to permit search of personal items for inspection are given; (2) where there is not physical coercion, and (3) the person may choose to not submit to the search by not entering the premises.

Commonwealth v. Harris, (Mass 1981) 421 NE2d 447. Search legally discovered a controlled substance. Warning sign posted stating that all persons entering must pass through the metal detector and if the detector registered, the person would be subject to a limited search, that all packages must be offered for inspection, and all weapons and contraband discovered would be seized. The sign further stated that entrance into the courthouse would be deemed to constitute consent to the performance of the search. "...threats of violent acts directed at courthouses have given rise to an urgent need for protective measures... where a search of persons entering a public place is necessary to protect a sensitive facility from a real danger of violence, and administrative search without a warrant may be justified... an initial search by a metal detector was limited, and was no more intrusive than necessary... it was reasonable to inspect any packages for lethal nonmetallic contents as explosives or corrosive acid." [28 ALR 1250]

Other cases involving administrative searches following warning signs and a positive magnetometer or X-ray scan are: State V. Plante, 594 A2d 165, (NH, 1991); People v. Rincon, 581 NYS2d 293, app den 584 NYS2d 1021, 596 NE2d 491; Bozer v. Higgins, 157 Misc 2d 160, 596 NYS2d 634, US v Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (1980), US v. Paulido-Basquerizo, 800 F.2d 899 (1986), and US v. Campbell, 873 F.2d (1989).

Michigan Statute controls the possession of firearms within a court and specifically

states:

MSA 28.431(4) [MCL 750.234d] Possession of firearm on certain premises prohibited; applicability; violation as misdemeanor; penalty.

- Sec. 234d.
- (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person shall not possess a firearm on the premises of any of the following:
 - (c) A court...
 - (2) This section does not apply to any of the following:
 - (a) A person who owns, or is employed by or contracted by, an entity described in subsection (1) if the possession of that firearm is to provide security services for that entity.
 - (b) A peace officer.
 - (c) A person licensed by this state or another state to carry a concealed weapon.
 - (d) A person who possesses a firearm on the premises of an entity described in subsection (1) if that possession is with the permission of the owner or an agent of the owner of that entity.
 - (3) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than \$100.00, or both.

2. PRISONERS

In Section 14 on Court Security, the Michigan Court Administration Reference Guide cites a number of cases addressing transportation of prisoners and the custody and restraint of the accused.

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986). Trial judge determined that additional security officers were needed in the courtroom. Conspicuous, or at least noticeable deployment of security personnel in a courtroom is not the sort of inherently prejudicial practice which should be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial. Sufficient cause for this level of security may be found in the state's need to maintain custody over defendants who have been denied bail after an individualized determination that their presence at trial could not otherwise be insured. The presence of four armed troopers in a courtroom did not violate the due process rights of the defendant. People have become used to the idea of security in public places and that the jury could draw inferences from the troopers' presence, other than defendant was dangerous and culpable. The guards, could have been present "to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence."

3. AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

In COURT SECURITY for Judges, Bailiffs and other Court Personnel, by Judge Richard W. Carter legal issues surrounding controlling court security are discussed. The inherent powers of the Court, are given as one of the major ways that security measures may be obtained, if they are shown as essential to the efficient operation of the court. Cases cited by Judge Carter to show that courts have used their inherent powers to secure needed facilities, personnel, equipment, or services are: Castle v. State, 237 Ind 83, 143 N.E.2d 570 (1957); Woods v. State, 233 Ind 320, 119 N.E.2d 558 (1954); State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha County, 11 Wis.2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960); McCalmont v. The County of Allegheny, 29 Pa.St.Rep 417 (1857); Carlson v. State, 220 N.E.2d 532 (Ind. 1966); "Inherent Power of Court to Compel Appropriation or Expenditure of Funds for Judicial Purposes," 59 A.L.R. 569 (1974); Board of County Commissioners v. Devine, 72 Nev. 57, 294 p.2d 366 (1956).

In Court Security: A Training Guide, Judge Fred Geiger cites Martinez v. Winner, 548 F.Supp 278 (1982). "The courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court."

Michigan Statute states:
MSA 27A.581 [MCL 600.581] Sheriff and deputies; attendance at court sessions.

Sec. 581. The sheriff of the county, or his deputy, shall attend the circuit court, probate court, and district court sessions, when requested by these courts, and the sessions of other courts as required by law. The judge in his discretion:

- (a) shall fix, determine, and regulate the attendance at court sessions of the sheriff and his deputies;
- (b) may fine the sheriff and his deputies for failure to attend.

Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated lists the following annotations:

Under former section reasonable compensation for attendance of sheriff at court could be allowed by the county auditing board where no fees were fixed by statute. Chipman v. Wayne County Auditors, 127 Mich 490.

The district court control unit must pay the cost of such services provided by deputy sheriffs. Op Atty Gen, August 4, 1980, No. 5752.

The sheriff of a county is required to furnish deputy sheriffs to attend sessions of a district court when requested by the court. Op Atty Gen, August 4, 1980, No. 5752.

4. LIABILITY ISSUES

In Court Security: A Training Guide, Judge Fred Geiger cites Martinez v. Winner, 548 F.Supp 278 (1982). "Control of order and security in and around the courtroom is an essential 'judicial' function, and the trial judge is immune from liability for claims arising out of his/her exercise of such control." [p.17] "Judge is absolutely immune from liability for his/her judicial acts, even if his/her exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." "State judges are immune from suit under the civil rights act of 1871 for their 'judicial' acts." [p.18]

In the book, Court Security for Judges, Bailiffs and other personnel by Judge Richard Carter contains a chapter on liability issues and court security. The material offers a number of perspectives and theories of liability, and immunity.

In a Michigan Supreme Court case, Landry v. Detroit (one of several cases consolidated under Hadfield v. Oakland Co. Drain, 430 Mich 139 at 195; 422 NW2d 205), reviews a case seeking to recover for personal injuries suffered when attacked in a courthouse. The case discusses liability for breach of contract, a nuisance under common-law nuisance and the public-building exception to governmental immunity (MCL 691.1406). Ultimately, the case was allowed to be dismissed, in part, because it was not properly appealed.

5. WHO THE COURT CAN EXCLUDE

In Detroit Free Press v Recorders Court Judges, 409 Mich 364, (1980); quoting EW Scripps Co v Fulton, 100 Ohio App 157, 169; 125 NE2d 896: the Court states "In the interest of fairness, a court can exclude from the courtroom members of the public who are creating physical disturbances or causing potentially dangerous situations."